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Abstract 
Despite the diverse philosophical accounts of the relation of humor to virtue or vice, this 
ethical dimension has not been included explicitly in psychological humor research. Some 
authors have considered laughing at oneself a core component of humor and perhaps the 
particularly virtuous aspect of it, whereas others even denied its existence. Until now little 
empirical evidence exists. This thesis deals with humor as a virtue. Main aims are to identify 
aspects of humor that are seen as representing virtue (and vice) and to investigate which 
virtues are most compatible with humor. Furthermore, laughing at oneself is studied. It 
approaches this topic in three strands. In Part I of the thesis, the items from 12 current humor 
questionnaires, among them one comprehensive measurement (Humorous Behavior Q-Sort 
Deck, HBQD; Craik et al. 1993), served as a collection of a broad variety of humor behavior 
manifestations and statements. In Study I of this part, 76 participants rated them for the 
degree from vice via neutral to virtue. About two thirds of the behavior manifestations and 
statements within the comprehensive measurement were rated as neutral. About one sixth 
was rated as representing vice, and also about one sixth was judged as representing virtue. 
Study II addressed the nature of virtue that were represented in Study I. Therefore, 17 
experts rated the degree of each of the six virtues identified as ubiquitous by Dahlsgaard, 
Peterson, and Seligman (2005) within the virtuous item contents of Study I. All virtues were 
represented, but wisdom and humanity were the virtues represented most highly. In Part II, 
lay people were asked directly to rate how often they exert virtue humorously. They were 
also asked to report situations in which virtue was achieved humorously. Again, wisdom and 
humanity were shown to be the two virtues judged to be most compatible with humor. But 
for all virtues situations were reported, and there was no difference in the number of 
situations between the virtues. Part III focused on the phenomenon of laughing at oneself. It 
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was assessed using a self- and peer-report measure on laughing at oneself (a subscale of the 
Sense of Humor Scale, McGhee, 1996) and an experimental approach. In the latter, the 
participants were confronted with distorted portraits of themselves. Their facial responses 
were videotaped and analyzed using the Facial Action Coding System (FACS, Ekman, 
Friesen, & Hager, 2002). Laughing at oneself could be shown to exist, i.e., genuine 
enjoyment displays were found. Furthermore, a convergence between the methods was 
shown. It seemed that laughing at oneself in questionnaire measures predicted most strongly 
laughter at one’s own distorted portraits. Even if no final conclusion could be drawn as to 
which virtue laughing at oneself represents, it seemed to match more the descriptions of the 
protagonists of laughing at oneself as virtue. In conclusion, this thesis provided a first basis 
of finer-graded evidence on humor as a virtue from a psychological perspective. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Philosophen verschiedener Epochen haben sich mit der Beziehung zwischen Humor und 
Tugend bzw. Laster beschäftigt, wogegen in der psychologischen Humorforschung diese 
ethische Dimension bisher nicht explizit berücksichtigt wurde. Ähnliches gilt für das 
Phänomen „Lachen über sich selbst“. Während manche Autoren es als Kernelement oder 
sogar als den entscheidenden Aspekt des tugendhaften Humors ansahen, bestritten andere 
Autoren überhaupt seine Existenz. Bislang gibt es kaum empirische Belege dafür. Diese 
Dissertation beschäftigt sich mit Humor als Tugend. Die Hauptziele sind, jene Aspekte des 
Humors zu identifizieren, die als tugendhaft bzw. lasterhaft gesehen werden, weiters zu 
untersuchen, welche Tugenden insbesondere mit Humor vereinbar sind, und schliesslich das 
Phänomen „Lachen über sich selbst“ zu untersuchen. Die Arbeit nähert sich dem Thema in 
drei Zugängen. In Teil I dienten Items von 12 gängigen Humorfragebögen als Sammlung 
einer breiten Auswahl von Humorverhaltensweisen und Aussagen zu Humor, darunter ein 
als umfassend geltender Humorfragebogen (Humorous Behavior Q-Sort Deck, HBQD, 
Craik et al., 1996). Die Items wurden in Studie I dieses Teils von 76 Teilnehmenden auf den 
Gehalt von Tugend und Laster beurteilt. Ein wichtiges Ergebnis war, dass ungefähr zwei 
Drittel der Items des umfassenden Humorfragebogens als neutral, ein Sechstel davon als 
lasterhaft und ein weiteres Sechstel als tugendhaft bewertet wurden. Studie II untersuchte 
die Art der Tugenden, die in Studie I repräsentiert waren. Hierfür beurteilten 17 Experten 
den Grad jener sechs Tugenden, die von Dahlsgaard, Peterson und Seligman (2005) als in 
den meisten Kulturkreisen gültig identifiziert wurden. Alle Tugenden waren vertreten, 
jedoch Weisheit und Humanität am stärksten. In Teil II wurden Laien nach ihrer 
Einschätzung gefragt, wie oft sie Tugenden auf humorvolle Art und Weise verwirklicht 
haben, und gebeten, entsprechende Situationen zu schildern. Wiederum erwiesen sich 
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Weisheit und Humanität als jene Tugenden, die als mit Humor am besten kompatibel 
bewertet wurden, jedoch wurden für alle sechs Tugenden annähernd gleich viele Situationen 
berichtet. In Teil III wurde das Augenmerk auf das Phänomen „Lachen über sich selbst“ 
gelegt. Dieses wurde über eine Selbst- und Fremdbeschreibungsskala für Über-sich-selber-
Lachen (eine Unterskala der Sense of Humor Scale, McGhee, 1996) und einen 
experimentellen Zugang erfasst. In letzterem wurden die Teilnehmenden mit verzerrten 
Portraits von sich selbst konfrontiert. Ihre mimischen Reaktionen wurden auf Video 
aufgezeichnet und mittels des Facial Action Coding Systems (FACS, Ekman, Friesen & 
Hager, 2002) analysiert. Es konnte gezeigt werden, dass ein Über-sich-selber-Lachen 
existiert, d.h., dass manche Personen mit echtem Erheiterungsausdruck reagierten. Weiters 
konnte eine Übereinstimmung über die Methoden hinweg gefunden werden. Die von den 
Probanden selbst beschriebene Tendenz, über sich selber zu lachen, schien am stärksten die 
tatsächliche Lachreaktion auf die eigenen Bilder vorherzusagen. Auch wenn noch keine 
endgültige Schlussfolgerung gezogen werden kann, welche Tugend nun das Über-sich-
selber-Lachen repräsentiert, so scheint es doch den Beschreibungen aus der Literatur von 
Über-sich-selber-Lachen als Tugend zu entsprechen. Insgesamt konnte diese Dissertation 
eine erste Basis für einen feinkörnigeren Beleg von Humor als Tugend aus einer 
psychologischen Perspektive bringen. 
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General Introduction 
Humor is a phenomenon that we regularly encounter in everyday life. 
Everybody seems to have an understanding of humor and a sense of humor and 
considers it an important characteristic of oneself and of others. Also, people want 
others to be able to “laugh at themselves” and not to take everything so seriously. Yet, it 
is not entirely clear what humor actually is. When people are asked what they 
understand “humor” to be, they often say it is a cheerful attitude or serenity that helps us 
face adversity. This is a notion of humor that was already brought forward by the 
humanists, five centuries ago. They separated this view of humor from mean-spirited 
laughter, and put forward the thought of (benevolent) humor as a virtue. 
Virtue and vice, in contrast to humor, are not mentioned so much in everyday 
language and seem outdated. But specific virtues such as humanity, justice, or courage 
are commonly used. Virtues can be seen as resources for people wanting to lead a good 
life. Humor—in its benevolent form—can be seen as a resource as well, either in its 
own right or in service of other virtues. Parents settling a dispute between their children 
in a humorous way have reached a goal of justice in a way that makes all involved 
parties feel better. Yet, until now psychological research on humor has not approached 
humor from the perspective of virtue.  
To this day, no consensus on an encompassing definition of humor has been 
found. Some theories focus on explanations of the essence of humor and why something 
is funny, others speculate about different functions of humor (Keith-Spiegel, 1972). 
Humor is not in the purview of a single field of research, so several disciplines approach 
it with their theories and methods: humor is studied from philosophical, sociological, 
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linguistic, literary, computational, and psychological perspectives, and even more. The 
conceptualizations of the moral evaluation of humor are equally varied. 
This thesis addresses humor as a virtue. This includes the question which aspects 
of humor are considered to represent virtue or serve virtue, as well as which of the 
virtues these might be, and in general how virtuousness can be achieved in a humorous 
way. Furthermore, laughing at oneself, often considered the core component of humor, 
will be examined. While this thesis addresses humor from a psychological perspective, 
theories from other disciplines like philosophy or theology have to be taken into account 
as well, as they have contributed to the shaping of the notion of virtue. 
The thesis comprises a general introduction, three parts describing the studies 
that were conducted, and an overall discussion. In the general introduction, I will first 
present historical developments of the term humor, as this development is connected to 
considerations of humor as a virtue throughout history as well. I will also describe how 
current psychological humor research deals with humor. I will then present theoretical 
considerations on virtue in general, and will introduce literature on the moral evaluation 
of humor and laughter, as well as on laughing at oneself. Finally, I will narrow down the 
aims and research questions of the thesis, and provide an overview of the three 
empirical sections. 
Humor and The Sense of Humor 
Historical Development of the Term “Humor” 
When approaching the topic of humor as a virtue, it is helpful to understand how 
the term “humor” and its changing connotations developed historically. The term 
“humor”, and also the term “wit”, have not always been in the field of the comic. 
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Humor (lat. umor = fluid) constituted the body fluids in medieval pathology referring to 
blood, phlegm, yellow bile, and black bile (Schmidt-Hidding, 1963; Ruch, 2004, 2007). 
Unbalanced body fluids produced a certain temperament, depending on which fluid was 
predominant. Predominance of a certain humor then was considered to influence 
“unstable behavior”, that is, mood, and was referred to as “good humour” or “bad 
humour” (Schmidt-Hidding, 1963, p. 94). It entered “the comic” and was potentially 
associated with laughter only in the 16th and 17th centuries, when persons showing 
eccentric behavior that was thought to be caused by predominant humors were laughed 
at and called “humorists”, whereas “men of humor” imitated this behavior in a funny 
way. A talent of humor then was the ability to make others laugh (Ruch, 2004; Schmidt-
Hidding, 1963; Wickberg, 1998).  
By the end of the 17th century, moralists argued that people should not be 
laughed at because of their oddities, as they are not responsible for them. Those 
peculiarities should rather be smiled at in an understanding attitude towards the 
incongruities of the world. “Good” and “bad” humor as well as “true” and “false” wit 
were distinguished, and “good humour”—later “humour” alone—became the term for 
the tolerant and benevolent forms of humor (Ruch, 2004, p. 586; Schmidt-Hidding, 
1963). It was also only in the 18th century, that “laughing at” and “laughing with” were 
distinguished (Wickberg, 1998). It was at that time also that the conceptualization of 
humor shifted to virtue (Ruch, 2004). One key person for this shift was Earl of 
Shaftesbury (1671–1713). According to him, it was not right to laugh only because 
something was different in a person. But it was approved to laugh at the fake or the 
phony. Thus, ridicule could serve as the test of truth. Shaftesbury’s “test of ridicule” (cf. 
Schmidt-Hidding, 1963; Wickberg, 1998) was a way of distinguishing between the true 
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and the false, and it was a process by means of which, in a discourse, things were 
defined as ridiculous, rather than a passive response to the ridiculous (Wickberg, 1998). 
Good humour then was the term for a sovereign attitude to expose oneself to mockery 
and criticism of others (Ruch, 2004). In the 19th century, finally, humor even became a 
British cardinal virtue alongside tolerance, compromise, and common sense (Schmidt-
Hidding, 1963).  
Wit, in contrast to humor, related rather to a cognitive ability (with the German 
word Witz, like the words wissen = know and weise = wise, stemming from the Indo-
Germanic root *ueid-, Schmidt-Hidding, 1963) and could also be hurtful. Both wit and 
humor entered the field of “the comic” which, in historical nomenclature, has its origin 
in the fields of aesthetics (Ruch, 2004, 2007). This nomenclature is mainly established 
in Europe. There, the comic was one element among other aesthetic qualities like 
beauty, tragedy, or harmony (Schmidt-Hidding, 1963). Humor, in turn, was only one 
component of the comic and was differentiated from wit, mockery, fun, or sarcasm. 
Humor, according to Schmidt-Hidding (1963), was sympathetic and based on the heart, 
whereas wit was based on the mind. 
Based on this distinction, Schmidt-Hidding (1963) consulted literature from 
antiquity and analyzed the modern vocabulary of humor. He derived eight different 
comic styles, which received much attention in German humor literature, namely humor 
(in its narrow sense of an understanding towards the incongruities of the world), wit, 
irony, satire, fun, nonsense, sarcasm, and cynicism. These comic styles differ with 
respect to several criteria like their aim, subject, attitude of the one using them, behavior 
towards the other, or linguistic characteristics. For instance, humor behavior is 
understanding, gracious, and benign, and includes oneself in judgments, whereas 
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sarcastic behavior is hostile. The attitude of someone using nonsense is playful, but 
liking, whereas satire is tensed, critical, superior and often negative. 
In a second nomenclature that is prevalent in North America, humor is used as 
an umbrella term for everything that is funny (Ruch, 2004). Aspects like humor 
creation, coping humor, or aggressive humor, are all subsumed by the term “humor.” 
This broad, multidimensional understanding of humor is prevalent in today’s humor 
research. 
Current Humor Research 
The conceptualization of humor is not consistent in contemporary humor 
research either. In everyday language as well, differing ideas of what humor is are 
present, as a survey by Ruch (2002) in different parts of the world found. Most 
generally, it has been considered to be a temperament. However, humor has also been 
considered by some to be a mood, a talent, a frame of mind, and/or a virtue. There are 
also numerous theories on what humor is or why something is funny. For instance, 
some theorists suggest that incongruity (cf. Suls, 1972) or superiority (cf. Gruner, 1997) 
is a necessary condition for humor. A distinction has to be made between “humor” and 
“the sense of humor” as well. In English, sense of humor as generally understood in 
humor research is an umbrella term for habitual individual differences in humor (Ruch, 
2007). Jokes or cartoons may be an expression of humor, in English sometimes referred 
to as “canned humor”.  
The multidimensionality of humor has also influenced the development of its 
scientific measurement, which began in the 20th century. About 70 psychological 
instruments, some historical, others in current use, have been developed. Especially 
over the last 30 years the number of instruments has increased (for a review, see Ruch, 
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2004, 2007). They measure humor as an ability, as an attitude, as humor appreciation, 
or, most often, as a temperamental trait, and partially accommodate its differing 
evaluative character. There is, however, no measurement directly addressing humor as a 
virtue. Considering that a common notion of humor in everyday language is often 
connected to a humanistic understanding of humor (e.g., a cheerful attitude that helps us 
to face the adversity of life) it seems necessary to approach this historical notion of 
humor—i.e., humor as a virtue—psychologically in order to capture it empirically and 
close this gap. In order to study humor as a virtue, it is important to also consider what 
has been said on virtue in general.  
Virtue 
Why study virtue? The idea of how to lead a good life has also been addressed in 
antiquity. Aristotle (as cited in Norman, 1998) claimed that the ultimate goal of human 
action is happiness. He referred to eudaimonia, which was not only a state of feeling 
happy, but also has some connotation of “well-being” and “flourishing” (Norman, 
1998). Virtue, (Greek: areté) translates as “excellences”, and Comte-Sponville (2001) in 
his classification of virtues therefore mentions “qualities that constitute the essence and 
excellence of humankind” (book cover) and generally sees virtue as acting morally, 
humanely, or benevolently. Yearley (1990) defined virtue as “a disposition to act, desire 
and feel that involves the exercise of judgment and leads to a recognizable human 
excellence or instance of human flourishing” (p. 13). For Peterson and Seligman (2004) 
virtues constitute core characteristics that are valued by religious thinkers and moral 
philosophers (see also Peterson, 2006).  
Several classifications of virtue have been considered here. Plato (360 BC/1969) 
included among the virtues justice, courage, wisdom, and temperance. In the Old 
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Testament, the Ten Commandments can be seen as a catalogue of virtue (Ex. 20:2-17, 
Revised Standard Version). The virtues faith, charity, and hope were proposed by 
Thomas Aquinas (as cited in Peterson & Seligman, 2004) as the theological virtues. 
There are the Prussian virtues (containing for example sense of order, obedience, and 
toughness) and values appreciated by religious groups and more. Comte-Sponville 
(2001) proposed a virtue catalogue with 18 virtues, among which are politeness, 
courage, justice, generosity, gratitude, love, and humor. Dahlsgaard, Peterson, and 
Seligman (2005) reviewed philosophical and theological literature in order to find 
virtues that are ubiquitous. The virtues they found were wisdom, courage, humanity, 
justice, temperance, and transcendence.  
Positive Psychology aims to counterbalance psychological research on human 
problems, which for decades has dominated the field, with research on positive traits. 
Practitioners should concentrate on amplifying strengths rather than, or at least in 
addition to, repairing weaknesses (cf. Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000; Seligman, 
2002; Peterson & Seligman, 2004).  
Thus, Peterson and Seligman developed the Values in Action (VIA) 
Classification of Strengths (2004) in which they proposed 24 character strengths that 
were subordinated the virtues. Examples for strengths are curiosity, perspective 
(subordinated to wisdom), kindness and love (assigned to humanity), or gratitude, hope, 
and humor (classified under transcendence). The character strengths can be assessed 
with the Values in Action Inventory of Strengths (VIA-IS, Peterson & Seligman, 2004). 
Character strengths have been found to contribute to life satisfaction. Humor is among 
those strengths contributing most strongly (e.g., Park, Peterson, & Seligman, 2004; 
Peterson, Ruch, Beermann, Park, & Seligman, 2007). Furthermore, beside bravery and 
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kindness, humor seemed to predict increased life satisfaction after recovery from 
physical illness (Peterson, Park, & Seligman, 2006). However, as I have illustrated 
before, humor is not a unidimensional construct. Therefore, it is necessary to identify 
those aspects of humor that are able to do so. 
Moral Evaluation of Humor and Laughter 
The moral evaluation of humor and laughter has not always been the same, but 
has changed over different periods in history. Some have stressed that humor represents 
vice, whereas others emphasized its virtuous side, and still others consider it to be 
morally neutral. In the following section I will illustrate the different views on the moral 
evaluation of humor. 
Humor as Vice 
Generally, followers of the superiority theory of humor consider humor to 
represent vice rather than virtue. Superiority theory states that humor only arises 
because of a feeling of superiority over somebody else (cf. Plato, 360 BC/1929, 
Aristotle, 335 BC/1932, Hobbes, 1588–1679, as cited in Morreall, 1987). Besides the 
loss of rational control when allowing an emotion like amusement in us, Plato (as cited 
in Morreall, 1987) considered amusement to be malice and disapproved of it. Aristotle 
(335 BC/1932) considered comedy “a representation of inferior people” and “the 
laughable […] a species of the base or ugly” (Section 1449a). However, Aristotle was 
not as strict as Plato, and found that “playful conversation” (335 BC/1934, 4.8) reflects 
good taste in social behavior, but only in moderation. Hobbes, again, stated that laughter 
expresses sudden glory when realizing that one is superior to somebody else (as cited in 
Morreall, 1987). Addison who was a journalist in the 18th century objected to laughing 
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and ridiculing others and to wit, if it was not “tempered with virtue and humanity” 
(Geier, 2006, p. 153). Also Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) saw malice in laughing 
at others, and Baudelaire (1821–1867) considered laughing the most satanic idea ever 
existing (Geier, 2006). Early Christianity mostly conceptualized humor and laughter 
negatively as failures in self-mastery (cf. Le Goff, 1997; Verberckmoes, 1997). 
Laughter was seen as the opposite of the virtue of humility (Le Goff, 1997).  
Humor as Virtue 
As discussed before, Earl of Shaftesbury’s “test of ridicule” and one’s attitude of 
exposing oneself to ridicule and criticism was probably the first notion of humor in a 
context of virtue. The humanists referred to the humane, benign, and benevolent use of 
humor, in which ‘laughing with’ instead of ‘laughing at’ should be pursued (Ruch, 
2004; Wickberg, 1998). 
Contemporary theorists referred to humor as a virtue as well. In Comte-
Sponville’s (2001) classification of virtues, he described humor as one of the last ones. 
He stated that it is impolite to aggrandize oneself and ridiculous to take oneself too 
seriously. The humorless, he argued, is lacking “humility, lucidity, and lightness; the 
humorless person is too full of himself, too self-deceived, too severe, or too aggressive 
and thus lacks generosity, gentleness, and mercy…” (p. 211). He even went so far as to 
say that “humorless virtue thinks too much of itself and is thereby deficient in virtue” 
(p. 211).  
This is also brought up by Berger (1998), who made a difference between people 
who don’t have a talent for humor and people who have it but don’t use it. Nobody can 
be accused for not being musical, and this can also be applied to humor. But to have a 
humorous talent and not to use it, Berger (1998) claimed, that is, to make the decision 
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not to use it, would be morally objectionable. For instance, he argued, there is the case 
of egomaniacs who refuse to find their own megalomania funny, or tyrants who oppress 
anybody who makes fun of the regime. Berger (1998) saw humor arise from 
“ontological incongruence” (p. 209). He pointed out that there was a comic 
contradiction in “the man as a conscious being, suspended in this ridiculous position 
between the microbes and the stars” (p. 209). Understanding this, for him, was a sign of 
transcendence. 
Peterson and Seligman (2004) also assigned humor as a character strength to the 
virtue transcendence. However, their allocation of character strengths to virtues was a 
purely theoretical one and not empirically founded. Humor, within the VIA-IS (Peterson 
& Seligman, 2004), manifests in the preference to laugh and tease, making other people 
smile, seeing the light side, and making (not necessarily telling) jokes (see also Peterson 
2006). 
The theologian Bühler (2007) considered humor to be a means of dealing wisely 
with everyday life. Webster (2003) viewed wisdom to be multidimensional and 
suggested five components of wisdom, one of which is humor. He considered 
recognition of irony, stress reduction, and prosocial bonding processes as those aspects 
of humor that are related to wisdom. Humor was added as a subscale to the Self 
Assessed Wisdom Scale (SAWS, Webster, 2003). 
Davies (2006) suggested that jokes might indicate virtue by mocking and 
reproving those who lack virtue. He doubted, however, that they are a good method of 
inciting moral indignation. But spontaneous “skillful and witty put-downs can be used 
to ridicule, control and even express moral criticisms of human weaknesses otherwise 
best left unadmonished” (Davies, 2002, p. 204). In all those cases, virtuous humor is 
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directly connected to virtue and is serving virtuousness. This is in contrast to, for 
instance, Christian humor, which in many cases is not really Christian but only uses 
stereotypes about Christianity as a theme (Hempelmann, 2003). 
Oring (2003) stated that it might be relevant in which context the jokes are told, 
because this might determine their function in communication. Jokes used as glosses in 
conversations can convey a critical message, advocate a course of action, support a 
friend or serve similar goals (Oring, 2003).  
Humor as Morally Neutral 
It is well possible that some aspects of humor can be seen as receiving no moral 
evaluation at all. For example, Ronald de Sousa (as cited in Morreall, 1987) stated that 
laughter is involuntary and that a something involuntary could not possibly be subject of 
moral evaluation. Kant’s explanation of why people laugh does not connote any 
representation of virtue or vice neither: “Laughter is an affection arising from the 
sudden transformation of a strained expectation into nothing” (Kant, 2007/1790, 
p. 161). 
Representing Virtue, or not at all Existing? —The Phenomenon of Laughing at 
Oneself 
Laughing at oneself, as a particular manifestation of self-deprecatory humor, has 
also been treated differently in the past. Several authors even denied the existence of 
laughing at oneself. Again, the arguments against it derived mostly from a superiority 
theory perspective of humor (Aristotle, 335 BC/1932; Hobbes, 1588–1679, as cited in 
Morreall). For example, Gruner (1997) stated that humor is always a game involving a 
winner and a loser. Following this argument, at least two persons need to be involved. 
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La Fave, Haddad, and Maesen (1996) also followed the superiority theory. They listed 
several arguments against the existence of laughing at oneself or self-deprecatory 
humor. Laughing at oneself would only be possible when laughing at a former self or a 
different part of oneself. They also claimed that an event at one’s own expense can’t be 
a happy event, and that humor and laughing are not necessarily the same—somebody 
who is laughing might not experience humor and somebody who experiences humor 
does not necessarily need to laugh.  
Buckley (2003) claimed different ways in which self-deprecatory humor might 
only reveal hidden superiority as well. One might be joking about a trivial weakness of 
oneself to show how little one cares (and thus show strength), or one might joke about a 
handicap, but convey the message that at least one can joke about it, in contrast to the 
listener who, assumedly, couldn’t. Thus, he maintained that a person telling self-
deprecatory jokes actually might even more show his or her superiority or even hostility 
towards the listener. 
On the contrary, many descriptions of humor as a virtue refer to a tendency not 
to take oneself too seriously or laughing at oneself (e.g., Comte-Sponville, 2001; 
Roberts, 1988; Wickberg, 1998). Furthermore, they suggest that laughing at oneself 
constitutes a core component of (the sense of) humor (e.g., Lersch, 1962; McGhee, 
1996). Allport (1954, p. 437) stated that humor is missing in a “syndrome of the 
prejudiced personality”, whereas it is present in the “syndrome of tolerance”. He argues 
that somebody who can laugh at himself will be less likely to feel superior to others, 
and, as reasoned by Wickberg (1998), would thus be morally superior.  
The tendency to laugh at oneself has also been seen as leading to humility 
(Comte-Sponville, 2001) in that one is not taking oneself too seriously and important. 
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For example, Comte-Sponville (2001) proposed a difference between irony and humor. 
Irony, he stated, laughs at others or, in case of “self-mockery, at itself as though it were 
another” (p. 214, italics added by author) and involves injury, whereas humor is self-
reflexive. He argued that lucidity begins with the self and “humor […] can make us 
laugh at anything provided we first laugh at ourselves” (p. 216), but without hatred. 
This is also what McGhee (1999) emphasized when he stated that laughing at oneself 
should not be put-down humor, but lead to acceptingly coexist with one’s problems and 
weaknesses.  
There seems to be an utter contradiction between these two positions. 
Superiority approaches per se seem not to be able to value humor as a virtue since the 
joke teller is considered always superior to the listener, by proving his wit in telling the 
joke or by the content of a joke that contains a contest between one superior and one 
inferior (Gruner, 1997). By inferring that pretending to be able to laugh at oneself might 
only be an even nastier means to actually accuse others or laugh at others’ inferiority 
(because they assumedly can’t laugh at themselves), it represents vice rather than virtue. 
The authors who see humor and laughing at oneself as representing virtue claim exactly 
the opposite: That laughing at oneself as the core component of humor leads to 
acknowledging that one is not too important, “not the center of the universe” (McGhee, 
1999, p. 198), and definitely not superior to others. 
Thus, it seems to be important to study whether and how the phenomenon of 
laughing at oneself exists and what it implies. In psychological research, not much 
attention has been paid to the phenomenon of laughing at oneself. Nevo (1985) 
operationalized laughing at oneself in a study involving Arabs and Jews by asking them 
to complete conversations in cartoon-like drawings in a humorous way. In phrasing a 
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remark within these conversations, participants could either choose the own or the other 
group to be the butt of the joke. In approximately 11% of the cases, self-aimed humor 
occurred which led Nevo to the conclusion that self-aimed humor exists. However, one 
might still argue that laughing at one’s own group is not the same as laughing at the 
own person, whom one could consider as the exception to the laughable stereotype 
about the group (cf. Davies, 1991, 2002). 
Ruch and Carrell (1998) used the only existing questionnaire measuring 
laughing at oneself (i.e., a subscale of the Sense of Humor Scale, McGhee, 1996) and 
investigated its relation to components of the temperamental basis of humor, that is, 
cheerfulness, seriousness, and bad mood (Ruch, Köhler, & van Thriel, 1996, 1997). 
They found that cheerful persons who don’t communicate too soberly but consider 
everyday ongoings intensely (i.e., two facets of seriousness, one related positively, the 
other negatively) are the ones being able to laugh at themselves mostly.  
However, no experimental approach has been attempted to capture the 
phenomenon of laughing at oneself. It appears to be crucial in a study investigating 
laughing at oneself to ensure that—should it exist—genuine enjoyment is involved. An 
occurrence of spontaneous exhilaration (Ruch, 1993) that does not arise from a planned 
joke one tells about oneself, but in response to stimuli that might provoke laughing at 
oneself. Emotion research has means to distinguish between genuine displays of 
enjoyment and fake, miserable or masking smiles (e.g., Ekman & Friesen, 1982; Ruch, 
1997; Ruch & Ekman, 2001). By means of the Facial Action Coding System (FACS; 
Ekman, Friesen, & Hager, 2002) it is possible to identify what has been found to be the 
marker of genuine enjoyment, namely the Duchenne display. The Duchenne display 
refers to the joint contraction of the Zygomatic Major muscle and the Orbicularis Oculi, 
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Pars Orbitalis muscle without involvement of other facial actions (with exception of the 
Orbicularis Oculi, Pars Palpebralis, and facial actions involving opening the mouth), in 
particular indicators of negative emotions. Further markers of genuine facial 
expressions involve symmetry, duration, and smoothness of the action (Ekman & 
Rosenberg, 2005). 
Summary of Aims of the Thesis 
Although there is much literature on humor as vice or virtue stemming from 
several disciplines, literature is often missing detailed examples of the type of humorous 
behavior when exerting virtues could look like, but rather stays at a somewhat abstract 
level. Commonly, humor in psychological research often treats humor as an ability (e.g., 
humor creation), attitude, or as a temperamental trait. Humor as a virtue, especially in a 
differentiating manner taking into account its multidimensionality, was largely 
neglected in psychological research. As humor has been shown to contribute to life 
satisfaction, it seems to be crucial to study humor and its differing aspects more 
systematically, in particular with respect to virtue. This thesis is an attempt to approach 
humor as a virtue in three different strands. First, statements and behavior 
manifestations out of existing humor questionnaires are rated on their moral evaluation. 
Second, lay-people are asked about their everyday experience of humor in service of a 
virtue and virtuous humor. And third, the phenomenon of laughing at oneself is 
examined using a multi-method approach. 
Generally within this thesis, if not indicated otherwise, I am using the term 
“humor” in its broader meaning. Furthermore, the focus does not lie on the content of 
canned humor (i.e., jokes or cartoons). Rather humorous behaviors, actions, or attitudes 
(however possibly also telling jokes) are addressed.  
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Different philosophical theories as well as psychological research have shown 
that humor (in its broad meaning) is a multidimensional construct. The six virtues 
identified to be ubiquitous by Dahlsgaard, Peterson, and Seligman (2005) served as 
framework for this thesis. Questions addressed are, what aspects of humor and the sense 
of humor are actually seen as representing virtuous behavior? Which are rather seen as 
transporting vice? Among the virtuous aspects, which are the virtues considered most 
compatible with humor? Do people and if yes, how often do they actually exert a virtue 
in a humorous way? And which virtues are those? Furthermore, at a somewhat more 
specific level, what are ways for people to exert virtue humorously in everyday life? 
Are there certain comic styles (e.g., humor in a sense of an understanding of the world, 
fun, satire, sarcasm) that are used more often or less often to exert virtue?  
As a specific form of humor that is often mentioned when humor is referred to as 
a virtue, laughing at oneself should be investigated. If it exists and if it involves genuine 
enjoyment, it might as well be contributing to aspects of well-being. Thus, this aspect 
will also be examined. Does it exist? Which behavior does reflect laughing at oneself? 
Which personality and temperamental traits characterize people who can laugh at 
themselves? 
These questions are addressed in several studies. Within this thesis, the studies 
are organized into three parts. Each of the parts is briefly described below. 
Part I: How Virtuous is Humor? What We Can Learn From Current Instruments 
The first part of this dissertation aimed at the investigation of humor as vice or 
virtue. In order to do this, descriptions of humor behaviors were needed. Current humor 
questionnaires cover a broad variety of components of humor and allow for 
investigating their implicit representation of virtue or vice.  
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
17 
Thus, for Study I of this part, items out of 12 current humor questionnaires 
served as humorous behavior manifestations and attitudes and were composed to the 
Humor Rating List. The Humor Rating List included one questionnaire that is intended 
to describe a person’s style of humor comprehensively (Craik, Lampert, & Nelson, 
1996). Furthermore, several uni- and multidimensional humor instruments were chosen 
that comprise a variety of humor manifestations as broad as possible. Two scales were 
selected that measure humor in the context of virtue (i.e., the subscales humor of the 
VIA-IS (Peterson & Seligman, 2004) and of the SAWS (Webster, 2003). Seventy-six 
participants rated the content of the items on a bipolar rating scale ranging from high 
degree of vice via neutral to high degree of virtue.  
Study II was undertaken to study the nature of virtue covered by the humor 
behavior manifestations and attitudes. The Humor Rating List II consisted of those 73 
items that were rated as representing virtue in Study I. Seventeen experts rated them for 
the degree of each of the six virtues courage, wisdom, humanity, justice, temperance, 
and transcendence.  
Part II: How Virtuous is Humor? Evidence From Everyday Behavior 
Part II of the thesis focused on examining humor as a virtue. In contrast to Part I, 
here lay people were asked directly about their experiences in exerting virtuousness by 
using humor. The Humor in Virtue (Humor in Tugenden, HiT) Questionnaire was 
developed for the study. It contained ratings on importance of and commitment to the 
virtues courage, wisdom, humanity, justice, temperance, and transcendence. 
Furthermore, they rated how often in general these virtues are achieved humorously and 
how often they do so themselves. In addition, the HiT asked to provide situations for all 
six virtues in which they or somebody they know or somebody they witnessed used 
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humor to achieve a virtue. It was considered that comic styles, as proposed by Schmidt-
Hidding (1963), would because of their different aims, behaviors, and attitudes of the 
user, might be usable for virtues in a differing degree. Thus, the participants were also 
asked to report which of eight comic styles (i.e., fun, humor [in the sense of appreciation 
of the world’s inconsistency and arousing sympathy], nonsense, wit, irony, satire, 
cynicism, and sarcasm) were used in the situations. 
Part III: Can People Really Laugh at Themselves? Experimental and Correlational 
Evidence 
The objective of Part III was to study the phenomenon of laughing at oneself for 
the first time experimentally. The focus within this study was one’s own appearance. 
The aims were to examine whether laughing at oneself exists, and what the displayed 
behavior would be like. Different methods were used as an approach in order to see 
whether they converged. It was also of interest which personality or temperamental 
traits underlie the tendency to laugh at oneself and how mood states would be related to 
showing the behavior. The participants and peers answered a questionnaire measuring 
“laughing at oneself” within a subscale (i.e., Sense of Humor Scale, McGhee, 1996). 
The participants also filled in a personality questionnaire (the short form of the Eysenck 
Personality Questionnaire Revised, EPQ-RK, Eysenck, Eysenck, & Barrett, 1985) and a 
questionnaire measuring the temperamental basis of the sense of humor as state and as 
trait (i.e., both the trait and state forms of the State Trait Cheerfulness Inventory, STCI, 
Ruch, Köhler, & van Thriel, 1996, 1997). 
Furthermore, in an experimental part, distorted portraits of the participants were 
shown to them. These were intended to provoke behavior that was possibly laughing at 
oneself. Additionally, distorted portraits of strangers were used as a comparison. 
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Participants rated funniness and aversiveness of the stimuli. Their faces were videotaped 
secretly and their facial responses analyzed using the Facial Action Coding System 
(FACS, Ekman, Friesen, & Hager, 2002). Furthermore, an Agreement Form was filled 
in by the participants after having been debriefed about the aims of the study and the 
camera which determined the degree of readiness of the participants to have their video 
and photo material shown to others. The Agreement Form ranged from deleting the 
material at once to the point of showing the material in documentations in television. 
Beside this obvious purpose, this Agreement Form was also used as an unobtrusive 
indicator of laughing at oneself. 
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Abstract 
Despite the diverse philosophical accounts of the relation of humor to virtue or 
vice, this ethical dimension has not been included explicitly in psychological 
humor instruments. Yet, behavior described in humor questionnaires covering a 
broad variety of components can be used to study an implicit relation of humor 
to vices and virtues. The main aim of the present paper was, (a) to find 
humorous behavior and attitudes representing virtues and vices within an item 
pool of 12 popular humor questionnaires; and (b) to investigate the nature of the 
virtues represented by their item contents. A comprehensive measure of humor 
covered the entire range from virtue to vice, with the majority of items 
evaluated as neutral. Humanity and wisdom were most strongly represented, but 
the items cover all six core virtues (Dahlsgaard, 2004) to varying degrees. 
Further research can now investigate the relationship of humor and individual 
virtues more closely. 
 
Keywords: humor; vice; virtue; questionnaires; instruments
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Introduction 
Humor as Virtue: Theoretical Approaches 
Throughout history, as well as in current research, the term “humor” has been treated 
in a multitude of divergent, sometimes even contradictory manners. The differences pertain to 
its meaning, to theories related to those meanings, and to more exact conceptualizations of 
those meanings (see Keith-Spiegel, 1972; Martin, 2007; Ruch, 2004, 2007). In particular the 
main issue of the present paper, namely the position of “humor” on the continuum from vice 
(in the sense of acting morally bad and maliciously) to virtue (acting morally, humanely, 
benevolently), has varied from antiquity until today.  
In the past, humor has been seen as morally negative, morally neutral, and morally 
positive. Aristotle (335 BC/1932) considered comedy “a representation of inferior people” 
and “the laughable […] a species of the base or ugly” (Section 1449a). In early Christianity, 
humor and laughter were also seen negatively. Expressions of humor were considered failures 
of self-mastery and were condemned, especially in the religious orders (Le Goff, 1997; 
Verberckmoes, 1997). Le Goff (1997), for example, described various monastic rules of the 
early Middle Ages in which laughter was considered the most horrible and most obscene way 
of breaking the monastic silence, a fundamental virtue. Laughter was therefore the opposite of 
the virtue of humility. Le Goff assumed that the condemnation of laughter resulted from its 
strong connection to the body. It is not clear if humor per se was condemned (as distinguished 
from laughter) or just its open bodily expression. Also the Counter-Reformation of the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries had a negative attitude towards humor. Verberckmoes 
(1997) cited Ignatius of Loyola, principal founder of the Society of Jesus, who demanded: 
“Do not laugh and do not say anything which arouses laughter” (p.79). 
In other historical descriptions of the phenomenon of humor, any positive or negative 
connotation of it was ignored. Kant’s explanation of why people laugh, for example, was 
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rather neutral and technical: “Laughter is an affection arising from the sudden transformation 
of a strained expectation into nothing” (Kant, 2007/1790, p.161). 
In contrast to this, for the humanists of the eighteenth century humor was a cardinal 
virtue. Shaftesbury (1671–1713) treated humor (or “good humour”) as the benevolent, 
tolerant form of laughter. For him it denoted the sovereign attitude of exposing oneself to the 
criticism and mockery of others—to a “test of ridicule” (see Schmidt-Hidding, 1963). Thomas 
Aquinas (see Verberckmoes, 1997) argued that moderate laughter in the sense of eutrapelia 
(the property of being funny in a civilized way) does not interfere with Christian charity, but 
rather offers an “honest recreation on the frivolous occasions which the human imperfections 
offer” (p. 82). Many contemporary philosophers and theologians have considered humor to be 
virtuous as well. In stark contrast to the attitude expressed in monastic rules (see Le Goff), 
Comte-Sponville (2001) and Roberts (1988) maintained that humor leads to humility by 
allowing oneself to feel less self-important and by taking oneself less seriously. Roberts 
(1988), for example, saw a virtuous aspect of the sense of humor in its facilitation of an 
interpretation of moral failures as mere incongruities. Additionally, according to Roberts, 
virtue is achieved through the amusement derived from one’s own follies, thus enabling one 
to distance oneself from one’s traits. Similarly, Bühler (2007) understood humor as handling 
everyday life wisely. Furthermore, while humor has been seen as a virtue in itself, it may also 
be possible that humor is in the service of other virtues such as wisdom (e.g., giving good 
advice in a humorous way), humanity (e.g., comforting sad people by making a humorous 
remark), or even more virtues at the same time. Frankl’s (1984) accounts of the conscious use 
of humor between him and his fellow inmates in the concentration camps to keep up morale 
suggest a connection to humanity (helping each other in this terrible situation), courage 
(outdaring the fatal conditions), or transcendence (hoping to survive). 
Current research in the field of Positive Psychology views character strengths and 
virtues as determinants of the good life and life satisfaction (e.g., Peterson & Seligman, 2004; 
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Seligman, 2002). Humor is one of 24 character strengths in the VIA-Classification (Peterson 
& Seligman, 2004) and is understood as part of the virtue transcendence. It is among those 
character strengths that contribute to life satisfaction most strongly (Peterson, Ruch, 
Beermann, Park, & Seligman, 2007).  
These differences in the appraisal of humor also seem to have shaped the existing 
differences in the understanding of the term “humor” (Ruch, 2004). One major terminological 
system considers humor a benevolent world-view, roughly the tendency to smile in the face of 
adversity (as opposed to other manifestations of the comic, such as wit, mockery or fun; 
Schmidt-Hidding, 1963). Another major terminological system (Ruch, 2004) treats humor as 
an umbrella term for anything that is funny, including not only neutral and positive, but also 
negative facets such as cynicism or sarcasm. In current everyday usage, it is also not entirely 
clear what is meant when people speak of ‘humor’. A survey by Ruch (2002) in different 
parts of the world found that humor has been considered by some to be a mood, a talent, a 
frame of mind, and/or a virtue. Most generally, though, it has been considered to be a 
temperament.  
Particularly in philosophical literature, humor has been both vilified and praised. 
However, there are two problems: First, philosophical views are not specific as to humor itself 
being a virtue or humor rather leading to virtues—and as to what these other virtues may be. 
And second, the philosophical literature does not provide precise examples of everyday 
virtuous humorous behavior. Despite this diversity in which humor is discussed by 
philosophers, and possibly because of it, empirical humor research could benefit from 
addressing this ethical dimension of humor. This would make it possible to study those humor 
components that are indeed virtuous and as such can lead to positive effects, for example, on 
life satisfaction. 
To address these issues, in particular in view of the lacking examples, several 
approaches are possible to obtain facets and examples in which humor can itself be a virtue or 
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serve a virtue. One way would be to ask experts to provide representative examples of 
behavior. Another would be to ask lay people to report situations of virtuous humor that they 
encountered in daily life. A third would be to study the contents of current humor 
questionnaires with considerable bandwidth. Most humor instruments have not been 
constructed for the purpose of assessing humor as, or in the service of, a virtue or vice, but are 
intended to capture underlying theories about a number of different humor-related issues. 
However, items from these questionnaires can serve as an extensive collection of the most 
diverse humor-related behaviors. Some of them may be evaluated as positive or even highly 
desirable, some as neutral or negative. Thus, in order to identify prototypes of humorous 
behavior representing virtue or vice, a collection of questionnaires should prove to be a good 
starting point. 
Current Approaches to the Measurement of Humor in Conjunction with Virtue and Vice 
The multidimensionality of humor has also influenced the development of its 
measurement, which began in the twentieth century. Especially over the last 30 years a large 
number of measurements has been constructed. A survey done by Ruch (2007) yielded about 
70 historically and currently used psychological instruments. They measure humor as an 
ability, as an attitude, or, most often, as a temperamental trait, and partially accommodate its 
differing evaluative character. 
Two approaches examined humor in the context of virtue. Webster (2003) constructed 
the Self Assessed Wisdom Scale (SAWS) containing a subscale “humor.” Peterson and 
Seligman (2004) developed a classification of character strengths, which can be assessed with 
the Values in Action Inventory of Strengths (VIA-IS). Here, humor was considered a character 
strength leading to the virtue of transcendence.  
Subscales of personality tests portray behavior that potentially could represent vice. 
The Objective-Analytic Test Kit (Jokes and Tricks; Cattell & Schuerger, 1971) provides a 
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subtest that asks participants to rate the funniness of a series of pranks. A sample item is Put a 
frog on someone’s neck (Q.1). 
Very few approaches to the assessment of humor exist that can be considered 
comprehensive. Among them, the Humorous Behavior Q-Sort Deck (HBQD; Craik, Lampert, 
& Nelson, 1993) intends to “give a comprehensive portrait of a person’s style of humor” 
(Craik, Lampert, & Nelson, 1996, p. 276). This instrument consists of 100 non-redundant 
statements, each identifying a characteristic of humor-related everyday behavior. These 
statements can be evaluated as elements of ten styles that are organized along five factors. 
Each factor is characterized by two contrastive styles of humorous conduct, namely: socially 
warm vs. cold, reflective vs. boorish, competent vs. inept, earthy vs. repressed, and benign vs. 
mean-spirited. Due to its bandwidth, such a test might serve as the best instrument for 
studying whether humor also involves virtue or vice. While its authors did not directly refer to 
vice or virtue, they did conduct social desirability ratings for the items of the HBQD and 
found that in particular socially warm and competent humor styles were considered to be 
socially desirable. Among the noncomprehensive measures, some treat humor as neutral and 
some as a highly desirable trait.  
Studying the instruments briefly introduced above should allow for a first inspection 
of whether and how humor can be a virtue or serve one. For that purpose, this paper will 
address the following questions. First, do we find humorous behavioral manifestations and 
attitudes that are regarded as representing virtue or vice in current humor measures? In 
particular, what do analyses of a comprehensive measure of humor reveal about the relation 
of its comprehensiveness to the ethical dimension of virtue vs. vice? And second, which are 
the virtues represented in these items? These questions were addressed in the two studies. 
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Study I 
The aim of the present study is to address the question of how prevalent virtue or vice 
is in humorous behavioral manifestations by using existing instruments and to identify those 
behaviors representing virtue or vice. The items of twelve contemporary humor instruments 
were combined in the Humor Rating List shown in Table 1. 
The choice of questionnaires included in the Humor Rating List (Table 1) was guided 
by the following criteria: a) The HBQD (Craik et al., 1993) was chosen as a comprehensive 
measure of the sense of humor. b) Uni- and multidimensional instruments encompassing the 
broadest possible variety of humor’s manifestations, including aspects of humor that are 
identified as positive and/or negative, and the phenomenon of “laughing at oneself” were 
included. c) Two scales were chosen that assess humor in the context of virtue: the subscales 
humor of the VIA-IS (Peterson & Seligman, 2004) and of the SAWS (Webster, 2003). 
Method 
Participants 
The sample consisted of N = 76 psychology students (16 males and 60 females) of the 
University of Zurich, Switzerland, between 19 and 47 years of age (M = 25.39, SD = 7.50). 
Participants were given credit hours for participation.  
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Table 1.  
Questionnaires Included in the Humor Rating List. 
Instrumenta Traits measured No. of 
Items 
No. of answer levels; most 
strongly agreeing answer 
HBQD  10 styles of everyday humorous conduct which are organized along 5 contrastive factors: 
(1) socially warm vs. cold, (2) reflective vs. boorish, (3) competent vs. inept, (4) earthy 
vs. repressed, (5) benign vs. mean-spirited 
100 9; most characteristic 
JOKES  Assumed amusement when hypothetically performing a list of pranks during adolescence 18 2; yes 
HSQ  Four unipolar styles of humor: (1) affiliative, (2) self-enhancing, (3) aggressive, (4) self-
defeating 
32 7; totally agree 
SAWS  Humor as one component of wisdom 8 6; strongly agree 
SHRQ  The individual's capacity to respond to a variety of pleasant or unpleasant situations with 
amusement, smiling or laughter; self-perception of humor 
21  5; I would have laughed 
heartily 
CHS  The degree to which individuals make use of humor in coping with stressful events 7 4; strongly agree 
SHS  (l) Enjoyment of humor, (2) seriousness and negative mood, (3) playfulness and positive 
mood, (4) laughter, (5) verbal humor, (6) finding humor in everyday life, (7) laughing at 
yourself, (8) humor under stress 
40 4; strongly agree 
SHQZ  Two components of the sense of humor: (1) Humor appreciation, (2) humor creativity 14 7; very often 
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Table 1 (continued).  
Instrumenta Traits measured No. of 
Items 
No. of answer levels; most 
strongly agreeing answer 
HUMOR Frequency with which people use specific humor behaviors with their friends 13 5; constantly 
VIA-IS  Degree to which respondents agree to statements reflecting 24 strengths of character; 
only subscale (23) Humor (defined as liking to laugh and tease; bringing smiles to other 
people) included 
10 5; very much like me 
STCI-T<60> The temperamental basis of humor, i.e., cheerfulness, seriousness, and bad mood as 
habitual traits; only subscale “cheerfulness” included 
20 4; strongly agree 
SHQ-6  Two components of the sense of humor: (1) Meta-message sensitivity, (2) Liking of 
humorous situations 
6 4; Yes indeed 
Note. HBQD = Humorous Behavior Q-Sort Deck (Craik, Lampert, & Nelson, 1993); JOKES = Jokes & Tricks (Cattell & Schuerger, 1971); HSQ = 
Humor Styles Questionnaire (Martin, Puhlik-Doris, Larsen, Gray, & Weir, 2003); SAWS = Self-Assessed Wisdom Scale (Webster, 2003); SHRQ = 
Situational Humor Response Questionnaire (Martin & Lefcourt, 1984); CHS = Coping Humor Scale (Martin & Lefcourt, 1983); SHS = Sense of 
Humor Scale (McGhee, 1996); SHQZ = Sense of Humor Questionnaire (Ziv, 1981); HUMOR = Humor Use in Multiple Ongoing Relationships 
(Manke, 2007); VIA-IS = Values in Action Inventory of Strengths (Peterson & Seligman, 2004); STCI-T<60> = State-Trait-Cheerfulness-
Inventory, Standard Trait Version (Ruch, Köhler, & van Thriel, 1996); SHQ-6 = Sense of Humor Questionnaire in the revised version (Svebak, 
1996). a German adaptations or versions were used.  
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Material 
The Humor Rating List consists of 298 items, the contents of which were rated for 
their degree of vice or virtue on a 9-point bipolar Likert-scale ("Humor Vice Virtue Rating", 
HVVR). The scale ranged from a very high degree of vice (= -4) via neutral (= 0) to a very 
high degree of virtue (= 4). Each level of the scale was labeled to express the degree of vice or 
virtue1. The items were presented as if a fictitious person had answered them using the highest 
(most strongly agreeing) answer choice. The items originated from 12 different questionnaires 
(see Table 1) with differing answer formats. Thus, for each item the top scoring original 
answer alternative was provided in parentheses. For example, an item was presented in the 
following way: “[The person] uses good-natured jests to put others at ease. (Most 
characteristic).” If a rater found that this behavior represents a fair degree of virtue, this item 
had to be rated as “3”. Negatively keyed items remained in the original wording.  
Procedure 
The participants were asked to fill in the Humor Rating List online. In general, results 
from web-based studies using self-report data converge well in terms of the reliability and the 
validity with samples from paper-pencil studies (Gosling, Vazire, Srivastava, & John, 2004). 
The Humor Rating List was arranged in accordance with the guidelines described in Hattie 
(2006). The participants were informed about the aim of the study. They were instructed to 
answer the items not as if they applied to themselves, but to rate the humor behaviors and 
attitudes with respect to “vice” and “virtue” using the HVVR. Raters were provided with 
definitions of these two concepts. They were informed that humor could represent either 
                                                
1 1.  The German originals for the answer format in Study I were: -4 = sehr lasterhaft, -3 = ziemlich 
lasterhaft, -2 = lasterhaft, -1 = eher lasterhaft, 0 = weder Tugend noch Laster, 1 = eher tugendhaft, 
2 = tugendhaft, 3 = ziemlich tugendhaft, 4 = sehr tugendhaft. 
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virtue or neutrality or vice and were given very global examples for each of the categories. 
The items were presented in blocks of 10. For each instrument, which came in their own 
blocks, the participants were informed about all answer alternatives of the instrument’s 
original answer format. They were instructed to take breaks at their convenience. Every item 
had to be answered.  
Results 
The convergence of the 76 raters was calculated by computing a Cronbach’s α for the 
raters (as variables) across all 298 items (as cases). This resulted in an α = .99, yielding a 
confidence interval of +/- 0.31. The average intercorrelation of all pairs of raters was r = .50. 
There were no gender differences (the ratings differed in 15 items which is as much as would 
be expected by chance). For every item, a mean Humor Vice Virtue Rating (mean HVVR) 
across all 76 raters was calculated.  
Virtue and Vice in a Comprehensive Humor Instrument 
First, the mean HVVR was analyzed separately for the HBQD (Craik et al., 1993). The 
HVVR scale was graded into intervals (class width of .5). The frequency distribution of the 
100 statements across these intervals was examined. Figure 1 shows the frequency 
distribution for the HBQD. 
Figure 1 shows that the HBQD covered almost the entire span of the continuum from 
virtue to vice. The majority of the items, though, were perceived as neutral. In fact the mean 
was -.04 (SD = 1.35) and 68% of the responses were in the neutral area (between -1.5 and 
+1.5). Behavioral manifestations that were rated as positive, but not yet clearly as virtuous 
(i.e., were below 1.5), were, for example, Enjoys the routines of stand-up comedians (Q.64), 
or Finds humor in the everyday behavior of animals (Q.16). Negative item contents that were 
not regarded as representing vice (i.e., were above -1.5) were for example Recounts familiar, 
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stale jokes (Q.45), or Laughs without discriminating between more and less clever remarks 
(Q.84). 
 
Figure 1. Distribution of the averaged Humor Vice Virtue Rating (HVVR) of the HBQD 
items. 
One third of the item contents were rated as exemplifying virtue or vice (15% of the 
items were above 1.5 and 17% below -1.5). The item contents considered to be the most 
highly virtuous were either globally “having a good sense of humor” (i.e., Has a good sense 
of humor, Q.18), or traits that would help maintain or increase the positive feelings of others 
(e.g., Maintains group morale through humor, Q.91) or to be perceptive to humorous aspects 
of everyday life (e.g., Appreciates the humorous potential of persons and situations, Q.1). 
The item contents considered representing a high degree of vice were Jokes about others’ 
imperfections (Q.40) and Is scornful; laughs “at” others, rather than “with” them (Q.79).  
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What are the humorous behavioral manifestations representing vice and virtue? 
In order to examine item contents that incorporate vice or virtue, all 298 items of the 
Humor Rating List were included in the analyses. Scales or subscales may serve as vehicles of 
topics or aspects of humorous behaviors. Thus, frequency analyses were conducted for the 
complete Humor Rating List as well as on the subscale level. For the analyses, the scores of 
the negatively keyed items were reversed. In multidimensional instruments, the items were 
plotted separately for subscales measuring positively and negatively evaluated concepts of 
humor. Figure 2 shows the mean HVVR ratings for the items of every instrument.  
Figure 2 shows that psychologically positively evaluated concepts were generally 
closer to virtue, while psychologically negatively-keyed items were generally closer to vice. 
This can be seen as evidence for the validity of the method used in this study. However, on 
the positive as well as on the negative side, items also existed that were classified as neutral 
(i.e., the mean HVVR was between 1.5 and -1.5). In total, 183 items (63.32%) were regarded 
as neutral (108 items or 37.37% between 0 and 1.5, and 75 items or 25.95% between 0 and 
-1.5). Furthermore, 23 items (7.96%) were evaluated as representing a low degree of vice 
(between -1.5 and -2), and a further 13 items (4.50%) were rated as representing an at least 
moderate degree of vice (i.e., with a mean rating below -2). Conversely, 50 items (17.30%) 
were considered slightly virtuous (between 1.5 and 2) and further 20 items (6.92%) were 
regarded as virtuous (exceeding 2).  
It can be said that behavioral manifestations represented by the items of several scales, 
both multidimensional (HBQD, HSQ, SHS) and unidimensional (SHRQ, HUMOR), covered 
the whole range from vice to virtue. For instance, the SHS contains eight subscales, seven of 
which refer to several aspects of sense of humor and predominantly fell between neutral and 
virtuous. One subscale refers to lack of humor, namely seriousness and negative mood. This 
subscale was rated between neutral and vice on the HVVR. 
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Note. + = Subscales with positive valence, - = subscales with negative valence. HBQD = 
Humorous Behavior Q-Sort Deck; HSQ = Humor Styles Questionnaire; SHS = Sense of 
Humor Scale; JOKES = Jokes and Tricks; HUMOR = Humor Use in Multiple Ongoing 
Relationships; SHRQ = Situational Humor Response Questionnaire; CHS = Coping Humor 
Scale; SHQZ = Sense of Humor Questionnaire; SHQ = Sense of Humor Questionnaire; 
SAWS Humor = Self Assessed Wisdom Scale, Subscale Humor; STCI-T<60> CH = State-
Trait-Cheerfulness-Inventory, Trait Standard Version, Subscale Cheerfulness; VIA-IS Humor 
= Values in Action Inventory of Strengths, Subscale Humor. Negatively scored items were 
reversed. 
Figure 2. Averaged Humor Vice Virtue Rating (HVVR) for the items of all instruments, 
separated for subscales with positive and negative valence.  
Furthermore, scales with contents predominantly scoring closer to virtue were found. 
Some of them have mostly neutral to positive contents (CHS, SHQ), whereas the items of 
some (sub-)scales were primarily rated as representing virtues (SAWS Humor, STCI-T<60> 
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Cheerfulness, VIA-IS Humor). Expectedly, the Jokes and Tricks scale ranged between neutral 
and vice. 
In more detail, items representing virtue strongly (i.e., above 2 on the HVVR) belonged 
to the following sub-scales (percentages relate to the total number of items of the subscale, in 
descending order): SAWS-Humor (5/8 items; 62.50%), HBQD socially warm humor style 
(4/12 items; 33.33%), HSQ Affiliative Humor (2/8 items; 25.00%), 
STCI-T<60> Cheerfulness (4/20 items; 20.00%), VIA-IS Humor (2/10 items; 20.00%), SHS 
Enjoyment of Humor (1/5 items; 20.00%), HSQ Self-enhancing Humor (1/8 items; 12.50%), 
and HBQD Reflective humor style (1/16 items; 6.25%). Surprisingly, while all items of the 
SHS subscale Laughing at Oneself were on the positive side, no item was classified as 
virtuous. Vice was strongly (i.e., below -2 on the HVVR) represented in the (sub-)scales (in 
descending order of the percentage) HSQ Aggressive Humor (2/8 items; 25.00%), HBQD 
Earthy humor style (2/10 items; 20.00%), Jokes & Tricks (3/18 items; 16.67%), HBQD Cold 
humor style (2/12 items; 16.67%), HBQD Mean spirited humor style (2/12 items; 16.67%), 
and HUMOR (2/13 items; 15.39%).  
Virtue Ratings, Item Means, and Social Desirability 
It was examined how the mean HVVR related to item means (derived from other 
studies) of the questionnaires HBQD, HSQ, SHRQ, CHS, SHS, HUMOR, VIA-IS Humor, 
and STHI-T<60> Cheerfulness and to social desirability ratings for the HBQD items (derived 
from Craik et al., 1996). The HVVR was correlated with the item means (r = .82, df = 241, 
p < .001), that is, the more the described behavior or attitudes were regarded as virtuous, the 
more they were reported to have occurred in daily life. Furthermore, high positive values on 
the HVVR went along with high ratings for social desirability for items of the HBQD (r = .84, 
df = 98, p < .001).  
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Discussion 
The present study revealed that humor as assessed in a comprehensive instrument (the 
HBQD) was normally distributed with respect to the continuum of vice to virtue. The 
majority of the humorous behaviors were ethically neutral. About one sixth of the humorous 
item contents of the questionnaires portrayed vice in attitudes and behavior, and about the 
same number portrayed virtue. Given the comprehensiveness of humor behaviors within the 
HBQD, this can be seen as a first hint as to how virtue and vice are represented in humor in 
general. Within the HBQD, attitudes representing vice were exemplified by mean-spirited 
humor contents. Virtuous attitudes were often connected with being receptive and ready to 
appreciate absurdities of everyday life, or with “keeping up people’s morals”.  
Within the complete Humor Rating List, behavioral manifestations evaluated as 
containing vice can generally be described as either mean-spirited or aggressive (for instance, 
practical jokes or behavior which might hurt another person physically, e.g., putting a tack on 
a chair, or psychically, e.g., laughing at weaknesses of another person), or as earthy (e.g., 
bathroom humor). Quite unexpectedly, a socially cold humor style (e.g., inappropriate smiling 
or fixed smiling without sincerity) and an inept humor style (e.g., chuckling or laughing in an 
exaggerated way in order to hide one’s fears or uncertainty) was also regarded as representing 
vice. Item contents regarded as virtuous were often connected with spreading good cheer or 
with being amused by everyday incongruities and absurdities, or intellectual wordplay. Also, 
items expressing amusement relating to one’s own embarrassing episodes (e.g., items from 
the SAWS) were seen as incorporating virtue. However, no item of the subscale Laughing at 
oneself from the SHS was regarded as virtuous. 
Further analyses revealed that the more a type of humorous behavior was considered 
to be virtuous, the more it also occurred in actual behavior. That is, people seem to show a 
certain behavior more often when they assume that it is valued as virtuous. In addition, 
behavior rated as virtuous was also considered socially desirable. Thus, it seems that 
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virtuousness incorporates social desirability but goes beyond it. The concept of social 
desirability differs from the concept of virtuous behavior with respect to approval. Social 
desirability is a response tendency (meaning that people are actually biasing their self-reports 
when filling out the questionnaire to simulate desired behavior), whereas virtuous behavior is 
morally prized (implying that people don’t bias their answers, but indeed show the indicated 
behavior when they report it).  
The current study identified humor content areas that are indeed perceived as virtuous. 
In the next step, the nature of virtues connected with humor needs to be examined. In 
particular, experts on virtues should be involved in order to identify the particular kind of 
virtue. Here, only items with an HVVR rating of 1.5 or higher should be studied. This is the 
task for the second study reported here.  
Study II 
Aims 
The Nature of Virtue in Humor Questionnaires 
Based on lay people’s judgments, Study I yielded a list of humor behaviors containing 
virtuous aspects. Study II involves experts on virtues, i.e., philosophers and theologians, who 
were asked to identify the specific type of virtue to which these items are related. The 
following questions are addressed in Study II: (1) Do lay people and experts converge in the 
degree of their virtue ratings? And (2), what is the nature of the virtues represented by the 
items? That is to say, given a catalog of six virtues, to what degree do experts see each of 
these virtues represented by the items?  
By reviewing historical texts across several cultures and religions, Dahlsgaard (2004) 
identified six broad universal virtues that are associated with various character strengths that 
will form the basis of Study II. These virtues are wisdom (cognitive strengths referring to 
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gaining and using knowledge for good purposes; character strengths involved are creativity, 
curiosity, judgment, love of learning, and perspective), courage (involving emotional 
strengths concerning the will to achieve goals in the face of external or internal opposition; 
these strengths are authenticity, bravery, perseverance, and zest), humanity (interpersonal 
strengths involved in relating to another in a kind, empathetic, and benevolent way; i.e., 
kindness, love, and social intelligence), justice (civic strengths which form the basis of a 
healthy community life, such as fairness, leadership, and teamwork), temperance (strengths 
that master excess; including the character strengths forgiveness, humility, prudence, and self 
regulation), and transcendence (strengths that concern connections to the larger universe and 
provide meaning; the virtue is realized by exercising appreciation of the beauty, gratitude, 
hope, spirituality, and humor).  
Method 
Participants 
The expert sample consisted of 17 students (six males and 11 females) at the 
University of Zurich, Switzerland, at an advanced stage of or with completed degrees in 
philosophy (with the background in general or applied ethics), or in theology, or in science of 
religion. The age of the participants ranged from 20 to 64 years (M = 29.29, SD = 11.91).  
Instruments 
The Humor Rating List II was composed of 73 items from Study I that reached mean 
HVVR ratings of 1.5 or higher. The virtues used for the classification of the item contents 
were wisdom, courage, humanity, justice, temperance, and transcendence. Definitions of each 
of the six virtues and their related character strengths (according to Peterson & Seligman, 
2004) that underlie the present study were provided in the instructions. As an exception, 
humor, which for Peterson and Seligman is subsumed under the virtue of transcendence, was 
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left out of the list of related character strengths. In addition, a category “other virtue” was 
provided, which was to be filled out only when none of the listed virtues and their related 
character strengths sufficiently described the virtuous aspect of the item. Otherwise it was to 
be crossed out. On basis of the definitions, every item of the Humor Rating List II had to be 
judged regarding the degree of every virtue on a 10-point Likert scale. The following answer 
alternatives were provided: 0 = not represented, 1 = very slightly represented, 3 = slightly 
represented, 5 = moderately represented, 7 = strongly represented, and 9 = very strongly 
represented.2 The remaining levels 2, 4, 6, and 8 were declared as intermediate levels. The 
answer format allowed for items to be scored highly in virtuousness in more than one virtue 
as well as to be scored as not representing any virtue at all. 
Procedure 
The participants were informed about the aims of the study and that they were 
approached as experts on virtue. They were given the paper pencil questionnaires in classes or 
they received them via postal mail and filled them out by themselves. The experts were 
informed that lay people previously had rated the degree of virtue within the items. It was 
explicitly pointed out that it is possible that some of the behavior descriptions don’t represent 
any virtue. In this case they should choose “0” for every virtue. They were instructed to 
choose the answer “1” or higher only if a virtue is represented at least very slightly. As a 
reward for returning the questionnaires participants were given a voucher for coffee. 
                                                
2 2. The German originals for the answer format in Study II were: 0 = überhaupt nicht vorhanden, 
1 = sehr schwach vorhanden, 3 = schwach vorhanden, 5 = mittelstark vorhanden, 7 = stark vorhanden, 
9  = sehr stark vorhanden. 
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Results 
Convergence of the Raters 
A reliability analysis for the 17 raters across all 73 items of the Humor Rating List II 
was computed, i.e., with the raters as variables and the items as cases. This revealed a 
Cronbach’s α of .88 with a confidence interval of the ratings of +/-0.99.  
How do the Ratings of Study I and II Converge? 
A multiple regression analysis with the mean HVVR of Study I as the criterion and the 
six mean virtue ratings as predictors was calculated. The multiple correlation was R = .53 
(F[5, 72] = 4.20, p < .001). Thus, despite the reduced variance in Study II, the separate 
judgments of the experts on the six virtues predict the overall virtuousness as rated by the lay 
people sufficiently well. 
What is the Nature of Virtues Covered by Humor Instruments? 
Only one expert used the category “other virtue” in one case. He or she considered the 
item Q.24 from the SAWS (At this point in my life, I find it easy to laugh at my mistakes.) as 
incorporating the virtue “self-deprecation” (German: Selbstironie). Overall, this item was 
classified as representing wisdom (wisdom score 5.94). The category “other virtue” was thus 
not integrated for the group analyses.  
In order to determine differences in the type of virtues identified by the experts, a one-
way ANOVA for repeated measures with the type of virtue as repeated measurement factor 
for the degree of virtue as a dependent variable was performed. The analysis revealed a 
significant main effect for the type of virtue (F[5, 72] = 37.77, p < .001). Figure 3 shows the 
mean ratings for the six virtues. 
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Figure 3. Mean ratings for the six virtues. 
Post-hoc tests (Fisher PLSD) revealed that among the six mean virtue ratings, the 
highest were achieved for wisdom (M = 4.12, SD = 1.12; see Figure 3). Humanity (M = 3.71, 
SD = 1.65) and transcendence (M = 3.57, SD = 0.96) ratings (which were not significantly 
different from each other) followed, ahead of courage ratings (M = 3.06, SD = 0.86). Justice 
(M = 2.18, SD = 1.53) and temperance ratings (M = 2.08, SD = 1.21) were the lowest and did 
not differ from each other. 
Three cut-off points were defined in order to identify items classified as representing 
virtue “slightly” (3), “moderately” (5), and “strongly” (7). Table 2 shows the frequencies of 
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ratings of the 73 items below 3, between 3 and 5, between 5 and 7, and above 7 for each 
virtue. 
Table 2.  
Absolute and Relative Number of Items that were Perceived as Not at all, Slightly, 
Moderately, and Strongly Virtuous, for Each Virtue.  
Virtue not at all slightly moderately strongly 
 f % f % f % f % 
Wisdom 13 17.81 43 58.90 17 23.29 0 0.00 
Courage 33 45.21 40 54.79 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Humanity 32 43.84 20 27.40 19 26.03 2 2.74 
Justice 56 76.71 11 15.07 6 8.22 0 0.00 
Temperance 61 83.56 10 13.70 1 1.37 1 1.37 
Transcendence 19 26.03 47 64.38 7 9.59 0 0.00 
Note. NRater = 17. NItems = 73. 
Cut-off points for the degree of virtue: <3 = not at all, 3 = slightly, 5 = moderately, 7 = 
strongly. 
f = frequency. 
As can be seen in Table 2, according to the raters only two virtues were represented 
strongly (i.e., exceeding 7) by item contents: Two items were classified as belonging to 
humanity and one item to temperance. Furthermore, the virtues humanity and wisdom were 
most frequently represented by the items at least to a moderate degree (i.e., exceeding 5), 
namely by 21 and 17 items, respectively. Although wisdom had the highest mean rating, 
followed by humanity, and temperance had the lowest of all six mean virtue ratings, the 
highest single ratings were achieved for temperance. The virtue of courage was represented 
no higher than slightly by the item contents. To illustrate the nature of items classified for the 
different virtues, two sample items for each are shown in Table 3.
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Table 3.  
Sample Humor Items Representing the Six Core Virtues. 
Virtue Sample items Mean Virtue 
Rating 
Wisdom Uses humor to express the contradictory aspects of 
everyday events. (HBQD, Q.83) 
6.41 
 Finds intellectual word play enjoyable. (HBQD, Q.21) 6.29 
Courage Laughs heartily, from head to heel, not just with face and 
diaphragm. (HBQD, Q.42) 
4.94 
 I never allow a gloomy situation to take away my sense of 
humor. (VIA-IS, Q.142) 
4.94 
Humanity Even if something is really funny to me, I will not laugh 
or joke about it if someone will be offended. (HSQ, Q.31) 
7.35 
 I do not like it when other people use humor as a way of 
criticizing or putting someone down. (HSQ, Q.15) 
7.29 
Justice Achieves a detached perspective on self and others. 
(HBQD, Q.53) 
6.59 
 Is squeamish about “sick jokes” (e.g., regarding human 
deformity). (HBQD, Q.82) 
5.82 
Temperance People are never offended or hurt by my sense of humor. 
(HSQ, Q.7)  
5.59 
 If I am feeling depressed, I can usually cheer myself up 
with humor. (HSQ, Q.2)  
4.12 
Transcendence I have an optimistic outlook on life. (SHS, Q.11) 6.06 
 I try and find a humorous side when coping with a major 
life transition. (SAWS, Q.14) 
5.65 
Note. NRater = 17. HBQD = Humorous Behavior Q-Sort Deck; HSQ = Humor Styles 
Questionnaire; SHS = Sense of Humor Scale; SAWS = Self-Assessed Wisdom Scale; VIA-IS 
= Values in Action Inventory of Strengths; Q. = Question number.  
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Table 3 shows the two highest-scoring items as sample items for the virtues. However, 
some item contents seemed to be representative for more than one virtue, albeit sometimes to 
different degrees. If an item ranked highest for more than one virtue, it was only listed under 
the virtue for which it had the higher mean in order to avoid double entries. For the other 
virtue(s) the next-highest ranking item was given. For example, the humanity item HSQ Q.31 
was scoring highest not only for humanity, but also for temperance (temperance rating = 7.12) 
and third highest for justice (justice rating = 6.35); likewise, item HSQ Q.15 was also rated 
highest for justice (justice rating = 6.88). For the two highest-scoring items, these co-
occurrences only existed for humanity, justice, and temperance. However, the items given in 
Table 3 illustrate the different aspects that might have lead the experts to the classification for 
a certain virtue.  
It is instructive to analyze the items of the humor subscales of the SAWS and VIA-IS 
separately to examine whether they indeed represent wisdom and transcendence, respectively. 
For Study II, eight of the ten VIA-IS Humor items were included. Experts considered four of 
them moderately virtuous (with scores higher than 5) for the virtues humanity (three items) 
and transcendence (one item). However, all VIA-IS Humor items represented virtue at least 
slightly (above 3). The virtues identified most often to a slight degree only were wisdom 
(seven items) and transcendence (six items).  
Within the seven of the total of eight items of the SAWS that were included in Study 
II, six items were considered to be at least moderately virtuous by the experts. They 
incorporated the virtues wisdom (one item), wisdom and transcendence (three items), and 
humanity (two items). All seven items were regarded as at least slightly virtuous, and they 
incorporated all six virtues. Wisdom was identified most often (for all seven items), followed 
by transcendence and courage (both for five items). 
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Combinations of the Six Virtues Within the Used Item Contents 
Several items incorporated more than one virtue. For example, all three items that 
were rated high for temperance, when representing virtue at least moderately, also represented 
humanity. One item (1.37%) had four virtues that were represented at least moderately. This 
was an item from the subscale Aggressive Humor of the HSQ (Even if something is really 
funny to me, I will not laugh or joke about it if someone will be offended, HSQ, Q.31.) Three 
items (2.74%) represented three virtues at least moderately (i.e., above 5), seven items 
(9.59%) exceeded 5 for two virtues, 29 items (39.73%) incorporated one virtue above 5, and 
34 items (46.58%) did not reach 5 for any virtue. Every item, however, had at least one virtue 
represented at least slightly (i.e., exceeding 3). In fact, one item even incorporated all six 
virtues at least slightly. This was an item from the subscale Reflective vs. Boorish of the 
HBQD (Achieves a detached perspective on self and others, Q.53). 
Discussion 
Study II showed a high degree of convergence among the experts not only with 
respect to the virtues to which they assigned the statements but also to their degree of 
relevance. Also, there was a moderate degree of convergence between the experts’ judgments 
and the lay people’s judgments. This convergence could be found despite several differences 
in the rating situations and formats: The lay people’s judgment of a global degree of 
virtuousness (which was opposed to vice, that is, the degree of virtuousness in the lay 
people’s judgments only ranged from 0 to 4) was related to the expert’s ratings for six 
different virtues (assessed by an answer format ranging from 0 to 9), which reduced 
comparability. 
The main aim of Study II was to examine the nature of virtues in the humor item pool 
more closely. This yielded two main results. First, the two virtues incorporated most often 
were humanity and wisdom. And second, all six used virtues were represented to some extent, 
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i.e., at least slightly, in current humor instruments. When considering a moderate degree of 
virtue as a minimum requirement, all virtues except courage were incorporated.  
The affinity of humor to humanity and wisdom is compatible with philosophical 
descriptions of humor. For example contemporary researchers like Roberts (1988) and Bühler 
(2007) view humor as a means for dealing wisely with everyday life. Item contents 
representing wisdom were present in about half of the scales. Items classified as belonging to 
wisdom typically referred either to intellectual play on language or to a humorous 
consideration of everyday incidents or one’s own mistakes.  
The humanists of the seventieth century distinguished “good humour” from “bad 
humour”, “true wit” from “false wit” (or “put-down witticisms”; Ruch, 2004) and referred to 
the benevolent forms of humor (laughing with in contrast to laughing at) based on sympathy 
(Schmidt-Hidding, 1963). Humanity (in at least moderate degrees) was found in items of nine 
scales. Among them, the virtues represented at least moderately by the item contents of the 
VIA-IS Humor scale were mainly humanity according to the experts of the current study. This 
seems reasonable, as Peterson (2006) refers to humor as a character strength of the heart (as 
opposed to strengths of the mind), which is compatible with other character strengths of 
humanity. Items representing humanity were often connected with not laughing or joking 
about others (even if it would be tempting) or with showing of a dislike of this behavior if 
displayed by others. Furthermore, items describing behavior such as comforting or relaxing 
others by cheering them up were typically understood to stand for humanity.  
Within the VIA-Classification (Peterson & Seligman, 2004) humor belongs to the 
virtue transcendence. In the present study, transcendence was among the three virtues with the 
highest means and was (in at least moderate degrees) identified in items of four scales. The 
subscale humor from the VIA-IS also contained one item representing transcendence. 
Transcendence was mainly connected with a hopeful or optimistic perspective on life or life 
crises. 
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Closely related to humanity, justice and temperance were also often represented by an 
aversion against using humor to put others down or laugh at them. Typically, items identified 
as belonging to justice are identified as belonging to humanity to an even higher degree. 
Temperance reached very high single ratings. However, the mean temperance rating was the 
lowest. This is surprising, as an oft-cited core component of the sense of humor, the tendency 
to laugh at oneself, is often described as the main virtuous component of humor leading to 
modesty (and thus to temperance; e.g., Comte-Sponville, 2001). This component, as measured 
by the SHS (McGhee, 1996), was not perceived as virtuous by the lay people and thus did not 
enter Study II. However, aspects related to actually laughing at oneself in one item of the 
SAWS (At this point in my life, I find it easy to laugh at my mistakes, Q.24) were identified as 
virtuous (although as representing wisdom). Items scoring high in temperance seem to 
highlight the tendency to refrain from doing things, even if they are tempting, because they 
would offend others. However, items representing temperance at least weakly are often 
connected to regulating one’s emotions.  
Although the mean virtue rating for courage was higher than that for justice and 
temperance, courage did not reach very high ratings among single items. The highest courage 
ratings were given for items describing open and authentic humor behavior or a brave and 
composed behavior or attitude in the face of unpleasant situations.  
Some of the humorous behaviors and attitudes from the questionnaires incorporated 
more than one virtue. For example, several items represented temperance, humanity, and 
justice. The co-occurrence of temperance and humanity or justice might possibly be explained 
by looking at the wording of the rated material. When temperance means, “to refrain from 
doing something” (e.g., from laughing at someone else’s weakness), although it would be 
tempting, this might well be motivated by humanity or justice (because it would be mean and 
inhumane to laugh at such a person, and because it’s not that person’s fault and thus not fair 
to laugh at him or her).  
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Whereas future studies should examine whether or not some virtues or configurations 
of virtues go together with humor more or less often than others, one should not jump to 
conclusions. On the one hand, these items have not been constructed to measure (single) 
virtues. Thus, if these items must not necessarily stand for any virtue, or, for instance, only for 
courage, or only for justice, this does not mean that it is impossible to construct items that do 
so. On the other hand, it should be noted that the items included in this study are not a random 
sample of items. Different questionnaires have been included and the percentages of items per 
questionnaire are not identical. Thus, the statistical results of these studies must be considered 
with caution.  
Taken as a whole then, Study II could not only replicate the judgments of 
virtuousness, it could also show that six core virtues were represented at least slightly and five 
virtues even at least moderately. In this study, wisdom and humanity are the virtues connected 
most strongly and most frequently with humor. Whether these two virtues always have a 
stronger connection with humor or whether this was just the case for the item pool given in 
this study, will have to be examined systematically. 
General Discussion 
In general, the two studies reveal that it is fruitful to examine the connection between 
virtue and humor. Out of a collection of humor behaviors and attitudes taken from several 
questionnaires, those behaviors and attitudes were indeed extracted that combine humor and 
virtue implicitly. Some items from the questionnaires used incorporate one virtue or even 
more virtues, as judged by lay people as well as experts on virtues. Other items were rated as 
neutral or as representing vice, suggesting that only certain aspects of humor are associated 
with virtue. The more a given behavior or attitude was evaluated as virtuous, the more it was 
also reported to be shown. 
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The approach chosen in the present paper has advantages and disadvantages. The 
advantage is that an existing pool of numerous behavioral manifestations (which are largely 
missing in philosophical literature about humor and virtue) could be taken as a basis to 
empirically address the relation of humor and virtues (as well as vices) in everyday life. The 
disadvantage is that—because of the heterogeneous sampling and wording of the items from 
the different questionnaires—the results yielded by these studies might be distorted. The item 
pool of the HBQD made it possible to examine the relation of humor, vice, neutral aspects 
and virtue per se. On the other hand, virtuous aspects not covered by the HBQD could be 
found by adding additional questionnaires. 
It must be kept in mind that virtues are not incorporated explicitly and systematically 
by the items in these questionnaires, i.e., the items have not been constructed in order to 
assess virtuous humor. However, all virtues are represented by the items, but not to the same 
extent. Some items represent more than one virtue. No final conclusion can be drawn as to 
whether it is in the nature of certain virtues to co-occur with certain other virtues more (or 
less) often in the context of humor or whether all virtues can also emerge distinctly when 
associated with humor. This is the first step in a broader project to study the relation of humor 
and virtue. In a second step evidence of humorous and virtuous behavior in everyday 
situations will be collected and analyzed which will complement the virtuous humor 
behaviors extracted in the current studies. From there it might be possible to systematically 
study and assess humor behavior prototypical for each virtue of the VIA-Classification. 
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Abstract 
Historical as well as contemporary writers across many disciplines have referred to 
humor as a virtue. However, in psychological research it is not clear in which ways 
humor can serve (as) a virtue, and for which virtues this holds. The current study 
addresses this issue from the perspective of lay people's everyday lives. The aims of 
the study are to investigate (1) how often people achieved each of six core virtues 
identified by Dahlsgaard, Peterson, and Seligman (2005) by means of humor, also in 
relation to how important the respective virtue was for the participants, (2) to collect 
reports of situations where participants actually used humor to achieve any of the six 
virtues, and (3) to study the use of eight comic styles (Schmidt-Hidding, 1963) within 
in the reported situations. Whereas justice and humanity were the virtues considered 
most important, the virtues most compatible with humor seemed to be humanity and 
wisdom. However, it was possible to report situations for each of the virtues. More 
benevolent comic styles were used more frequently to achieve virtue than more 
malevolent styles. But whenever malevolent styles, like sarcasm or cynicism, were 
used, this was disproportionally often the case in order to exert justice. 
 
Keywords: virtue, humor, positive psychology, comic styles, situations 
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Introduction 
There are numerous theories and conceptions of the sense of humor and its function 
(e.g., Martin, 2007; Ruch, 2004, 2007). Most commonly, humor is conceptualized as a 
temperament (Ruch, 2002). Not surprisingly, psychologists as well see humor mostly as a 
temperament or personality trait. But humor is also considered a mood, frame of mind, talent, 
or a virtue (Ruch, 2002). This latter notion of humor as a virtue can be found in historical as 
well as contemporary philosophical and theological literature. Despite the prevalence of this 
notion, psychological research has not paid much attention to humor as a virtue. 
Positive Psychology has adopted the concept of virtues and character strengths into 
psychological research. These are seen as the “inner” determinants of the good life and life 
satisfaction (e.g., Peterson & Seligman, 2004; Seligman, 2002). As one of the character 
strengths, humor is among those related to life satisfaction most strongly (Peterson, Ruch, 
Beermann, Park, & Seligman, 2007, p. 152). However, it is neither entirely clear which 
aspects or facets of humor can function as virtues or serve other virtues, nor in which ways 
this could happen. 
Humor as Virtue 
In the 18th century, humanists treated humor as a cardinal virtue. Shaftesbury (1671–
1713) considered humor (or “good humour”) a benevolent, tolerant form of laughter that 
denotes the sovereign attitude of exposing oneself to the criticism and mockery of others—to 
a “test of ridicule” (Schmidt-Hidding, 1963, p. 108). As Ruch summarized, “While one 
should not poke fun at those who were simply odd, it was permissible to laugh at the 
pompous, the unreal, the faked, or the conceited” (2004, p. 586). “Humor” was then 
distinguished from other elements of the comic, such as wit, fun, or ridicule (Schmidt-
Hidding, 1963, p. 48). Also within the Christian church, certain traditions were open to 
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humor. According to Gilhus (1997, p. 73), in Gnostic myths comic techniques were vehicles 
to bring forth knowledge (gnosis). 
More contemporary writers refer to humor as being virtuous as well. According to 
Comte-Sponville (2001, p. 211-215), for example, humor allows one to feel less self-
important and thus leads to humility. Cox found that the only possibility to make sense of a 
traditional religion is with a playful stance toward it. This playful stance has its basis in the 
opposition between critical thinking and traditional belief, which may be contradictory. “It 
[the comic style of the theology of juxtaposition] therefore refuses to trim the symbol to fit the 
situation because it sees that, precisely in the bizarre conjoining of the two, both symbol and 
situation break open to disclose newer and richer perceptions of reality.” (1969, p. 132). 
Davies (2006) suggested that many jokes indicate virtue by mocking and reproving those who 
lack virtue. The context in which the jokes are told, however, might be relevant for their 
function in communication. Jokes used as glosses in conversations might convey a critical 
message, advocate a course of action, support a friend or serve similar goals (Oring, 2003, 
p. 91-92). One might conclude that these glosses can serve virtues. 
Philosophical literature only rarely provides examples of how humor served (as) a 
virtue. But it is possible to come up with examples of persons who act humorously in order to 
achieve positive effects. For instance, it is possible to comfort sad people by making a 
humorous remark in an act of kindness or humanity. Furthermore, Victor Frankl’s (1984) 
conscious use of humor in concentration camps suggests a connection with transcendence 
(hoping to survive).  
Virtues in Positive Psychology  
Virtuousness is generally seen as acting morally, humanely, or benevolently (e.g., 
Comte-Sponville, 2001). Yearley (1990, p. 13) defines virtue as “a disposition to act, desire 
and feel that involves the exercise of judgment and leads to a recognizable human excellence 
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or instance of human flourishing” (1990, p. 13). In philosophy and in other disciplines, 
several virtue catalogues exist. To synthesize these, Dahlsgaard, Peterson, and Seligman 
(2005, p. 205) reviewed historical texts stemming from different cultures and religions and 
named six broad virtues they claimed to be universal. For Peterson and Seligman (2004) these 
six virtues are associated with various character strengths. The virtues are wisdom (which is 
associated with cognitive strengths referring to gaining and using knowledge for good 
purposes; character strengths involved are, e.g., judgment, love of learning, or perspective), 
courage (including emotional strengths concerning the will to achieve goals in the face of 
external or internal opposition; e.g., authenticity, bravery, or perseverance), humanity 
(interpersonal strengths involved in relating to others in a kind, empathetic, and benevolent 
way; i.e., kindness, love, or social intelligence), justice (involving civic strengths that form 
the basis of a healthy community life, i.e., fairness, leadership, or teamwork), temperance 
(strengths which master excess; e.g. forgiveness, humility, or self regulation), and 
transcendence (strengths that affect connections to the larger universe and provide meaning; 
e.g., hope, spirituality, or humor; Peterson & Seligman, 2004).  
Virtues and Facets of Humor 
The question arises whether all virtues are served equally well by all forms of humor 
or whether certain comic styles are more conducive to certain virtues but not appropriate for 
others. Humor has often been treated as an umbrella term for everything that is funny. 
However, with different underlying emotions, it is possible that humor has different “flavors” 
(cf. Ruch, 1995, 2001; Milner Davis, 2003). For instance, pure farces may shift their simple, 
robust fun either towards romantic sentimentalism, towards bitter, black, existential angst or 
towards other satirical ends (Milner Davis, 2003, p. 16). Similarly, Condren, Milner Davis, 
McCausland, & Phiddian (2008, p. 403) remark that some examples of satire are so bleak they 
are scarcely even humor. Schmidt-Hidding (1963) differentiated humor from other forms of 
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the funny and suggested that humor (in the sense of an understanding for the incongruities of 
the world) is based on a sympathetic heart, whereas wit, for example, is based on a superior 
intellect. Thus, it is also conceivable that humor differs with different underlying virtues.  
By consulting literature from antiquity and analyzing the modern language of humor, 
Schmidt-Hidding derived eight different comic styles, which received much attention in 
German humor literature, namely humor (in its narrow sense), wit, irony, satire, fun, 
nonsense, sarcasm, and cynicism (1963, p. 50-51). In 2001, Ruch found that Schmidt-
Hidding’s comic styles were located in a two-dimensional space with one factor covering 
affective/motivational elements (good humor vs. bad humor or benevolence vs. malevolence) 
and one factor covering mental/cognitive elements. Regarding the “affectivity” factor, the 
comic styles fun, humor and nonsense were located nearer the pole “good humor” (or 
benevolent humor, “laughing with”; Ruch, 2001, p. 412–413). Wit was located rather in the 
middle between the two poles, and irony (as the mildest form among those four), satire, 
cynicism and sarcasm were located nearer the pole “bad humor” (or skeptical, malevolent 
humor, “laughing at”; Ruch, 2001, p. 412–413). In terms of virtue, this would lead to the 
assumption that the more benevolent a comic style, the more often it is used to show a virtue, 
and the other way round. 
However, one might argue that the malevolent comic styles also have the potential to 
serve certain virtues. For example, some authors referred to the use of derisive, skeptical 
comic styles such as satire, sarcasm, or cynicism as a social corrective. Schmidt-Hidding 
proposed that mockery is based on a moral sense, and for him satire aims to decry the bad and 
foolish, and at the general “betterment of the world” (German: Weltverbesserung, Schmidt-
Hidding, 1963, p. 50). Similarly, Davies assumed that jokes, in their common canned form, 
can indicate moral failure (2006), but he doubted that they are a good method of inciting 
moral indignation. But spontaneous “skillful and witty put-downs can be used to ridicule, 
control and even express moral criticisms of human weaknesses otherwise best left 
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unadmonished” (Davies, 2002, p. 204). Thus, while, in general, the skeptical styles are rarely 
used for a positive purpose and may be hurtful, they might be employed quite frequently in 
context of the virtue of justice. Thus, a collection of situations in which lay people describe 
how they acted virtuously through the use of humor should also ask what comic style was 
employed. This way it is possible to study whether or not the eight comic styles of Schmidt-
Hidding will be affiliated with different virtues.  
The Present Study 
The present study addressed the question if, to what extent, and how virtue can be 
achieved by humor using people’s everyday experiences. The study was based on the six 
virtues found to be universal by Dahlsgaard et al. (2005), namely wisdom, courage, humanity, 
justice, temperance, and transcendence. On this basis, the aim of the present study was 
threefold. First, it was of interest how often people exert virtues humorously (based on self-
reports by the participants) and whether or not certain virtues are expressed humorously more 
often than others. Such a study needs to take into account that someone who does not consider 
a virtue important presumably does not show it often, humorously or otherwise. Thus, as an 
anchor a judgment of the importance of a particular virtue were also assessed, both 
concerning the participants themselves and people in general.  
The second aim was to collect as many examples as possible for any of the six virtues 
that were achieved through humorous behavior. Here, the “feasibility” of exerting virtue 
humorously was addressed. In particular, in the current study, the frequency of incidents was 
of interest. And third, the use of eight comic styles (Schmidt-Hidding, 1963) within 
humorously-exerted virtue situations was studied. It was expected that more benevolent styles 
(i.e., humor in the narrow sense, fun, wit, nonsense; Ruch, 2001) occur more frequently than 
more skeptical ones. Furthermore, if skeptical, derisive comic styles (in particular sarcasm, 
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cynicism, or satire) were used, participants were expected to apply them disproportionately 
often in justice-related situations. 
Method 
Participants 
The sample consisted of N = 48 German-speaking participants (18 males and 30 
females) between 25 and 88 years of age (M = 47.67, SD = 18.80) from Switzerland, Austria, 
and Germany. Among them, the education level of 6 participants was a completed 
apprenticeship, 13 participants had a general qualification for university entrance, and 27 
participants had a university degree. Two participants did not specify their level of education. 
Instrument 
The Humor in Tugenden questionnaire (Humor in Virtues, HiT) was developed for the 
current study to assess humorous events that simultaneously served a certain virtue. It consists 
of two parts. Part A addresses four ratings concerning the attitude to virtue, and to virtue and 
humor. Part B allows for reporting incidents and for assigning comic styles that participants 
had used in these incidents. Both parts are organized by the six core virtues identified by 
Dahlsgaard et al. (2005). In order to counteract sequence effects, two parallel versions of the 
HiT with reversed sequences of the six virtues exist.  
Part A assesses the attitude to the six virtues wisdom, courage, humanity, justice, 
temperance, and transcendence. For every virtue, a definition according to Peterson and 
Seligman (2004) is provided together with a list of those of the 24 character strengths that are 
hypothesized to lead to the respective virtue. This is followed by four ratings: (1) How do you 
evaluate the role of virtue X in daily human interaction? (Rated “importance”; bipolar 7-point 
rating scale from -3 = “extremely obstructive” via 0 = “neither obstructive nor beneficial” to 3 
= “indispensable”), (2) How much do you feel committed by virtue X? (Rated “commitment”; 
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5-point Likert-scale from 1 = “not at all” to 5 = “very much”), (3) In everyday life, people are 
sometimes serious and sometimes humorous. This is also the case in situations where virtues 
occur. When considering all situations in which the virtue X is shown: In how many of them is 
this done in a humorous way? (Rated “employment, general”; the frequency has to be 
estimated; 0 = “never” to 100 = “always”), and (4) how often have you been able to exert the 
virtue X in a humorous way? (Rated “employment, self”; 5-point Likert-scale from 1 = “never 
before” to 5 = “nearly always”).  
Part B of the questionnaire aims to collect actual scenarios from everyday life in 
which each of the six virtues mentioned above was achieved in a humorous way. For each of 
the virtues, the instruction is designed to help the participants to either remember situations 
where they themselves were the acting persons showing the respective virtue humorously, or 
where they witnessed another person doing so, or situations which they have been told by 
someone else, seen on television, read in a book, or just can imagine. These remembered or 
visualized situations have to be written down as accurately as possible. In order to facilitate 
recall and to obtain as detailed descriptions as possible, questions concerning details of the 
situations are integrated into the instruction (i.e., Where did the situation take place? Who was 
there? What caused the situation, what was going on, how did it end?). Furthermore, 
questions regarding the virtuous and the humorous aspects of the situations are added (i.e., 
What in particular was the virtuous act? Which humorous behavior has been shown that 
helped to exert the virtue?). For the current study, the frequencies of the situations rather than 
the actual contents were of interest. 
Additionally, for each situation provided the participants were asked to choose one or 
more of eight comic styles according to Schmidt-Hidding (1963), which they thought was 
used in a given situation. The comic styles were the following: Humor (in the sense of 
appreciation of the world’s inconsistency and arousing sympathy), wit, irony, satire, fun, 
nonsense, sarcasm, and cynicism.  
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Procedure 
The participants received the questionnaire via email or postal mail. Each parallel 
version of the HiT was answered by half of the participants. The participants filled in Part A 
by themselves at home. However, they were allowed to exchange thoughts with their family 
or friends regarding Part B. This should facilitate the relatively complex task of remembering 
and writing down situations in which they or somebody else was both virtuous and humorous, 
and thus combining two aspects in hindsight that they probably were not too aware of at the 
time. This procedure was chosen because the aim of Part B is not to measure any behavior but 
to collect as many scenarios as possible. 
The participants were asked to report as many situations as possible for each virtue. 
They were encouraged to take their time remembering virtuous and humorous situations. 
However, they were reassured that it would be fine if they would not be able to cover all 
virtues when reporting situations. If they found that more than one virtue was realized in the 
situation, they were instructed to assign it to the virtue most prominent for them. 
Without addressing directly how virtuous the participants actually acted, the virtue 
ratings assessed a general judgment concerning the role of the virtue and their commitment to 
the virtue (regardless of how successful the participants actually were in realizing the virtues). 
Even so, in order to counteract social desirability effects, it was pointed out explicitly that the 
aim of this study was not to find out how virtuous or how humorous the participants were, but 
that it was of interest if, and if so how, humor can be employed in order to realize virtue. 
Finally, the participants were assured that their data would be handled anonymously.  
Results 
 The Role of Virtue and Humor in Part A of the HiT 
Means were computed for rated importance of and the participant’s personal 
commitment to virtue, and the employment of humor for virtue in general and concerning 
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themselves (Part A of the HiT). Next, differences between the six virtues were studied using 
one-way ANOVAs for repeated measures with the type of virtue as repeated measurement 
factor for each of the four ratings as dependent variable. For significant effects, posthoc tests 
(Fisher LSD) were computed to locate the differences between virtues. Means, standard 
deviations, and the ANOVAs for each rating are presented in Table 1. 
The data in Table 1 confirms that participants indeed found virtues important. Across 
all virtues, the mean rating was M = 1.95 suggesting that the participants tended to judge the 
role of virtue very beneficial (= 2). The ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for the 
type of virtue on rated importance. Two of the virtues, namely humanity and justice, were 
judged to be more important than wisdom, courage, temperance, and transcendence, which 
did not differ from each other.  
The participants felt on average rather (= 4) to very much (= 5) committed by the 
particular virtue (M = 4.18). The ANOVA for rated commitment showed a significant main 
effect for the type of virtue. Here, posthoc tests yielded that the participants felt especially 
committed to humanity, justice, transcendence, and wisdom. The judgments for the two 
virtues temperance and courage followed these four and did not differ from each other.3  
.
                                                
3 Within the commitment rating, and only here, there were gender differences, F(1, 44) = 5.07, 
p < .05. Females rated their commitment to virtue higher than males (Fisher LSD). 
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Table 1.  
Effects of the Kind of Virtue on the Importance, Commitment, Employment General, Employment-Self Ratings, the Difference Between Commitment 
and Employment-Self and the Number of Situations. 
Variable Wisdom Courage Humanity Justice Temperance Transcendence Main effects 
Importance         
M 1.89b  1.70b  2.24a  2.37a  1.83b  1.70b  F(5, 45) = 6.97 
SD 0.92 0.70 0.67 0.88 0.83 0.81 p < .0001 
Commitment         
M 4.26a  3.89b  4.37a  4.46a  3.91b  4.20a  F(5, 45) = 5.70 
SD 0.77 0.77 0.83 0.86 0.84 0.86 p < .0001 
Employment-g        
M 42.57a  33.78b  46.59a  30.48b  26.87b  26.69b  F(5, 41) = 12.13 
SD 24.25 22.08 22.59 22.13 18.49 18.68 p < .0001 
Employment-s        
M 3.09ab  3.00bc  3.39a  3.02bc  2.80c  2.87c  F(5, 43) = 4.95 
SD 0.87 0.71 0.68 0.72 0.86 0.83 p < .001 
      (table continues) 
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Table 1 (continued).  
Rating Wisdom Courage Humanity Justice Temperance Transcendence Main effects 
Commitment — Employment-s        
M 1.14ab 0.89bc 0.98bc 1.43a 1.11ab 1.34a F (5, 43) = 3.66 
SD 1.05 0.92 0.79 0.93 0.92 0.91 p < .01 
Number of situations1        
Median 0.60 0.67 0.73 0.60 0.61 0.71 χ2(5, 46) = 1.71 
Mean ranks 3.40 3.52 3.74 3.37 3.30 3.66 p = .89 
Note. N = 42-47. 
Importance = Importance of the role of each virtue in general; Answer format from -3 to +3. Commitment = Felt commitment to each virtue; 
Answer format from 1 to 5. Employment-g = Estimate of how often humor is employed for each virtue in general; Answer format from 0 to 100. 
Employment-s = Estimate of how often humor is employed for each virtue by participants themselves; Answer format from 1 to 5. Commitment — 
Employment-s  = Difference between commitment and employment, self-rating. Number of situations = Number of valid situations.  
1 Friedman’s ANOVA was computed for the number of situations. 
a,b,c Means of a column with same superscripts don’t differ significantly at p < .05 (Fisher LSD).  
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On average, the participants estimated that in 34.77% of all situations virtue had been 
shown humorously (employment, general). The ANOVA resulted in a significant main effect 
for the type of virtue. Humor was used most often for humanity and wisdom, followed by 
courage, justice, transcendence and temperance, which did not differ from each other. 
The participants reported having employed humor for virtues themselves several times 
(= 3; M = 3.03) on average. Conducting the ANOVA for the rated employment, self yielded a 
significant main effect for the type of virtue. Humanity was followed by wisdom, courage, 
justice, transcendence, and temperance. However, whereas humanity as the highest differed 
from all five other virtues, wisdom did neither differ from humanity nor from courage and 
justice. Wisdom was exerted humorously more often than transcendence and temperance, but 
the latter two were not significantly different from courage and justice. 
Relations Among Importance and Commitment to a Virtue and its Humorous Realization 
In order to analyze how rated importance, commitment, employing humor for virtue in 
general and employing humor for virtue by oneself corresponded to each other, within each of 
the six virtues Pearson correlations for all pairs of ratings were computed. The coefficients for 
each rating combination are shown in Table 2.  
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Table 2.  
Pairwise Correlations Among the Four Ratings for Each Virtue. 
r of Importance with r of Commitment with r of Employment-g with 
Virtue 
Commitment Employment-g Employment-s Employment-g Employment-s Employment-s 
Wisdom .29 .06 .02 .13 .20 .55** 
Courage  .36* -.16 -.13 .01 .21 .32* 
Humanity .48** .14 .23 -.13 .45** .45** 
Justice .57** .21 .34* .32* .34* .56** 
Temperance .52** .10 .30* .20 .44** .52** 
Transcendence .56** .37* .33* .21 .44** .55** 
Average corr. .46** .12 .18 .12 .35* .49** 
Note. N = 43-46. 
Importance = Importance of the role of each virtue in general. Commitment = Felt commitment to each virtue. Employment-g. = Estimate of 
how often humor is employed for each virtue in general. Employment-s = Estimate of how often humor is employed for each virtue by 
participants themselves.  
* p < .05. ** p < .01.
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The data in Table 2 shows that the more people thought of a certain virtue as 
important for human interaction (importance), the more they also felt committed to that virtue 
(commitment). The average correlation across all virtues was r = .46. The correlation was 
lowest for wisdom and highest for justice. Furthermore, the more people thought it is possible 
to achieve a certain virtue by using humor in general (employment, general), the more they 
reported to have done so themselves for that virtue (employment, self). Not surprisingly, these 
two ratings yielded a very high mean correlation coefficient (r = .49). Courage showed the 
lowest correlation and justice the highest. Additionally, the more people felt committed to a 
certain virtue (commitment), the more they also sought to exert this virtue by using humor 
(employment, self). There was a moderate average correlation (r = .35). It was not significant 
for wisdom and courage, and highest for humanity. Furthermore, considering a virtue 
important for human interaction (importance) was only weakly related to its humorous 
realization by oneself (employment, self) with an average correlation of r = .18. There were, 
however, significant relationships for the virtues justice, temperance, and transcendence. 
Does the use of humor generalize across all virtues? To answer this question, the 
intercorrelations among the six virtues were computed for rated employment, self. It turned 
out, that no general tendency to employ humor in virtues was found. However, the virtues 
were not completely independent either, rather clusters of related virtues emerged. First, 
people who have frequently exerted transcendence humorously, also said they have done so 
for temperance (r = .55, p < .01) and wisdom (r = .49, p < .01), with temperance and wisdom 
yielding a correlation of r = .30 (p < .05). Second, having shown humanity humorously went 
along with having exerted courage humorously (r = .52, p < .01). And third, the realization of 
temperance in a humorous way by the people themselves was related to the realization of 
justice in a humorous way (r = .41, p < .05). 
Is the relationship between how important a virtue is to how often one employed 
humor when pursuing that virtue the same for each of the virtues? In other words, are some 
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virtues more conducive to a humorous treatment than others? In order to answer this question, 
a 2 (type of rating) x 6 (type of virtue) ANOVA for repeated measures was computed. The 
profiles are illustrated in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. Mean ratings for commitment for virtue and employment of humor for virtue by 
oneself across the six virtues.  
As expected, the ANOVA revealed a significant interaction, F (5, 43) = 3.66, p < .01, 
confirming that the frequency of the use of humor does not merely reflect the importance of 
the virtue (Figure 1). In order to examine which of the virtues were involved in the 
interaction, difference scores were calculated by subtracting the mean score for rated 
employment, self from the mean score of rated commitment for each virtue. A one-way 
ANOVA for repeated measurement was performed for the resulting six difference scores with 
type of virtue forming the repeated measurement factor. As Posthoc tests revealed, for justice 
and transcendence the difference value was larger than for the other four virtues (although for 
temperance and wisdom, the values failed to be significantly lower; see Table 1). This means 
that participants, irrespective of how much they felt committed to a virtue, tended to use 
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humor less frequently in justice and transcendence situations. In other words, humor is 
relatively infrequently combined with these two virtues. 
Number of Situations for Each Virtue—Part B of the HiT 
Analysis of Part B showed that of the 48 participants, 42 reported at least one situation 
in total resulting in a total of 248 situations. However, not all situations contained the criteria 
the participants had been asked for or were “off-topic”. For example, some of the situations 
represented elements of humor but no virtuous aspects, or vice versa. Thus, the first author 
screened all reported situations and removed the off-topic situations. This yielded 40 
remaining persons providing “valid” situations. They reported a number between 1 and 18 
valid situations per participant (Mdn = 4.25, MAD = 1.50) and a total of 210 situations. Per 
virtue, the participants described between 1 and 6 situations.  
For every virtue situations were reported in which humor has been employed. In order 
to determine whether there were differences in the number of situations between the virtues, a 
Friedman ANOVA for the number of situations within the six virtues was conducted. The 
exact medians and the mean ranks for the number of situations for every virtue are given in 
Table 1. As the coefficients in Table 1 show, there was no difference; the participants 
reported situations for all six virtues to the same degree.  
Comic Styles 
For all reported situations, the participants also assigned the situations to one or more 
comic styles that were used in the situations.4 In order to assess differences in the use of the 
                                                
4 A researcher familiar with the terminology by Schmidt-Hidding (1963) served as expert and 
coded 40 of the collected situations for the comic styles. The agreement between the expert 
and the participants was .64. 
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comic styles, a Friedman’s ANOVA5 was performed. Indeed, there were significant 
differences in the frequency of the styles, Friedman’s χ2 (7, 203) = 175.01, p < .001. The 
comic style used most often was humor (in the narrow sense). This was followed by fun, wit, 
irony, sarcasm, nonsense, satire, and cynicism, in that order. 
Wilcoxon tests were calculated in order to obtain information on significant 
differences regarding the comic styles. A Bonferroni correction was applied. All reported 
effects are tested at p < .002. Humor and wit appeared significantly more often than satire 
(T = 576 and 520, respectively), nonsense (T = 570 and 513.5, respectively), sarcasm 
(T = 768 and 870, respectively), and cynicism (T = 495 and 410, respectively, all p < .002). 
Furthermore, people applied fun and irony significantly more often than nonsense (T = 468 
and 540, respectively), sarcasm (T = 1069.5 and 396.5, respectively), and cynicism (T = 410 
and 150, respectively, all p < .002). Fun was used more often than satire (T = 637.5, 
p < .002). 
In the following, the frequencies of the comic styles for every virtue were investigated 
in more detail. Figure 2 shows the relative frequencies of the comic styles (i.e., profiles for 
each comic style) for every virtue.  
                                                
5 For dichotomy data like these, usually a Cochran’s Q analysis is performed. However, the 
Friedman’s χ2 had exactly the same power as the Cochran’s Q and provided mean ranks 
which was more appropriate for describing the results. 
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Figure 2. Profiles of the comic styles across the six virtues. 
Figure 2 illustrates that, generally, the use of a specific comic style seemed to depend 
on the virtue that was targeted. In particular, there seemed to be much variance in fun 
depending on the virtue (with a minimum relative frequency of .23 and a maximum of .59); it 
was used moderately often to show wisdom, courage, or transcendence, rather often to show 
humanity and even more so for temperance, but less often for justice. The use of wit was 
rather high with the exception of temperance (the relative frequency ranged from .14 to .44 
with a mean of .34). The profile of irony had a moderate level (ranging from .22 to .44 with 
an average relative frequency of .30). It was noticeable that the profile of irony with respect to 
virtue mirrored the one of humor. Especially comic styles generally regarded as more 
skeptical (Ruch, 2001, p. 412–413, in particular sarcasm, irony, and cynicism) had peaks or 
higher values with respect to justice. However, it must be kept in mind that with respect to 
comic styles, multiple answers were possible. Comic styles were not entirely independent 
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from each other. Figure 2 is intended to illustrate the differentiated use of comic styles, but 
does not show the different configurations among the comic styles.  
To test the hypothesis whether derisive humor was used more often in justice 
situations compared to the other virtues, a χ2-analysis was undertaken for all justice situations 
vs. situations for all other virtues with the frequency of dark humor (a variable aggregated 
from the three derisive comic styles satire, sarcasm and cynicism with 0 or 1 data) as 
dependent variable. The proportion of derisive humor differed significantly between justice 
vs. all other situations, χ2 (1) = 5.39, p < .05. Based on the odds ratio, it seems that derisive 
humor was used 2.57 times more often for justice situations than for situations of all other 
virtues.  
Discussion 
The current study is an attempt at addressing humor as one possible means of 
achieving virtue. By involving lay people, it was possible to study the use of humor for 
virtues based on everyday experience. Self-reports on virtue independent of humor, on virtue 
exerted by using humor, as well as actual examples of acting virtuously in a humorous way 
were assessed. Indeed, the study could show that humor can serve the entire six core virtues 
identified by Dahlsgaard et al. (2005). Self-reports revealed that it seems to be particularly 
appropriate to employ humor for humanity and wisdom. Using the performance part of the 
HiT, each of the virtues examples of everyday situations could be identified. Within these 
situations, generally benevolent comic styles were used more often. If derisive and skeptical 
styles were used, this was in particular the case in justice situations. 
Virtues and Humor in the Lay People’s View 
The first goal of the study was to investigate the participants’ estimates of how often 
people have achieved each of the six core virtues according to Peterson and Seligman (2004) 
in a humorous way. It revealed two virtues that seem to be exceptionally suitable for 
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implementing them with the help of humor. These “top” (i.e., most frequently realized by 
humor) virtues are humanity and wisdom. One reason for this may be connected with 
associations people have concerning humanity and wisdom. Both seem to incorporate 
something like “goodwill”. Helping people and being friendly is associated to smiling and 
making harmless jokes. Humor is a frequently mentioned desirable attribute of partners and 
thus contributes to the character strength of love. Wisdom is connected to giving good advice, 
which might also include advice concerning problems of other people. In movies or books, 
wise people are often depicted as old, benignly smiling, composed men or women, who teach 
their younger and still unsettled pupils in a calm and sometimes humorous way, thus realizing 
sereneness and smiling benevolently in the face of adversities. However, beside these 
associations, this is also in accordance with philosophical and theological literature. The 
humanists referred to (good) humor as the benevolent forms of humor (Schmidt-Hidding, 
1963; Ruch, 2004). Schmidt-Hidding proposed that humor (as opposed to mock, wit or fun) is 
based on a “sympathetic heart”. Similarly, Peterson considers humor to be a strength of the 
heart (as opposed to strengths of the mind), which is compatible with other character strengths 
of humanity (2006, p. 158). Others see humor as a way of dealing wisely with everyday life 
(cf. Bühler, 2007; Webster, 2003). By asking experts to rate the degree of the six core virtues 
within the contents of humor questionnaire items, Beermann and Ruch (2009) found wisdom 
and humanity to be the top virtues connected to humor. One might imagine a person acting 
humanely and wisely at the same time. But even so, employing humor for wisdom was only 
weakly related to employing humor to realize humanity. Thus, mostly independent from each 
other, both virtues seem to be highly compatible with humor. 
The kind of virtue applicable for using humor doesn’t seem to be entirely congruent 
with the kind of virtue considered most crucial. The top two virtues considered most 
important for daily human interactions were justice and humanity, and the top four virtues 
people felt committed to were justice, humanity, wisdom, and transcendence. Compared to 
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the commitment to virtue, people seemed to use humor less for the two virtues justice and 
transcendence. Several explanations are possible for this result. One explanation is that it is 
more difficult to use humor for justice or transcendence. For example, people might have 
problems assuring their authority as leaders. When employing humor for leadership, they 
might fear that they are not taken seriously. Another possibility is that even if they would be 
able to apply humor for justice or transcendence, the recipient might not acknowledge this. A 
person who tends to suffer from gelotophobia (cf. Ruch, 2009) might be irritated when he or 
she is rebuked in a humorous way, even when it was meant to be benevolent. Likewise, 
situations conveying transcendence were often connected with dying. Some people probably 
think that when dealing with death humor is not allowed, and feel affronted if someone jokes 
in this kind of situations. However, there are reports of seriously ill or even dying persons 
who wish a “normal”, humorous communication with nursing staff or family and friends 
rather than a muted and deadly serious one in order not to feel “as if you were already buried” 
(e.g., Bischofberger, 2002, p. 129). 
As expected, finding a particular virtue important in general relates to feeling 
committed to the respective virtue. It was also predictable that people who think that virtues 
have been achieved humorously in general also report that they had employed humor for 
virtues themselves. Furthermore, feeling committed to a virtue was related to exerting it 
humorously for four of the virtues. Feeling committed to wisdom or courage, however, does 
not relate highly to applying humor in order to exert these two virtues. What is the difference 
between wisdom and courage and the other four virtues? It seems that the difficulty in 
achieving different virtues varies. For example, wisdom might be connected to cognitive 
strengths, such as intelligence, so that some people might find it difficult to “choose” to act 
wisely—as compared to, for example, humanity, where you can more easily choose to be 
friendly, or temperance, where you can more easily choose to moderate yourself. Also, 
courage might be difficult for some people who, for example, have higher degrees of anxiety. 
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Thus, it might be possible that the more difficult a virtue putatively is, the less opportunities 
existed where the respective virtue could be shown, and especially in a humorous way—but 
only for a part of the participants. That is, in addition to how difficult it is to realize a virtue 
humorously, for these two virtues it might be difficult to show it at all, that is, humorously or 
non-humorously—as it was not asked how often participants succeeded in showing virtue 
independently from humor. 
Examples of Humorous and Virtuous Behavior—The Collected Situations 
The second goal was to collect examples of the participants’ lives where they actually 
employed virtue in a humorous way. This was done in order to check for the “feasibility” of 
doing this. Indeed, it is possible to report a considerable number of situations in which humor 
has been employed for each of the six virtues. More than 80% of the participants found and 
remembered ways of using humor to achieve virtue. Most of the examples were detailed and 
it was possible to get a good impression (some of the descriptions had more than 400 words). 
This was possible in spite of the complexity of the task. People had to remember situations 
that they—retrospectively and possibly for the first time ever—had to evaluate as virtuous 
(and assign to a certain virtue), and which contained humorous behavior that was aimed at 
achieving virtue. In addition, a talent in writing has an influence on the number of reported 
situations. This performance aspect might also have influenced that, in contrast to the self-
reports, there is no significant difference in the number of situations reported per virtue.  
What Kind of Humor? —The Comic Styles 
The third goal was to study (self-reported) linguistic comic styles that were used in 
order to apply humor to achieve virtue. The analyses regarding the use of comic styles 
revealed that any comic style was used in the situations to achieve virtue. However, the rank 
order of the frequency of use of the styles roughly corresponded to Ruch’s (2001) findings on 
the location of the comic styles on the “good humor” vs. “bad humor” factor. That is, 
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benevolent comic styles were in general exploited more often in the virtue situations than 
malevolent styles. Only irony and nonsense seemed to have changed sides. Irony was among 
the four comic styles used more often—along with three benevolent styles, whereas nonsense 
was among the four styles used least in the reported situations. As irony is milder and not as 
“aggressive” as the other skeptical styles, it seems plausible to use it more often in context of 
virtue. Since the content of nonsense is absurd and literally does not make sense, nonsense 
does not necessarily seem to have a function with respect to virtue (see also Ruch & Hehl, 
1987). Thus it seems understandable that an application with any virtue as a purpose is not 
easily possible. 
However, the analyses of the different comic styles revealed that in comparison to 
other virtues, more skeptical, “laughing at” comic styles such as satire, cynicism or sarcasm 
were used in order to achieve justice. This result is in accordance with Schmidt-Hidding who 
proposes that mock and ridicule are based on moral sense (1963, p. 48), and Long and 
Graesser who proposed the use of sarcasm or satire in order to enforce social norms (1988, 
p. 53-54). The following example illustrates a situation where sarcasm was used to exert 
justice. 
About 40 years ago, when I was a student I had a summer job as a waiter in a hotel. 
The boss was extremely tough and dealt with the employees as if they were pieces of 
wood. Especially female foreign seasonal labors were exploited wherever possible (14 
hours of work with only one break, which was already before midday after only two 
hours of work, and during which they had to clean the bedrooms of their male 
colleagues—the waiters) and often were fired because of the smallest “misdoings”. 
When again a whole series of “sackings” had happened, I was seething with rage 
about this injustice and xenophobia. But because I didn’t dare stand up to it openly, I 
started humming the melody of “Zehn kleine Negerlein” (An outdated children’s song 
to the tune of “Ten Little Indians”, containing ten verses in each of which one boy 
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dies or “disappears”, A/N) while I was cleaning the lounge—loud enough for my boss 
to hear it. She snarled at me asking what I was singing, and I told her defiantly. She 
left without another word. —It was due to an older waiter that I wasn’t fired after this 
incident; he told me later that he had spoken to her on my behalf. Here the “humor” of 
the song served as a vehicle for standing up for justice in a hidden way, because I 
didn’t dare do it openly. 
The situation exemplifies a hard situation involving a high degree of injustice 
(although also courage was probably needed in this situation). The participant described how 
(self-reported) sarcasm helped him to express his disapproval of his boss’ exploitative and 
xenophobic behavior.  
Above, several possible explanations were discussed why justice has been shown less 
often in a humorous way than what could be expected when considering the high commitment 
to it. If skeptical styles were used disproportionately often in justice situations, this might be 
an additional explanation for the reduced frequency of justice and humor. Not everybody is 
able or ready to use skeptical comic styles. 
Of course, not all justice situations involved sarcasm. For example, one participant 
described how she achieved justice among children pushing around a toy. She settled a 
dispute among them by imitating their behavior in an exaggerated, funny way, which made 
the children laugh and pay more attention to all children being able to play with it. The comic 
style she identified in this situation was fun.  
The following examples illustrate how further comic styles were used in order to exert 
virtues. One participant provided the following transcendence situation as an example for the 
comic style humor (in its narrow sense). She reported how her grandmother, when she was 
about to die, had planned the funeral together with the priest and her family including the 
guest list and funeral oration. She had intended to “make it a nice day, since all family and 
friends were meeting there.” According to the participant, on the funeral day there was indeed 
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a lot of laughter, thus the grandmother had succeeded in planning an event in the way she 
wanted it to be transcending her own death. An example for wit and irony is given in a 
situation reported for the virtue temperance. The participant described a friend moving into 
her tiny room in her accommodation during a weekend workshop, and reducing her demands 
concerning the size of motel rooms by commenting that luxury doesn’t make one happy 
anyway.  
There are, of course, limitations to the study. The analyses were restricted to self-
reports of comic styles. However, there was a considerable agreement between the comic 
styles self-reported by the participants and those coded by an expert for 40 of the situations. 
This agreement has been found in spite of the fact that the expert was not present in the actual 
situations (and thus only had the reports varying in veracity with the writing abilities of the 
participants). It is necessary to replicate the link between skeptical comic styles and justice. 
Furthermore, there might be further humor styles that were not included in the present list.  
Nevertheless, the current study was able to show that humor can be a way of 
implementing virtue. It yielded a pool of situations covering six universal virtues. It focused 
on the general feasibility and analyzed the comic styles used in the situations. Based on this 
study it is now possible to extract more detailed facets on how each virtue can be realized. 
Similarly, the causality is not always clear: does a person exert wisdom in a humorous way, or 
does a person use humor in a wise and tactful way? This corresponds to Aristotle’s’ view on 
humor, summed up by Morreall: “The virtue of engaging in humor to the right degree, and at 
the right time and place, Aristotle called eutrapelia, ready-wittedness” (2008, p. 218). Both 
directions might be possible and should be investigated based on the examples collected in 
this study. 
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Abstract 
Laughing at oneself constitutes a core component of the sense of humor in the theories 
of several authors (e.g., Lersch, 1962; McGhee, 1996). In McGhee’s (1996) eight-
step-training program of the sense of humor, laughing at oneself constitutes one of the 
most difficult levels. However, some have doubted the existence of laughing at 
oneself, because in their view humor derives from a feeling of superiority (e.g., 
Gruner 1997; La Fave, Haddad, & Maesen, 1996). Using a multi-method approach, in 
the current study, 70 psychology students and a total of 126 peers filled in the Sense of 
Humor Scale (SHS, McGhee 1996), containing as a subscale “Laughing at oneself”. 
Additionally, the participants answered the Short form of the Eysenck Personality 
Questionnaire Revised (EPQ-RK, Eysenck, Eysenck, & Barrett, 1985), and the Trait 
and State forms of the State-Trait-Cheerfulness-Inventory (STCI, Ruch, Köhler, & van 
Thriel, 1996, 1997). They then were confronted with six distorted images of 
themselves. Facial responses of the participants were videotaped and analyzed using 
the Facial Action Coding System (FACS, Ekman, Friesen, & Hager, 2002). Four 
indicators of exhilaration were examined: experienced funniness, AU12 smiles, 
Duchenne displays, and laughter. Furthermore, fake and masking smiles were studied. 
Results demonstrated that self- and peer reports of “laughing at oneself” converged 
moderately. All four indicators of exhilaration were shown, but laughter seemed to be 
the most strongly predicted behavior. Trait cheerfulness and (low) seriousness, 
emotional stability, and a cheerful mood state formed further characteristics of persons 
who laugh at themselves. 
 
Keywords: Laughing at oneself; distorted portraits; Duchenne display; sense of 
humor; Cheerfulness 
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Introduction 
While the sense of humor incorporates facets like humor production and humor 
temperament (Ruch, 2004), several authors have argued that a core component of humor is to 
be able to laugh at oneself (Lersch, 1962). Yet, to this day, despite increasing attention to it as 
a personality construct (cf. Martin, 2007; Ruch, 2007), there is no authoritative definition of 
the sense of humor, and it is also not yet clear what “laughing at oneself” is, or if it even 
actually occurs in people’s everyday behavior. 
 “Laughing at oneself”: Theoretical Claims and Empirical Evidence 
The concept of “laughing at oneself” has not been thoroughly examined. Some have 
even argued against its existence, because in their view humor derives from a feeling of 
superiority (cf. Aristotle, 335 BC/1932; Hobbes, 1588-1679, cited by Morreall, 1987). 
Hobbes stated that laughing at oneself is only possible when laughing at a “former” self. 
Gruner (1997) views humor as a playful contest with winners and losers, one being superior 
to the other one. La Fave, Haddad, and Maesen (1996) considered “laughing at oneself” a 
“myopic illusion“ (p. 79). They reason that a mishap at one‘s own expense can‘t be a happy 
event. One of the possible reasons for laughter when considering one’s own follies they 
provided was self-hatred or masochism, furthermore separating the amusing part of the self 
from the “butt part” (p. 82). They also pointed out that humor is not necessarily the same as 
laughter, and that a differentiation between several kinds of smiling and laughter would be 
necessary.  
In contrast to the latter position, in everyday language as well as in philosophical 
literature the ability to “laugh at oneself” is often considered a core component of the sense of 
humor and in this manifestation might even “qualify” humor itself as a virtue. Comte-
Sponville (2001), for example, stated that humor leads to humility. One should laugh at 
oneself before laughing at anything else, but without hatred. A person lacking the ability to be 
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amused by his or her own foolishness develops a kind of rigidity and doesn’t have any ‘slack’ 
in their personality (Roberts, 1988). Lersch (1962), who saw humor as a world-view, 
considered the inability to laugh at oneself or to distance oneself from one‘s problems, and the 
tendency to take oneself too seriously, indicators for “humorlessness”.  
Nevo (1985) studied laughing at one’s own expense in Jewish and Arab participants, 
who rated funniness of jokes with a Jewish and with an Arab butt. They were also asked to 
complete conversations between Jews and Arabs in cartoon-like drawings in a humorous way. 
Participants aimed 11.3% of the humorous remarks at their own group. Nevo thus concluded 
that self-aimed humor exists. However, humor aimed at or laughing at one’s own group still 
might be different from laughing at oneself. Apart from the possibility that one might not 
consider oneself a “real member” of the group, Davies (1991, 2002) argued that one could 
laugh at one’s own group without laughing at oneself even if one does not reject or distance 
oneself from the group. For example, it would be possible to accept a characteristic or so-
called “stereotype” about the own group and to make fun of it because one is confident it does 
not apply to oneself. 
McGhee (1979), whose Sense of Humor Scale (SHS, McGhee, 1996) is the only 
existing questionnaire containing a subscale that measures “laughing at oneself”, considers 
humor a form of play. In his eight-step-training program of the sense of humor (McGhee, 
1996), taking oneself lightly and laughing at oneself constitutes one of the most difficult 
levels of the sense of humor. Among other things, taking oneself lightly means seeing the 
funny side of one’s own circumstances or behavior. But he also emphasized that laughing at 
oneself doesn’t mean put-down humor, but rather to confidently accept problems or 
weaknesses that one can’t change. Using McGhee’s scale, Ruch and Carrell (1998) studied 
the relation of the sense of humor to what Ruch, Köhler, and van Thriel (1996, 1997) consider 
the temperamental basis of humor: Cheerfulness, seriousness and bad mood. They found that 
trait cheerfulness and some facets of low seriousness predicted laughing at oneself.  
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But until now, there is only one description of “laughing at oneself” (i.e., McGhee, 
1996), and is largely described ex negativo, that is, what it is not (e.g., taking oneself not too 
seriously). No experimental approach has been attempted to study the phenomenon of 
“laughing at oneself” and it is not at all clear what “laughing at oneself” looks like 
behaviorally. 
Until now no studies have been done that evaluated the role of Extraversion, 
Neuroticism, and Psychoticism in laughing at oneself. But several components of the sense of 
humor have been found to relate to Extraversion (Köhler & Ruch, 1996), which is defined by 
components such as susceptibility for positive affect, or smiling and laughter (Ruch, 1999). 
On the contrary, Neuroticism is a predictor of negative affectivity and has often been related 
negatively to different sense of humor components (Köhler & Ruch, 1996). 
Measuring Behavior—Laughing at Oneself? 
What can be considered as behavioral signs of laughing at oneself? Until now, there is 
no empirical evidence for how people respond to situations in which laughing at oneself 
would be one of several options. Experimental settings that are able to provoke laughing at 
oneself may also provoke negative responses—especially in persons who don’t or cannot 
laugh at themselves. Furthermore, accepting one’s problems, embarrassing experiences or 
weaknesses, or disliked features might still imply negative feelings about them. However, as 
McGhee (1996) puts it, laughing at oneself should help mastering these emotions by being 
able to heartily laugh at them. Thus, even if negative emotions occur, they should be 
alternated by positive emotions or genuine enjoyment and exhilaration6, unencumbered by 
                                                
6 The term exhilaration is derived from its Latin root (hilaris = cheerful) to denote either the 
process of making cheerful or the temporary rise in cheerful state (Ruch, 1997). Current 
dictionaries list two meanings for “exhilarate”. These are “to make cheerful or merry” and “to 
enliven; invigorate; stimulate” (Webster’s Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the 
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negative emotions. However, the term “hearty laughter” leads to the assumption that the 
emotion exhilaration is elicited. But it is not yet clear whether literally laughter will be 
shown, or merely smiling and finding an own image funny, or if it even only means the 
absence of negative emotions at the sight of distorted images of oneself. 
The emotion exhilaration is observable in physiology, emotional experience, and 
behavior (Ruch, 1993). The experience of exhilaration can be assessed by self-report, whereas 
the facial expression can be measured by analyses of the facial movements (i.e., the Facial 
Action Coding System, FACS, Ekman, Friesen, & Hager, 2002). FACS is a comprehensive 
coding system describing 44 minimal facial movements—so-called action units (AUs)—
based on the muscular anatomy of the face. 
FACS has proven to be useful in humor research as it is capable to differentiate 
between genuine and fake types of smiling. This is important because failing to identify 
genuine types of smiling and laughter often led to distorted results in former studies (cf. Ruch, 
1997). Using FACS, classifications of smiles were determined that describe up to 18 types of 
smiles (cf. Bänninger-Huber, 1996; Ekman, 1985), most of which are not smiles of 
enjoyment. An important marker of genuine enjoyment is the Duchenne display (Ekman, 
Davidson, & Friesen, 1990). The Duchenne display refers to a contraction of the Zygomatic 
Major (pulling the lip corners backwards and upwards, AU12) and the Orbicularis Oculi, Pars 
Orbitalis, muscles (raising the cheeks causing eye wrinkles, AU6). Symmetry of the facial 
actions is another marker for spontaneous and genuine facial expressions. 
However, Ruch (1990) found that different levels of exhilaration influence the 
threshold for facial expression of exhilaration. He was able to show that the experience of 
exhilaration is induced at the easiest. This is followed by an AU12, then by the joint action of 
AU12 and AU6, and then by laughter.  
                                                                                                                                                   
English Language; 1989). The latter meaning is not referred to by the German term 
Erheiterung on which our coining of exhilaration is based. 
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People who can’t laugh at themselves probably experience more negative emotions 
when provoked to laugh at themselves. This could result in facial expressions of negative or 
mixed emotions. Smiles of people who are not being able to laugh at themselves could be 
suppressed or accompanied by signs of contempt or annoyance. 
The Present Study 
The current study addressed the phenomenon of laughing at oneself using a multi-
method approach: (a) self-report, (b) peer-report, and, in an experimental setting, (c) 
behavioral responses to stimuli which might provoke laughter at oneself. The participants 
were surprised by distorted portraits of themselves. Thus they were put in a situation where 
negative or positive responses were possible, including smiling or laughing at themselves. As 
a comparison, distorted portraits of two strangers were also used. Participants’ emotional 
responses were assessed through funniness- and aversion ratings and video analyses of their 
facial expression. 
Aims of the study were firstly to investigate the convergent validity among methods in 
the form of a positive relationship among self- and peer-report and behavioral responses—i.e., 
verbal and facial signs of exhilaration were expected for people who endorse laughing at 
oneself in a questionnaire. In the current study, four levels of exhilarated behavior are 
examined. In the strictest sense of laughing at oneself, the more participants describe 
themselves as laughing at oneself, the more they should indeed show laughter when 
confronted with distorted portraits of themselves. If only true in a wider sense, smiling in a 
genuine way (i.e., the Duchenne display) should go along with self- or peer-reports of 
laughing at oneself. As a sign of lower intensity of laughing at oneself, genuine AU12 with or 
without AU6 (i.e., symmetrical and not accompanied by negative emotions) is expected. As 
the lowest intensity of exhilaration in laughing at oneself, participants who reported to laugh 
at themselves in the SHS (McGhee, 1996) and whose peers did so as well, were expected to 
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find their own images funny. In contrast to this, fake or masking smiles, i.e., AU12s that are 
asymmetric or accompanied by AUs indicating negative emotions, should be negatively 
related to laughing at oneself in the SHS. 
Secondly, relations to the temperamental basis of humor—i.e., cheerfulness, 
seriousness, and bad mood—and other personality variables (i.e., Psychoticism, Extraversion, 
and Neuroticism) should be investigated. It was expected that cheerfulness would be related 
positively to self- and peer-reported laughing at oneself as well as exhilaration responses 
within the experiment. Furthermore, laughing at oneself should be positively related to 
Extraversion and negatively related to Neuroticism. 
Finally, another measure was considered as an indicator for the tendency or ability of 
laughing at oneself. Participants have to fill out an agreement form at the end of experiments 
that involve video recordings. The obvious purpose of the agreement form is to document the 
readiness to have one’s video- and photo material exposed to a wider range of people—
ranging from having the material deleted on the spot to allowing its use in television 
documentaries. The degree of this readiness might also be related to the tendency of laughing 
at oneself. 
Method 
Participants 
The sample consisted of 70 psychology students (48 females, 22 males) between the 
ages of 19 and 65 years (M = 25.49, SD = 7.93), who were recruited in undergraduate 
psychology classes and via a mailing list. Each participant asked one to two peers to fill in the 
peer reports of the SHS. In total, 122 peers (72 females, 48 males, 2 n.n.) between the ages of 
18 and 72 years (M = 31.78, SD = 13.80) were recruited, but two participants did not provide 
peer ratings. In return for participation, personalized feedback on the results of the 
questionnaires after the end of data acquisition was provided by request. In three cases, a 
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camera failure occurred, so that the video material of 67 participants (45 females, 22 males) 
could be used for the facial analyses. 
Instruments 
The Sense of Humor Scale (SHS, McGhee, 1996) is a 40-item questionnaire with a 4-
point answering format (1 = “strongly disagree”; 4 = “strongly agree”). It is aimed at 
measuring what McGhee considers to be the foundation of sense of humor with eight 
subscales each of which contains five items. For the current paper, only the subscale SHS-7 
(laughing at oneself) was analyzed. An example for an item of the scale is “I have no trouble 
poking fun at certain physical qualities of myself.” In addition, a peer questionnaire form was 
generated by rephrasing the items in a he/she-version and adapting the instructions 
accordingly. 
The State-Trait-Cheerfulness-Inventory (STCI, Ruch, Köhler, & van Thriel, 1996, 
1997) assesses cheerfulness, seriousness, and bad mood as habitual traits and as actual states 
with a four-point answer format from 1 = “strongly disagree” to 4 = “strongly agree”. The 
standard trait form STCI-T<60> contains 60 items (20 items for each dimension). The 
instructions aim at moods and mentality in general. Item examples for the trait version are “I 
am a cheerful person” (trait cheerfulness), “In my life, I like to have everything correct” (trait 
seriousness) and “Compared to others, I really can be grumpy and grouchy” (trait bad mood). 
The standard state form STCI-S<30> consists of 30 items (10 items for each dimension). The 
instruction addresses the mood state at this moment. Item examples are “I feel merry” (state 
cheerfulness), “I am in a thoughtful mood” (state seriousness) and “My mood is spoiled” 
(state bad mood). 
The short version of the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire—Revised (EPQ-RK, 
Eysenck, Eysenck, & Barrett, 1985) in its German adaptation by Ruch (1999) is a 50-item 
questionnaire in a yes-no answer format. It assesses the dimensions of the PEN personality 
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system, namely Psychoticism (14 items), Extraversion (12 items), and Neuroticism (12 items), 
and an additional Lie scale (12 items). The questionnaire contains items like “Do you take 
much notice of what people think?” (Psychoticism, negatively keyed), “Do you enjoy meeting 
new people?” (Extraversion), “Are you a worrier?” (Neuroticism), or “Have you ever cheated 
at a game?” (Lie scale). Only the content scales are analyzed within the current study.  
The Agreement Form asks for the permission in different degrees of usage of the 
video- and photo material (in anonymized form) produced during the experiment. The five 
degrees range from 1 = “The material has to be deleted on the spot”, 2 = “The material may 
be analyzed in the context of the current study”, 3 = “The material may be analyzed and 
archived and may be used for future research purposes (e.g., training of experimenters)”, 
4 = “The material may be analyzed and archived and may be used for future research and 
teaching purposes (it may be shown to students)”, 5 = “The material may be analyzed and 
archived and may be used for future research, teaching and publication or documentation 
purposes (e.g., television documentaries)”.  
Confrontation with Distorted Images of the Participants’ Faces: The Distorted Portrait 
Judgment Task 
The Distorted Portrait Judgment Task (DPJT) aimed at measuring verbal and facial 
indicators of exhilaration at the sight of distorted portraits of oneself and two strangers. It 
consisted of 18 distorted images of faces, i.e., of a set of 18 Distorted Portraits. There were 
six distorted portraits of a woman’s face (i.e., a subset of Distorted Portraits of Woman), six 
distorted portraits of a man’s face (i.e., a subset of Distorted Portraits of Man, resulting in a 
subset of 12 Distorted Portraits of Strangers), and six distorted portraits of the participant’s 
face (i.e., a subset of Distorted Portraits of Oneself). The distorted portraits were integrated in 
a computer presentation and had to be rated for funniness (1 = “not funny”, 7 = “very funny”) 
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and aversion (1 = “not aversive”, 7 = “very aversive”) on an answer sheet in paper-and-pencil 
format.  
All distorted portraits were created using a web cam and the program “Photo Booth” 
that is part of Mac OS X. For each distorted portrait within one subset, a different distortion 
effect (e.g., stretch, twirl) was chosen. The subset of Distorted Portraits of Strangers already 
existed before the experiment within the DPJT computer presentation. The production of the 
Distorted Portraits of Oneself and their insertion into the computer presentation took place at 
the beginning of the experiment, while participants filled in a questionnaire. Each distorted 
portrait was on a single slide and a sound signaled each slide transition. The distorted portraits 
of the three subsets (Distorted Portraits of Men, Distorted Portraits of Woman, Distorted 
Portraits of Oneself) were in a counterbalanced order with respect to the distortion effect and 
the position of the images of the Distorted Portraits of Man and Distorted Portrait of Woman. 
A parallel version with a mirrored sequence of the distorted portraits was developed, so that in 
total two versions existed. However, images from the Distorted Portraits of Oneself were in 
the same positions in both versions, and both versions started with an image from the 
Distorted Portraits of Oneself. Figure 1 shows illustrative examples of the subset Distorted 
Portraits of Oneself.  
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Note. a The photographs in the figure demonstrate the distortion effects used for the Distorted 
Portraits of Oneself. They don’t show an actual participant. b The image numbers represent 
the position of the images out of the Distorted Portraits of Oneself within the computer 
presentation of all 18 stimuli. 
Figure 1. Example stimuli of distorted images of the participant’s face (Distorted Portraits of 
Oneself).  
Figure 1 shows the distortion effects that were used for the distorted portraits. 
Furthermore, the position of the images from the Distorted Portraits of Oneself among all 18 
portraits is indicated. Mean scores for funniness and for aversion of Distorted Portraits of 
Oneself (PorO f, PorO a) and Distorted Portraits of Strangers (PorS f, PorS a) were derived.  
Facial Measurement 
The Facial Action Coding System (FACS, Ekman, Friesen, & Hager, 2002) was used 
as method for measuring facial parameters of enjoyment and other facial reactions to the 
distorted images. All AUs were coded for frequency, intensity (on a 5-point scale ranging 
from 1 = “minimum intensity” to 5 = “maximum intensity”, corresponding to the FACS A = 
“trace” to E = “maximum”) and symmetry. However, analyses focused on AU12 and 
AU6+12 (the Duchenne display). These AUs could possibly be accompanied by AU 7 (lids 
tight), AU 25 (lips part), AU 26 (jaw drop), and AU 27 (mouth stretch). Negative emotions 
must not occur simultaneously for a Duchenne display. Additionally, laughing was defined by 
coding forced exhalation of air accompanying AU6+12. In agreement with Ruch (1997) and 
Zweyer, Velker, and Ruch (2004) single vs. multiple (which could be either voiced or 
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unvoiced) forced exhalations of air were distinguished. Furthermore, “instruction” (for 
reading the instruction) and “writing” (for performing the ratings on the sheet of paper) were 
defined as coding units. “Picture” was an additional coding unit coded with every “beep” 
sound that indicated a change of picture on the participant’s screen. Head and eye movements 
related to these activities were not coded separately. The coding was performed by two 
certified FACS-coders using the software “Observer” by Noldus. The facial reactions of five 
participants were coded by both coders to determine the reliability and the resulting 
coefficient was .93.  
For analyses of AU12 as well as AU6+12, the occurrence, frequency, and intensity for 
Distorted Portraits of Oneself and the Distorted Portraits of Strangers were analyzed. AU12 
included all AU12 with or without AU6; however, AU12 and AU6+12 were only taken into 
account when they were not asymmetric or accompanied by AUs indicating negative 
emotions, such as AU4 (brow lowerer), AU10 (upper lip raiser), AU11 (nasolabial furrow 
deepener), AU14 (dimpler), AU15 (lip corner depressor), AU20 (lip stretch), or AU24 (lip 
presser). Occurrence of AU12 and AU6+12 was an index reflecting whether the respective 
AUs were (= 1) or were not (= 0) displayed at least once per portrait. This resulted in four 
scores: the averaged occurrence of AU12 when watching Distorted Portraits of Oneself 
(PorO 12 Occ.), of AU6+12 when watching Distorted Portraits of Oneself (PorO 6+12 Occ.), 
of AU12 when watching with Distorted Portraits of Strangers (PorS 12 Occ.), and of AU6+12 
when watching Distorted Portraits of Strangers (PorS 6+12 Occ.). Likewise, four scores each 
were built for frequency and for intensity. Frequency was defined by the total number of 
AU12 and of AU6+12 per Distorted Portrait, averaged across the Distorted Portraits of 
Oneself (PorO 12 fr., PorO 6+12 fr.) and across the Distorted Portraits of Strangers 
(PorS 12 fr., PorS 6+12 fr.). For intensity scores, the mean maximum intensity was taken. 
That is, the maximum intensity of AU12 and of AU6+12 per portrait was averaged across the 
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Distorted Portraits of Oneself (PorO 12 Int., PorO 6+12 Int.) and the Distorted Portraits of 
Strangers (PorS 12 Int., PorS 6+12 Int.).  
For laughter, the frequency was defined by the total number of a series of single or 
multiple expulsion of air (accompanying AU6+12) per portrait, resulting in frequency of 
laughter in response to Distorted Portraits of Oneself (PorO laugh fr.) and frequency of 
laughter in response to Distorted Portraits of Strangers (PorS laugh fr.). The iterative rate of 
laughter ranged from 0 (no laughter at all) via 1 (single expulsion of air, such as “ha”) to 2 
(multiple expulsion of air, such as “ha-ha-ha”). This score was coded for each portrait and 
then averaged across the Distorted Portraits of Oneself (PorO laugh rate) and Distorted 
Portraits of Strangers (PorS laugh rate). 
Procedure 
The participants filled in the paper-and-pencil versions of the EPQ-RK, STCI-T, and 
the SHS at home. The peers answered the SHS Form Peers only. They were instructed to 
return their questionnaires directly to the Department of Psychology to ensure their anonymity 
towards those whom they answered the SHS Form Peer for. In addition, the participants were 
invited to an experimental part at the Department of Psychology for a single testing session 
during which they also handed in their questionnaires.  
The experimental part consisted of the STCI-S<30>, the production of the Distorted 
Portraits of Oneself, and the Distorted Portrait Judgment Task. For the DPJT, the participants 
were seated in front of a computer. Answer sheets for the ratings were in paper-and-pencil 
format. Each parallel version of the distorted portraits in the DPJT was answered by half of 
the participants to counteract sequence effects. For the assessment of mood states, the 
participants were seated at another desk and answered the paper-and-pencil version of the 
STCI-S before and after the task. The experimental part lasted approximately 20-30 minutes. 
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As a cover story when producing the Distorted Portraits of Oneself for the DPJT, 
participants were told that the photos were “made for a study evaluating physiognomy 
hypotheses” and did not know of the distortion. The Distorted Portraits of Oneself were 
inserted into the DPJT computer presentation without the participants’ awareness while they 
filled in the STCI-S for the first time. They received instructions by the DPJT computer 
presentation to rate the photographs they were going to see. However, they were not informed 
that they would see distorted portraits, and that some of them would show themselves.  
During the whole procedure, a hidden camera recorded their face. At the end of the 
experiment, the participants were debriefed and informed of the actual goal of the study and 
that they have been secretly videotaped. They filled in the Agreement Form in which they 
were offered to see the video material deleted in front of their eyes. None of the participants 
took up the offer.  
Results  
In a first step, the means, standard deviations, skewness, kurtosis for each variable and 
Cronbach Alphas for the questionnaire scales and Distorted Portraits ratings were analyzed. 
The two peer-reports were averaged and these scores were used for all analyses. When a 
participant had only one peer report (14 cases), this single measure was used. The means, 
standard deviations, skewness, kurtosis, and Cronbach Alphas are presented in Table 1. 
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Table 1.  
Means, Standard Deviations and Alphas of Laughing at Oneself (Self and Peer), State and 
Trait Cheerfulness, Seriousness, and Bad Mood, Personality, and Responses to the Distorted 
Portrait Judgment Task. 
Variables M SD Sk K α 
Laughing at yourself, Self-report (SHS) 14.80 3.16 -0.90 0.97 .86 
Laughing at yourself, Peer-report (SHS) 13.60 2.81 -0.18 -0.33 .82 
Trait cheerfulness (STCI-T) 63.23 9.38 -0.74 -0.14 .91 
Trait seriousness (STCI-T) 46.52 6.54 -0.13 -0.06 .73 
Trait bad mood (STCI-T) 36.91 12.47 0.62 -0.72 .95 
State cheerfulness (STCI-S), t1 27.03 5.97 -0.39 -0.19 .92 
State cheerfulness (STCI-S), t2 29.58 6.45 -0.83 0.80 .94 
State seriousness (STCI-S), t1 22.74 5.49 0.02 -0.39 .85 
State seriousness (STCI-S), t2 19.09 6.36 0.99 0.80 .91 
State bad mood (STCI-S), t1 13.53 4.65 1.51 1.55 .88 
State bad mood (STCI-S), t2 12.64 4.08 1.62 2.11 .89 
Psychoticism (EPQ-RK) 3.41 2.53 1.48 2.96 .76 
Extraversion (EPQ-RK) 8.01 2.96 -0.72 -0.04 .80 
Neuroticism (EPQ-RK) 5.30 3.10 0.40 -0.66 .80 
Agreement Form 3.51 1.12 -0.02 -1.35 - 
PorO, funniness 4.36 1.17 -0.78 0.53 .76 
PorO, aversion 1.94 1.28 1.56 1.63 .87 
PorS, funniness 3.83 0.93 0.02 0.33 .84 
PorS, aversion 1.57 0.85 1.79 2.51 .92 
PorO, AU12 occurrence 0.58 0.28 -0.51 -0.76 - 
(table continues) 
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Table 1. (continued)  
Variables M SD Sk K α 
PorO, AU6+12 occurrence 0.38 0.28 0.00 -1.34 - 
PorS, AU12 occurrence 0.40 0.30 0.50 -0.82 - 
PorS, AU6+12 occurrence 0.16 0.19 1.29 0.77 - 
PorO, AU12, intensity 1.70 0.98 0.01 -1.03 - 
PorO, AU6+12, intensity 1.43 1.15 0.35 -0.90 - 
PorS, AU12, intensity 0.79 0.63 0.60 -0.63 - 
PorS, AU6+12, intensity 0.41 0.51 1.27 0.90 - 
PorO, frequency of laughter 0.21 0.39 2.80 8.80 - 
PorS, frequency of laughter 0.04 0.08 3.37 13.58 - 
PorO, laughter rate 0.24 0.36 1.50 1.45 - 
PorS, laughter rate 0.05 0.15 2.40 5.41 - 
Note. Nself = 65-70. Npeer = 126. 
SHS = Sense of Humor Scale; STCI = State-Trait-Cheerfulness-Inventory; T = Trait part; S = 
State part; t1 = testing time 1; t2 = testing time 2; t3 = testing time 3; EPQ-RK = Short 
version of the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire Revised (only content scales were 
analyzed); PorO = Distorted Portraits of Oneself; PorS = Distorted Portraits of Strangers; 12 = 
AU12; 6+12 = AU6 + AU12 (Duchenne display). 
Table 1 shows that all questionnaire scales and the ratings for the portraits yielded 
satisfactory reliabilities ranging from .73 to .95. Compared to data in former studies, all 
means were within a range of +/- one standard deviation of the means found in the those 
studies.  
Three of the facial indicators of enjoyment deviated from normal distribution rather 
strongly, namely frequency and iterative rate of laughter when confronted with Distorted 
Portraits of Oneself, and iterative rate of laughter when confronted with Distorted Portraits of 
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Strangers (see Table 1). Following recommendations by Tabachnick and Fidell (2007), they 
were transformed by using a square root transformation in order to counteract distortion of the 
results in the analyses. In each of the three variables, the transformation resulted in skewness 
and kurtosis values < 2.56 and were thus assumed as adjusted to normal distribution. In all 
following analyses the transformed variables were used. 
Laughing at Oneself within the Questionnaires: Self- and Peer Ratings, Personality Traits, 
and Mood States 
Pearson correlations were calculated between self- and peer-report of laughing at 
oneself, trait cheerfulness, seriousness, and bad mood, the PEN variables, and facial and 
verbal responses to the Distorted Portraits of Oneself and of strangers. They are shown in 
Table 2. 
Table 2 shows that self- and peer-reports of laughing at oneself converged moderately 
well, r = .31, p < .01. Furthermore, as expected, those higher in trait cheerfulness reported to 
laugh more at themselves (i.e., subscale SHS-7 out of the SHS, McGhee, 1996). Those 
participants who were described with higher scores in laughing at oneself (SHS-7) by their 
peers were less habitually serious (trait seriousness). Furthermore, extraverts scored higher in 
self- as well as peer-reported laughing at oneself. Participants who were described to laugh 
more at themselves by their peers also seemed to be more psychoticistic. 
Self-reports of laughing at oneself also predicted mood states. People who had higher 
scores in laughing at oneself, also were likely to be more cheerful, less serious, and in a less 
bad mood both prior to and following the DPJT.  
Furthermore, the Agreement Form was related to the self-report of laughing at oneself. 
Participants who reported to laugh at themselves to a higher extent also were more likely 
ready to have their video- and photo material exposed to a wider range of people (r = .20, 
p = .05, one-tailed). 
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Table 2. 
Correlations between Laughing at Oneself (Self and Peer), PEN Variables, Trait and State Cheerfulness, Seriousness and Bad Mood, and Verbal 
and Facial Indicators of Funniness and Aversion Towards the Different Subsets of Distorted Portraits. 
LaY Indicators 
LaY 
self 
LaY 
peer 
Trait 
CH 
Trait 
SE 
Trait 
BM P E N 
State 
CH t1 
State 
CH t2 
State 
SE t1 
State 
SE t2 
State 
BM t1 
State 
BM t2 
LaY self - .31** .32** -.11 -.08 -.02 .20† -.07 .47*** .40*** -.40*** -.32** -.34** -.28* 
LaY peer .31** - .13 -.38*** -.06 .24* .23† -.02 .09 -.08 -.19 .00 -.12 -.04 
PorO laugh fr. a .24* .28* .19 .16 -.22† .17 -.07 -.25* .13 .19 -.19 -.19 -.07 -.08 
PorS laugh fr. a .04 .11 .10 .11 -.22† .16 -.05 -.24* .06 .07 -.04 -.03 .11 .09 
PorO laugh rate .20† .27* .16 -.05 -.27* .11 .13 -.23† .15 .19 -.16 -.20† -.09 -.11 
PorS laugh rate a .07 .10 .21† -.08 -.29* .07 .13 -.24* .14 .14 -.11 -.08 .05 .05 
PorO 12 fr. .12 .10 .17 .12 -.24† .22† -.11 -.22† .06 .18 -.13 -.18 -.10 -.08 
PorO 6+12 fr. .16 .19 .17 .04 -.26* .24* .04 -.23† .06 .20† -.13 -.20† -.20† -.19 
PorS 12 fr. .16 .08 .24* .10 -.27* .02 -.09 -.19 .15 .25* -.25* -.23† -.13 -.15 
PorS 6+12 fr. .20† .18 .23† .01 -.21† .09 .03 -.14 .09 .11 -.16 -.13 .03 .03 
(table continues) 
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Table 2 (continued). 
LaY Indicators 
LaY 
self 
LaY 
peer 
Trait 
CH 
Trait 
SE 
Trait 
BM P E N 
State 
CH t1 
State 
CH t2 
State 
SE t1 
State 
SE t2 
State 
BM t1 
State 
BM t2 
PorO laughing qu.b .30* .29* .23† -.19 -.26* .09 .31* -.17 .18 .18 -.19 -.22† .03 .04 
PorS laughing qu.c -.19 .06 -.12 -.19 -.03 .05 .11 -.06 -.06 -.10 .16 .20 .24 .19 
PorO 12 occ. .22† .09 .28* .20† -.30* .15 -.06 -.21† .18 .32** -.19 -.32** -.23† -.27* 
PorO 6+12 occ. .21† .16 .18 .12 -.25* .17 -.07 -.17 .08 .26* -.16 -.29* -.25* -.29* 
PorS 12 occ. .19 .07 .24* .07 -.24* .05 -.07 -.16 .16 .26* -.25* -.25* -.13 -.16 
PorS 6+12 occ. .22† .18 .20† .01 -.18 .08 .00 -.11 .09 .11 -.15 -.12 .03 .02 
PorO 12 int. .23† .13 .15 .11 -.21† .18 -.17 -.20† .13 .29* -.25* -.34** -.20† -.23† 
PorO 6+12 int. .23† .17 .09 .04 -.17 .24* -.09 -.15 .07 .25* -.19 -.30* -.20† -.25* 
PorS 12 int. .22† .07 .26* .05 -.20† .04 -.09 -.13 .19 .26* -.30* -.28* -.08 -.09 
PorS 6+12 int. .22† .16 .21† .04 -.17 .06 -.05 -.09 .11 .16 -.21† -.18 .03 .01 
(table continues) 
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Table 2 (continued). 
LaY Indicators 
LaY 
self 
LaY 
peer 
Trait 
CH 
Trait 
SE 
Trait 
BM P E N 
State 
CH t1 
State 
CH t2 
State 
SE t1 
State 
SE t2 
State 
BM t1 
State 
BM t2 
PorO f .28* .15 .25* .06 -.25* .03 -.03 -.14 .26* .49*** -.30* -.52*** -.39*** -.44*** 
PorO a -.16 -.16 .16 -.09 -.14 .09 .29* -.01 .01 -.08 .01 .05 .00 .00 
PorS f .20† .04 .24* .11 -.14 .01 .07 .03 .25 .41*** -.16 -.38*** -.27* -.32** 
PorS a -.23† -.26* .18 .09 -.21† -.02 .16 -.15 .11 .08 .06 .04 -.04 -.05 
Note. N = 65 – 70. Nb = 53; Nc = 40. 
LaY self = Self-report of laughing at oneself (SHS, Sense of Humor Scale); LaY peer = Peer-report of laughing at oneself (SHS); P = Psychoticism 
(EPQ-RK, short version of the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire Revised); E = Extraversion (EPQ-RK); N = Neuroticism (EPQ-RK); CH = 
Cheerfulness (STCI, State-Trait-Cheerfulness-Inventory); SE = Seriousness (STCI); BM = Bad Mood (STCI); Trait = Trait Part of the STCI; State 
= State part of the STCI; t = testing time. Por = Distorted Portrait; O = Oneself; S = Stranger; f = funniness; a = aversion; 12 = AU12; 6+12 = AU6 
+ AU12 (Duchenne display); int. = maximal intensity; fr. = frequency; occ. = occurrence; laugh rate = iterative laugh rate (single, multiple); 
laughing qu. = laughing quotient (laugh fr./AU6+12 fr.). 
a Variables were transformed using the square root. 
† p ≤ .05 (one-tailed). * p ≤ .05. ** p ≤ .01. *** p ≤ .001. 
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Laughing at Oneself within the Experiments: Facial Enjoyment 
The task proved useful in inducing exhilaration in the participants. Frequency analyses 
showed that in total, 63 out of 67 participants (94.03%) responded with at least one AU12 to 
the Distorted Portraits of Oneself. At least one Duchenne display (i.e., AU6+12) was shown 
by 53 (79.10%) participants. Furthermore, 27 participants (40.29%) laughed at least once. 
Regarding the Distorted Portraits of Strangers, 59 participants (88.06%) displayed at least one 
AU12, and 40 participants (59.70%) had at least one Duchenne display. In 15 cases (22.38%), 
laughter was shown at least once.  
Laughing 
One aim of the study was to investigate which levels of exhilaration are shown in the 
behavior of the participants when looking at their own pictures. Laughing at oneself, when 
understood in its strictest sense, should involve Duchenne display accompanied by single or 
multiple forced exhalations. Do people reporting to be able to laugh at themselves literally 
laugh when confronted with distorted images of themselves?  
Table 2 indicates that the more people reported to laugh at themselves, the more they 
showed laughter (frequency) when confronted with the Distorted Portraits of Oneself. Also 
the iterative rate of laughter (i.e., whether the forced exhalation of laughter was single or 
multiple) went along with the self-report. For those whose peers described them with higher 
scores in laughing at oneself (SHS-7), the correlations were even higher. In contrast to that, 
there was no significant correlation between frequency or rate of laughter as a response to 
Distorted Portraits of Strangers and self- and peer-report of laughing at oneself. 
Smiling 
Frequency of AU12 as well as of AU6+12 when confronted with Distorted Portraits of 
Oneself did not increase with the scores in self- nor to peer-report (see Table 2). But 
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displaying either AU12 or AU6+12 (occurrence) correlated with the self-report scale. 
Furthermore, participants who reported to laugh at themselves showed more intense AU12 
and AU6+12 (intensity). In contrast to laughing, the occurrences of smiling reaction (AU12 
alone, AU6+12) as well as intensity of the smiling reaction (AU6+12) as a response to the 
Distorted Portraits of Strangers were also related to self-reported laughing at oneself (see 
Table 2).  
In order to find out whether the proportion to which exhilaration is expressed by 
laughing rather than smiling was more distinctive for laughing at oneself rather than all 
distorted images, a laughing quotient was built by dividing the frequency of laughing by the 
frequency of Duchenne display (for those participants with a frequency of laughing greater 
than 0 only). This was done for the Distorted Portraits of Oneself (n = 53) as well as for the 
Distorted Portraits of Strangers (n = 40). Correlations suggested that the higher the laughing 
quotient was for Distorted Portraits of Oneself, the higher were their self- (r = .30, p < .05) 
and their peer- (r = .29, p < .05) rated laughing at oneself scores within the SHS (McGhee, 
1996), each with approximately 9% of overlapping variance (r2). There were no meaningful 
correlations between the laughing quotient and self-reported laughing at oneself 
(r = -.19, n.s.) and peer-reported laughing at oneself (r = .06, n.s.) for the Distorted Portraits 
of Strangers. 
However, the differentiation of genuine and false kinds of smiles proved to be 
important. Correlations with AU12 were only found when they were symmetric and not 
associated with AUs indicating negative emotions. Fake AU12 when watching Distorted 
Portraits of Oneself, i.e., AU12 accompanied by negative emotions or asymmetric AU12, 
were negatively related to self-reported laughing at oneself (r = -.27, p < .05). There were no 
correlations regarding peer-reports (r = -.14, n.s.). Neither were there correlations between 
self- (r = -.08, n.s.) nor peer-reports (r = .09, n.s.) for fake AU12 when watching Distorted 
Portraits of Strangers. 
PART III 
112 
Verbal responses 
Participants who reported to laugh at themselves within the SHS (McGhee, 1996) also 
found the Distorted Portraits of Oneself funny (see Table 2). However, they also rated the 
Distorted Portraits of Strangers as funny, albeit with a lower coefficient. Furthermore, 
participants whose self- and peer-reported laughing at oneself scores were low found the 
Distorted Portraits of Strangers aversive. 
Personality, Mood States and Laughing at Oneself in the Experiment 
Humor Temperament 
As shown in Table 2, humor temperament as well as the PEN variables were also 
related to the responses to the Distorted Portraits within the experiment. Trait cheerfulness 
predicted in particular occurrence, frequency, and intensity of smiling reactions, with the 
highest relation for occurrence of AU12 when confronted with Distorted Portraits of Oneself. 
Trait bad mood was consistently negatively related (however, not all at a significant level), 
also with the highest relation between occurrence of AU12 when judging the Distorted 
Portraits of Oneself. 
Psychoticism, Extraversion, and Neuroticism 
Among the PEN variables, Psychoticism predicted frequency and intensity of the 
Duchenne display when looking at the Distorted Portraits of Oneself (see Table 2). 
Furthermore, the more extraverted participants were, the more they expressed their 
exhilaration by laughter rather than smiling (i.e., the laughing quotient) when looking at their 
own Distorted Portraits. The coefficients between Neuroticism and the facial and verbal 
responses to the DPJT, as for bad mood, were negative (again, however, some of the 
coefficients were rather low).  
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Mood States 
Table 2 shows that facial as well as verbal responses to the Distorted Portrait 
Judgment Task were related to the mood states. Higher states of cheerfulness and lower states 
of seriousness and bad mood were related with higher funniness of the Distorted Portraits of 
Oneself. Sate cheerfulness subsequent to the DPJT was also related to both funniness of 
Distorted Portraits of Oneself and Distorted Portraits of Strangers. Furthermore, occurrence 
and intensity of both AU12 and AU12+6 in response to the Distorted Portraits of Oneself and 
of AU12 in response to Distorted Portraits of Strangers went along with subsequent sate 
cheerfulness.  
State seriousness and state bad mood decreased subsequent to the task with increasing 
funniness of Distorted Portraits of Oneself. Likewise, several facial indicators of enjoyment 
predicted both state seriousness and bad mood, with the highest relations being again 
occurrence and intensity of both AU12 and AU12+6 when confronted with Distorted Portraits 
of Oneself.  
Furthermore, a difference score was built by subtracting facial indicators of enjoyment 
in response to Distorted Portraits of Oneself from facial indicators of enjoyment in response 
to Distorted Portraits of Strangers. A positive score indicated that a participant found the 
Distorted Portraits of Oneself funnier than the Distorted Portraits of Stranger, whereas a 
negative score means that a participant found the Distorted Portraits of Strangers funnier than 
their own ones. Correlations revealed that showing Duchenne display more often and more 
intensely in response to own distorted portraits as compared to stranger’s ones (i.e., a higher 
difference score) contributed more to enhancement of state cheerfulness, r = .39, p < .001 for 
occurrence of Duchenne display, and r = .39, p < .001 for intensity of Duchenne display. 
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Multivariate Relations 
It was of interest to examine whether there are multivariate relations between 
experimental and trait variables related to laughing at oneself. Thus, a canonical correlation 
was computed between a set of trait “laughing at oneself” variables (i.e., trait variables 
measured by questionnaires) and a set of experimental positive response variables (i.e., 
observed responses to the stimuli within the experiment) using the software Statistica 4.1. 
Only variables with a positive valence were included. For the set of trait variables, scales 
measuring laughing at oneself directly and scales measuring strongly related traits were 
chosen. Those were the self- and peer-report of laughing at oneself (SHS, McGhee, 1996), 
and trait cheerfulness (STHI-T<60>, Ruch et al., 1996), which proved to be the strongest 
predictor of laughing at oneself among the positively related trait variables. This held within 
the correlation analyses as well as in the study by Ruch and Carrell (1998). For the set of 
response variables, for each level of exhilaration in response to Distorted Portraits of Oneself 
one representative variable was selected. That is, verbal ratings of funniness, occurrence of 
AU12, occurrence of AU6+12, frequency of laughter, and the laughing quotient—all in 
response to Distorted Portraits of Oneself—were chosen. This resulted in a first canonical 
correlation of R = .63, χ2 (15) = 27.88, p < .05. Thus, there was 40% of overlapping variance 
(R2) between the two sets of variables. Subsequent χ2 tests for the remaining four roots were 
not significant. Factor loadings are displayed in Table 3. 
Canonical factor loadings (see Table 3) ranged from -0.33 (laughing at oneself, peer-
report) to -0.85 (trait cheerfulness) with a median of -0.85 for the set of trait variables and -
-0.16 (PorO 6+12 occurrence) to -0.51 (PorO laughing quotient) with a median of Mdn = 
-0.33 for the set of response variables. All factor loadings were negative. 
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Table 3. 
Canonical Factor Loadings for two Canonical Correlation Analyses with Trait and Response 
Variables of Laughing at Oneself. 
 Canonical factor loadings 
Variables 
Set 1 excluding  
Agreement Form 
Set 1 including  
Agreement Form 
Trait variables   
LaY Self -0.84 0.78 
LaY Peer -0.33 0.72 
Trait CH -0.85 0.61 
Agreement Form  0.26 
Median -0.84 0.67 
Response variables   
PorO f -0.33 0.49 
PorO 12 occ. -0.45 0.45 
PorO 6+12 occ. -0.17 0.14 
PorO laugh qu. -0.51 0.39 
PorO laugh fr. -0.31 0.21 
Median -0.33 0.39 
Note. N = 49.  
Only the significant first root of each canonical correlation is shown. 
LaY self = Self-report of laughing at oneself (SHS, Sense of Humor Scale); LaY peer = Peer-
report of laughing at oneself (SHS); Trait CH = Trait cheerfulness (STCI-T<60>, trait part of 
the State-Trait-Cheerfulness-Inventory); PorO = Distorted Portraits of Oneself; f = funniness; 
a = aversion; 12 = AU12; 6+12 = AU6 + AU12 (Duchenne display); occ. = occurrence; 
laughing qu. = laughing quotient (Laugh fr./AU6+12 fr.); laugh fr. = frequency of laughter. 
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While the trait variables in the analyses above were selected because of theoretical and 
empirical reasons, a further indicator of laughing at oneself has been discussed before, namely 
the Agreement Form. The readiness to have one’s material shown to a larger audience reflects 
a further indicator for a tendency of laughing at oneself. Thus, in order to investigate whether 
the score of the Agreement Form contributed any more to laughing at oneself, a second 
canonical correlation was calculated. Although the Agreement Form was answered within the 
experimental part, it was seen as a behavioral trait that was measured unobtrusively, rather 
than being a response to the images. Thus, for the set of trait variables, Agreement Form was 
added, while none of the other variables in the two sets were changed. This resulted in a first 
canonical correlation of R = .69, χ2 (20) = 37.31, p = .01, with none of the subsequent χ2 tests 
for the remaining roots being significant. There was 47.44% of overlapping variance (R2). The 
canonical factor loadings (Table 3) ranged from 0.26 (laughing at oneself, peer-report) to 0.78 
(Trait cheerfulness) with a median of 0.66 for the trait variables and from 0.14 (PorO 6+12 
occurrence) to 0.48 (PorO funniness) with a median of 0.39 for the set of response variables. 
Thus, the Agreement Form indeed seems to have additional predictive potential for laughing 
at oneself. 
Discussion 
The present study is the first to use a multi-method approach to the phenomenon of 
“laughing at oneself.” Questionnaire measures were used as self- and as peer-reports. 
Furthermore, by means of distorted images of them, participants were put into a situation 
where they were provoked to laugh at themselves. Four levels of exhilaration were examined 
to determine the behavior that is shown when laughing at oneself. Smiles that do not reflect 
felt enjoyment were also studied.  
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Convergence Among Methods 
Laughing at oneself was measured by self-report, by peer-report, and by observation 
of behavioral responses to experimental stimuli. All methods converged moderately. Among 
the exhilaration behaviors, all four levels of exhilaration were shown more strongly/frequently 
by people who reported to laugh at themselves. The weakest predictor was frequency of both 
AU12 and AU6+12. Whether or not the participants responded with AU12 or AU6+12 at all, 
as well as how intensely they smiled, was more predictive. It seems that is more essential 
whether somebody smiles or does not smile, than how often somebody smiles. Experiencing 
funniness when seeing the distorted portraits, laughing, and especially the proportion of 
laughter within all exhilaration displays were behavioral responses related strongest to 
claiming to laugh at oneself in the questionnaire. 
However, while participants who reported to laugh at themselves also smiled at 
distorted portraits of other persons and found them funny, laughing at distorted portraits of 
the strangers did go along neither with self- nor peer-reported laughing at oneself. Also, 
finding one’s own images funnier than images of others added more to enhancement of state 
cheerfulness than the other way round. The question arises why self-reported laughing at 
oneself predicts smiling at the images of strangers. One interpretation could be the following: 
If people can smile at the sight of their own images, they know that although the images are 
targeting their own person, they are innocent jokes—perhaps a prerequisite for laughing at 
oneself. But the same applies to the strangers’ distorted portraits, and in accepting these 
images as innocent jokes, one smiles at one’s own pictures as well as at those of the others. 
However, a more intense level of exhilaration—laughing—can perhaps only be elicited by 
their own images in persons who can laugh at themselves. Showing the same level of 
exhilaration at strangers’ distorted portraits might be related to laughing at others and thus 
capture another trait (e.g., the joy from laughing at others: Katagelasticism, Ruch & Proyer, 
2009), but it was not correlated with laughing at oneself. 
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Personality 
As for Ruch and Carrell (1998), in the current study high trait cheerfulness and low 
trait seriousness predicted laughing at oneself. Habitually cheerful participants also responded 
more likely with AU12 smiles and rated funniness. On the contrary, but not surprisingly, trait 
bad mood was negatively related with almost all exhilaration behaviors. However, trait 
seriousness was weakly, but positively, correlated with displaying AU12 in response to one’s 
own images. It might be that the task per se also appealed to the serious people, as they did 
only know that they would have to rate some pictures the content of which they did not know 
before. 
The results concerning the mood states very much corresponded to the findings of 
previous research on the temperamental basis of humor and sense of humor measures (Ruch 
& Köhler, 2007). Participants who reported to laugh at themselves arrived for the 
experimental part in a cheerful, non-serious, and good mood. Also, subsequent to the task, 
their mood states were related in the expected way, but the correlations were smaller than in 
the pretest. However, regarding the behavioral responses, for the majority of indicators the 
correlation increased from before to after the task. In general, experienced and actually 
displayed exhilaration during the task lead to enhanced mood subsequent to it. 
Participants who laughed more at themselves according to their own and their peers’ 
reports, tended to be the more extraverted people. This is not surprising, as Extraversion has 
been found to be related to sense of humor components before (cf. Köhler & Ruch, 1996). 
Definitional components of Extraversion include susceptibility for positive affect, smiling and 
laughter, and enjoyment of entertaining others (cf. Köhler & Ruch, 1996; Ruch, 1999). But 
there were no correlations with laughing per se and with smiling. Several interpretations are 
possible. First, even though within the norms of a comparison sample, on closer examination 
Extraversion scores were somewhat higher in the current sample and variance was lower 
(M = 6.67, SD = 3.62 in the data by Ruch, 1999, as compared to M = 8.01, SD = 2.96 in the 
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current sample). This could have reduced the coefficients. Second, the Distorted Portrait 
Judgment Task was perhaps more suitable for introverted people as it was a passive task 
without social interaction. This might have counteracted the correlation. However, it was also 
found that extraverted participants expressed their exhilaration by laughter rather than 
smiling. This result is very much in accordance with the definition of Extraversion as well as 
results of former studies (cf. Köhler & Ruch, 1996). 
Whereas Neuroticism was related neither to self- nor peer-reported laughing at 
oneself, participants who were less emotionally stable showed less facial signs of exhilaration. 
The negative relation between humor and Neuroticism also corresponds well to findings of 
former research (i.e., Köhler & Ruch, 1996) and its definitional relatedness to negative 
affectivity. The correlations tended to be higher for the Distorted Portraits of Oneself than for 
those of strangers. Independent of questionnaire measures, neuroticistic (or emotionally 
unstable) participants did perhaps not enjoy that they had in a way been kidded and images of 
their faces had been distorted. The results might be different if the participants themselves 
could control the situation in which they do (or don’t) laugh at themselves. 
Psychoticism predicted several indicators of laughing at oneself. This was unexpected, 
as previous research found relations for Psychoticism mainly for humor production (Köhler & 
Ruch, 1996). Persons with lower scores in Psychoticism, though, tend to be characterized by 
more conformity than persons with higher scores. Thus, more conformist participants might 
have less understanding for this kind of pictures and therefore less likely react with facial 
expressions of enjoyment. Also, people who don’t care too much about what other people 
think of them might be more relaxed and more accepting towards their own weaknesses or 
peculiarities in their appearance. However, regarding the questionnaire measures, the relation 
was only true for the peer-reports. 
Multivariate relations were found as well: Traits of laughing at oneself, a temperament 
of habitual cheerfulness, and behavioral responses to distorted images of oneself together 
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explain 40% of variance. This might mean that laughing at oneself forms a special form or 
facet within a cheerful temperament. Among the trait variables, self-report of laughing at 
oneself and trait cheerfulness held the highest factor loadings. In the second analyses, the 
degree of readiness to have the material shown to a broader publicity (i.e., the Agreement 
Form) contributed to the prediction of laughing at oneself. In both analyses, among the 
response variables, laughing indices had rather high factor loadings. In the first analyses, the 
laughing quotient—i.e., whether a person showed laughing rather than smiling, the laugh 
quotient—was shown to account most strongly for laughing at oneself. Thus, again, these 
analyses seem to indicate that behavior shown when laughing at oneself can be literally 
understood as laughing in its general form. 
Conclusion 
The present approach is the first to examine the phenomenon of laughing at oneself 
experimentally. In this study, the focus of laughing at oneself was triggered by one’s own 
appearance. Using distorted portraits of the participants, it could not only be shown that 
“laughing at oneself” exists and different methods of its measurement converge. It was also 
demonstrated that the behavior is, indeed, laughing. The tendency to laugh at oneself seems to 
be a trait-like characteristic, and cheerful, not overly serious people who don’t tend to be too 
strongly affected negatively seem to laugh at themselves more. But a cheerful mood state is 
also helpful for laughing at oneself.  
As the participants’ images were produced immediately before the task, they could not 
have possibly laughed at a “former” self, as Superiority theorists would argue. Nor does La 
Fave’s et al. (1996) argument that laughing at oneself could not possibly be a happy event 
seem to be applicable since participants responded to the distorted portraits with genuine 
displays of enjoyment, and only those were related with a “laughing at oneself” questionnaire 
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measure. Fake or masking smiles, i.e., smiles that did not reflect enjoyment, were even 
negatively related to this measure. 
However, the task the participants were asked to do was a rather passive task in that 
they did not have any possibility of control. It would be interesting to investigate laughing at 
oneself in a more active context in which participants can determine the “intensity” of a 
stimulus. Also, one’s own embarrassing events or mishaps other aspects of laughing at 
oneself would be worth studying.  
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Overall Discussion 
Humor as a virtue has received attention in particular in philosophy and theology (cf. 
Bühler, 2007; Comte-Sponville, 2001; Geier, 2006; Gilhus, 1997; Berger, 1998). However, 
until now, psychological research has largely neglected to study humor from the perspective 
of virtues and virtuousness. In other literature on humor as a virtue, examples for how humor 
can serve a virtue or be a virtue, are rarely provided. Furthermore, humor is not a unidimen-
sional construct (cf. Ruch, 2007; Martin, 2007). Benevolent humor is probably serving virtue 
to a larger degree than mean-spirited and malevolent humor, as was also stated in philoso-
phical literature (e.g., Aristotle, 335 BC/1932, 1934; Morreall, 1987). But until now there is 
neither comprehensive knowledge on which aspects of humor are seen as incorporating 
virtue, nor is it clear which virtue it might be, or incorporating vice, or whether it is neutral.  
When humor as a virtue is described several authors refer in particular to laughing at 
oneself and not taking oneself too seriously (Comte-Sponville, 2001; Roberts, 1988). 
According to Comte-Sponville, this should lead to the virtue of humility. However, laughing 
at oneself has not received much attention in psychological research either. It had not even 
been established whether laughing at oneself exists, nor was it clear, which behavior would be 
shown. Do people literally laugh, do they smile, or is it merely the absence of negative 
emotions that accounts for laughing at oneself?  
This dissertation is the first attempt to systematically examine which aspects of humor, 
as they are represented in items of questionnaires or reports of everyday situations, are 
considered to represent virtue (and represent vice), which virtues might be particularly 
“compatible” with humor, and how humor can be and was actually used to exert a virtue. The 
phenomenon of laughing at oneself is also studied experimentally for the first time. 
Three approaches were taken to study humor as a virtue: First, different humorous 
behavior manifestations and statements in 12 current humor questionnaires were rated for the 
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degree of vice and virtue. In addition, experts on virtue were asked to determine the degree of 
each of six virtues in those humor behaviors and statements that were rated as representing 
virtue. Second, lay people were asked on their experience with humor as a virtue. They rated 
importance of and commitment to each of six virtues. Furthermore, they estimated how often 
humor is employed for each virtue in general, and how often they do it themselves. Also, the 
participants provided 210 situations in which they actually had employed humor for virtues, 
which covered all of the six virtues. And third, a particular aspect of humor as a virtue was 
investigated for the first time experimentally: namely laughing at oneself.  
In the following, the results of the three parts of the thesis will be discussed. Table 1 of 
the Overall Discussion summarizes the research questions, methods, and results of each of the 
three parts. 
Overview 
As can also be seen in Table 1, Part I and Part II had similar aims: to study the 
aspects of virtue that are compatible with humor. But they differ with respect to the empirical 
approach taken. Part I used items of humor questionnaires as an already existing collection of 
humor behavior manifestations and attitudes to examine the implicit representation of vice 
and virtue. This approach was chosen because questionnaires should cover as broad a variety 
of humor behaviors as possible.  
Great care was taken in the selection of questionnaires in order to serve this intention 
best. One of these questionnaires, the Humorous Behavior Q-Sort Deck (HBQD, Craik, 
Lampert, & Nelson, 1993) was developed to portrait a person’s humorous style 
comprehensively. Its 100 non-redundant items yield ten styles that are organized along five 
contrastive factors, such as socially warm vs. cold, competent vs. inept, or benign vs. mean-
spirited. Further uni- and multidimensional questionnaires were added covering both 
generally positively and negatively evaluated aspects of the sense of humor, like temperament 
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(i.e., Cheerfulness), coping humor, laughing at oneself, and humor styles like affiliative or 
aggressive humor style. One scale was added because it only contained assumedly negatively 
evaluated aspects (i.e., Jokes and Tricks, Cattell & Schürger, 1971). Two subscales were 
added that were developed to measure humor in the context of virtue, namely the humor 
subscales of the Self-Assessed Wisdom Scale (SAWS, Webster, 2003) and of the Values in 
Action Inventory of Strengths (VIA-IS, Peterson & Seligman, 2004).  
Analyses of the comprehensive measure, i.e., the HBQD (Craik et al. 1993), revealed 
that about two thirds of the humorous behavior manifestations were seen as neutral. One third 
are either seen as representing vice or as representing virtue. It seems that humor behavior 
manifestations of a comprehensive measure are rather normally distributed with respect to 
their moral evaluation. Thus, humor per se seems to be neutral rather than to incorporate 
virtue or vice. However, based on the present research it is now possible to analyze the 
morally negative and positive aspects more closely. 
Regarding the complete Humor Rating List, behaviors seen as incorporating vice were 
mainly behavior manifestations that would hurt other people physically or psychologically. In 
accordance with former literature (e.g., Aristotle 335 BC/1934; Addison, as cited in Geier, 
2006) laughing at others’ weaknesses was seen as ethically negative. However, some 
behaviors reflecting inept humor style (as covered by the HBQD) were also seen as 
representing vice. This is somewhat surprising, because, as Berger (1998) put it, not having 
the talent is not the fault of the person, only having the talent for humor and not using it is. A 
closer look at the respective item contents, however, revealed that especially those behaviors 
that expressed exaggeratedly amused responses or habitual hiding of anxiety by nervous 
snickering were seen as representing vice, and thus as being unauthentic behaviors, rather 
than, for example, incompetence in telling jokes. The ethically positively rated humor 
behaviors included general good cheerfulness when dealing with other persons, or a 
playfulness regarding language.  
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Table 1.  
Summary of the findings within the three parts of the dissertation. 
Section Part I: How virtuous is humor? What 
we can learn from current instruments 
Part II: How virtuous is humor? Evidence 
from everyday behavior. 
Part III: Can people really laugh at themselves? 
Experimental and correlational evidence 
Aims How prevalent are virtue or vice in 
humorous behavioral manifestations 
out of a pool of current humor 
questionnaire items? 
What is the nature of virtuousnessa 
represented by those items? 
How often do people exert virtuesa 
humorously? Are some virtues more often 
achieved humorously than others? 
Which examples on exerting virtuousness 
humorously do people report? (Collection 
of situations). Use of comic stylesb? 
Does laughing at oneself exist? Do different 
methods for measuring it converge? Which 
verbal and facial responses occur? 
Which personality and temperamental traits 
and which mood states predict laughing at 
oneself? 
Methods Study I: 76 Raters, Humor Rating List 
formed by 298 items out of 12 current 
humor questionnaires, rated on a con-
tinuum for degree from vice via 
neutral to virtue 
Study II: 17 experts, Humor Rating 
List II formed by 73 items represen-
ting virtuousness, rated for degree of 
each of 6 virtues 
48 participants, Humor in Tugenden (HiT):  
- Ratings concerning people in general and 
participants themselves: How important is 
each virtue?, How often is it exerted 
humorously?  
- Instructions to write down scenarios in 
which humor was used to exert each of the 
virtues and to report used comic styles 
70 participants, 126 peers; Self-and peer-
report on SHS, self-reports on STCI, EPQ-
RK 
Experimental part using distorted images of 
participants and strangers 
Behavioral data: facial expressions (analyzed 
using FACS), verbal responses 
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Table 1 (continued). 
Section Part I: How virtuous is humor? What 
we can learn from current instruments 
Part II: How virtuous is humor? Evidence 
from everyday behavior. 
Part III: Can people really laugh at themselves? 
Experimental and correlational evidence 
Results Study I: 68% of behavior manifest-
ations of a comprehensive humor 
measure are neutral; 17% of them 
represent vice, 15% represent virtue.  
Study II: Among the 15%, all virtues 
were represented. But the most 
strongly represented virtues were 
wisdom and humanity (closely 
followed by transcendence.) 
Importance of virtue was highest for 
justice and humanity. Virtues exerted 
humorously most often were humanity and 
wisdom.  
210 (valid) situations were collected. There 
was no difference in the number of 
situations depending on the virtue.  
The comic styles used most often were 
humor and wit. Comic styles like sarcasm, 
cynicism, and satire were used only to a 
small degree, but if, then overpropor-
tionally often for justice.  
Laughing at oneself exists (facial signs of 
exhilaration were shown). There was 
convergence among methods (self-report, peer-
report, behavioral data). Laughter seemed to be 
strongest related to laughing at oneself. 
Underlying temperamental traits were 
cheerfulness and low seriousness. (Partly) 
related mood states were high cheerfulness, 
low seriousness, and low bad mood subsequent 
to the experiment. (Partly) related personality 
traits were high extraversion, low neuroticism. 
Note. a The six virtues referred to are wisdom, courage, humanity, justice, temperance, and transcendence (cf. Dahlsgaard et al., 2005). b The comic 
styles are fun, humor (in the sense of appreciation of the world’s inconsistency and arousing sympathy), nonsense, wit, irony, satire, cynicism, and 
sarcasm (Schmidt-Hidding, 1963). 
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In Study II, the experts rated the degree of each of the six virtues (Dahlsgaard, 
Peterson, & Seligman, 2005) within the item contents that had been rated as representing 
virtue in Study I. Two main results should be emphasized here: First, all of the six virtues 
were represented at least slightly. And second, as summarized in the title of this thesis, the 
virtues represented most strongly were wisdom and humanity. These were closely followed 
by transcendence. 
This result is not only in accordance with theoretical literature on humor as virtue. The 
humanists of the 17th century emphasized good-natured humor (Schmidt-Hidding, 1963; 
Ruch, 2004). They distinguished “good humour” from “bad humour” (Ruch, 2004) and 
opposed put-down witticisms and thus advocate humane humor. Furthermore, contemporary 
authors like Webster (2003) saw humor as one of five ways to achieve wisdom, or Bühler 
(2007) who viewed humor as a mean to deal wisely with everyday life.  
One might wonder why the participants of Study I were asked to rate the 
representation from virtue or vice, rather than positive vs. negative valence of the behaviors. 
As the participants were lay people, they might have had difficulties in understanding the 
concepts of “virtue” or “vice”. However, the focus of interest was on virtue and vice. Positive 
and negative valence of a behavior would have been rather broad and unspecific in 
comparison to virtue and vice, and would not have revealed the information that was aimed at 
with this study. My assumption is that “virtue” is more specific than “positive” behavior, and 
the same applies to “vice” and “negative” behavior. Not everything that is positive can be 
considered a virtue. In contrast to that, behavior that is considered to represent virtue is 
assumed to be positive. A solution for an empirical test of this assumption would have been to 
include both a rating on a dimension of positive to negative valence of the behavior as well as 
a dimension on representation of virtue to vice. In that way it would have been possible to 
compare the two ratings. The counter-argument is an economical one: With the contents of 
298 item contents to rate, the effort invested by the participants was already rather high, and 
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doubling the ratings would have overstrained the willingness for participation in this study. 
Thus, the best way seemed to ask for ratings on virtue and vice. In order to make sure that the 
participants understood the concepts of virtue and vice, the instructions contained easily 
understandable definitions of the concepts of virtue and vice. The high convergence of 
Study I and Study II, which was achieved in spite of different kinds of samples and 
differences in the ratings, corroborated the approach taken in Study I. 
Part II of this thesis confirmed the result obtained in Part I (see Table 1 of the overall 
discussion). This part’s study had lay people rate how often they themselves would exert each 
of the six virtues (Dahlsgaard et al., 2005) in a humorous way, and how often they thought 
this would be done in general. The lay people, again, reported to use humor in order to exert a 
virtue for humanity and wisdom most often. Transcendence, on the other hand, was rather low 
in the ratings of this study.  
Part II also asked people to report situations in which they (or another person they 
know) exerted virtue in a humorous way. For all virtues, situations were found, and there was 
no difference in the number of situations between the virtues.  
The participants were also asked to report comic styles proposed by Schmidt-Hidding 
(1963; i.e., fun, humor [in the sense of appreciation of the world’s inconsistency and arousing 
sympathy], nonsense, wit, irony, satire, cynicism, and sarcasm). That way, not only specific 
examples could be collected, but also first evidence for “mechanisms” could be assessed that 
were used to achieve a given virtue. Good-natured comic styles like fun or humor (in a 
broader sense) were typically used more often than dark humor styles (i.e., satire, sarcasm, 
cynicism). It was nevertheless remarkable that dark humor styles still occurred in the 
situations. But dark humor styles seemed to be used in particular to achieve justice. It seems 
that put-down humor might be ethically acceptable when used to ridicule unethical—
specifically, unjust—behavior.  
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One peculiarity seemed to apply to both Part I and Part II of the thesis. In both parts, 
humor behaviors and situations sometimes seemed to match more than one virtue. In these 
cases, it seemed that single aspects of the item or situation contents accounted for one virtue, 
and other aspects for another. For example, the statement “Achieves a detached perspective 
on self and others.” (HBQD, Q.53) achieved high ratings for justice, humanity, and wisdom 
(with justice rated highest). In this statement, the justice aspect might be to look at others 
without prejudice. The humanity aspect might be that somebody approaches other people 
good-naturedly and without distrust, and thus is kind and enables a good relationship with that 
person. And the wisdom aspect could reflect the knowledge and perspective that, for instance, 
the first impression doesn’t always have to be the most accurate one and that it is wise to get 
to know people better and not to judge them too quickly. The combination of justice, 
humanity and temperance also occurred quite often.  
In the collection of situations in Part II, some participants remarked that they did not 
know which virtue to assign their situation to. They then decided for a virtue according to 
which aspect they thought to be the most important one. Reading those situations also made 
thinking of more than one virtue. For example someone’s grandson at the age of five 
stumbled and hit the corner of a wall and cried loudly. The grandfather checked the small 
wound that his grandson had received, and then exclaimed that, thank Goodness, the corner of 
the wall had not been hurt. The boy was so baffled that the crying seamlessly turned into loud 
laughter. This situation has been assigned to the virtue of wisdom because of the clever idea 
of the grandfather on how to cheer his grandson up again. But there might also be a humane 
aspect in humorously comforting his grandson. However, the participants themselves have 
assigned the situations they had provided and it might be fruitful to let them be rated by 
experts as well.  
Another aspect that was noticed when looking closer on the material of the studies of 
Part I and Part II was that the “direction” or causality between humor and virtue was not 
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always clear. For example, within wisdom, items and situations occurred that emphasized 
knowledge about humor (for example, knowing that a certain aspect of humor has a 
comforting effect and other aspects might be hurtful). Other items and situations focused 
more on a humorous way of dealing with knowledge. This was the case, for example, when 
humor was used in teaching, i.e., to explain some subject matter in a humorous way. In other 
words, there seemed to be wise humor, and there seemed to be humorous wisdom. 
Furthermore, contents of some items and situations reflect a third aspect: To be wise 
enough to detect incongruities, absurdities, or ironies in everyday situations or even in 
difficult life situations seem to lead to a humor experience. This is exemplified in this item: “I 
often find that the small things in everyday life are really funny and amusing” (STCI, Ruch, 
Köhler, & van Thriel, 1996, Q.26).  
Part III was dedicated to the investigation of the phenomenon laughing at oneself (see 
Table 1). As the title of this thesis suggests, laughing at oneself is considered to lead to 
humility (cf. Comte-Sponville, 2001). The aim of the study the third part lay rather in 
experimentally examining how laughing at oneself manifests in behavior. The focus of this 
study was on laughing at one’s appearance. Stimuli used in this study were distorted portraits 
of the participants and distorted portraits of strangers. Participants had to indicate funniness of 
and aversion to the distorted portraits and were secretly videotaped in order to record their 
facial responses. Using the Facial Action Coding System (Ekman, Friesen, & Hager, 2002), it 
was possible to show that genuine exhilaration (Ruch, 1993, 1997) is involved when people 
laugh at themselves (at least in the case of their own appearance) as participants showed 
genuine smiles and Duchenne display. Even more, laughing at their own distorted portraits 
was predicted by a questionnaire measure of laughing at oneself, whereas laughing at 
strangers’ distorted portraits wasn’t. Also, finding one’s own distorted portraits funnier than 
those of strangers, contributed more enhancement to the participants’ state cheerfulness than 
the other way round. In contrast to this, fake smiles (i.e., asymmetrical smiles, smiles 
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accompanied by facial actions indicating negative emotions like lowering one’s brows or 
pressing lips together), did occur in people who had low scores in laughing at oneself. 
However, a complication in this study might have been the distorted portraits of 
strangers. As they were indeed complete strangers to the participants, the participants didn’t 
know how the strangers looked like when “undistorted”. Because of this missing incongruity 
distorted portraits might just not be as funny as their own ones, or as distorted portraits of 
people the participants know. Furthermore, the degree of familiarity or intimacy with the 
person on the distorted portrait might influence the participants’ responses. There is however 
no easy solution to this issue. To take distorted portraits of friends would have meant to incur 
logistical problems, because the participants themselves were not to know about the kind of 
portraits before the experiment. Also, it would have been necessary to control for the degree 
of familiarity or intimacy of the participants and their friends, relatives, or partners. Distorted 
portraits of celebrities could have possibly been by a person not known by some of the 
participants; in addition, some participants might have liked the celebrity displayed on the 
portrait and some might have disliked them, which would have further distorted the results. 
Portraits of complete strangers had the advantage of providing the same conditions for all 
participants. Also, there were participants who found complete strangers’ portraits funnier 
than their own ones (the difference score of funniness ratings of their own and strangers’ 
portraits ranged from -1.92 to 2.83, M = .53, SD = .78). Furthermore, finding their own ones 
funnier than the strangers’ ones went along with a personality variable, namely neuroticism 
(r = -.24, p < .05). Thus, not only were actual mood states affected by the stimuli, but habitual 
neuroticism also predicted the tendency of the participants to differ in funniness ratings, 
depending if these were their own or not.  
One additional possibility would have been to take portraits of the experimenter as the 
stranger’s portraits. Each participant would know this person from the experiment (unless 
there is more than one experimenter). This solution is currently implemented in a subsequent 
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study (Hofmann, 2010). For future studies it might be advisable to do pilot studies in order to 
optimize the kind of stimuli taken for the strangers’ portraits. 
The complication described above not withstanding, the results of Part III indicate that 
La Fave, Haddad, and Maesen’s (1996) argument that an event at one’s own expense can’t be 
a happy event, do not apply. Genuine smiles imply that there is in fact happiness and fun. 
Also, superiority theory (e.g., Aristotle, 335 BC/1932; Hobbes, as cited in Morreall, 1987; 
Gruner, 1997; La Fave et al., 1996) would imply that participants who can laugh at 
themselves would also laugh hard at the stranger’s distorted portraits. But this did not seem to 
be the case. The enhanced state cheerfulness after the task and a habitual emotional stability, 
which related to finding one’s own distorted portraits funnier than those of strangers, indicate 
that there was no feeling of superiority involved. Taking the incidents into account where 
strangers’ portraits were rated funnier than the own ones, it seems illogical that superiority 
toward the “butt part” of oneself (cf. La Fave et al., 1996) would contribute more to a 
subsequent cheerful mood state than would superiority toward strangers. Buckley’s (2003) 
argument of laughing at oneself as a way of telling the others how inferior they are because 
they cannot laugh at themselves does also not apply, as the experimental setting did not 
involve social interaction, but merely spontaneous responses to stimuli. The results of Part III 
rather fit to the descriptions of laughing at oneself by Comte-Sponville (2001) and McGhee 
(1996, 1999) who emphasize that no self-hatred or put-down should be involved.  
Part III itself did not involve virtue ratings. Thus, we don’t really know yet if laughing 
at oneself is really seen as a virtue and which kind of virtue that might be. We have, however, 
clues from the results in Part I. Item contents from the laughing at oneself subscale of the 
Sense of Humor Scale by McGhee (1996) did not enter Study II of Part I. However, all of 
them were clearly on the positive side of the Humor Vice Virtue Rating (HVVR). The highest 
among those was the item “I often tell others about the funny side of my blunder or 
embarrassing incidents” (SHS, Q.39), and the lowest was “I find it easy to laugh at others’ 
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jokes when I am the butt of the joke” (SHS, Q.23). It might be that the phrasing of the latter 
item was rather ambiguous with regard to put-down humor, that is, it was not clear in this 
item how good-natured the jokes of others are.  
Other scales contain items that focus on laughing at oneself, e.g., “I can chuckle at 
personal embarrassments” (SAWS, Webster, 2003, Q.4) or “I often find the slight mishaps of 
everyday life amusing, even if they happen to me” (STCI, Ruch, Köhler, & van Thriel, 1996, 
Q.44). In contrast to what Comte-Sponville (2001) suggested, these items had their highest 
ratings for the virtue of wisdom rather than temperance. However, it seems that aspects of 
laughing at oneself are considered as virtues, even if it remains unclear which one. It might 
well be a virtue in its own right. 
Is virtuous humor still humble? Both in Part I and Part II, all virtues were represented, 
and so was temperance. Furthermore, even if the mean ratings of items in Part I were rather 
low for temperance, single items reached high temperance ratings. The focus of items that 
were rated highly for temperance was on restraining oneself from laughing or making fun in 
order not to hurt others, and on self-regulation in the sense of regulating one’s emotions, 
rather than humility. Also in Part II the focus of the strength self-regulation occurred 
frequently. However, several situations were reported where humility was achieved by using 
humor. This was the case, for example, for the director of the company of one of the 
participants. When the participant guided visitors through his rather big company they 
sometimes met the company’s director, who was a man well known from the media. When 
they did so, the director would introduce himself humbly as the “caretaker” of the company. 
This, for example, would match the idea of humor as a way to humility. 
Conclusions and Outlook 
This thesis is the first in psychology to systematically study humor as a virtue. While 
humor per se seems rather neutral, there are aspects of it, that is, humor behaviors and ways to 
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employ humor that can function to achieve virtuousness. As the title “Wise, Humane, and 
Humble” suggests, wisdom and humanity seem to be the virtues most compatible with humor. 
Humility, or temperance, on average did not seem to be among the highest rated virtues. 
However, there were several examples of humor as employed to achieve humility, and ratings 
of single items were, together with humanity, among the highest ones. Laughing at oneself 
does exist, and even if it is not possible reach a conclusion as to which virtue might be 
represented by laughing at oneself, laughing at oneself as measured in this thesis seems to 
match the description of philosophers. 
The analyses reported here revealed information on the mechanisms through which 
virtue is achieved by humor. It might be the case that the use of certain comic styles is more 
appropriate for certain virtues. Fun, or humor in its broader sense, seemed to be useful for 
most virtues and was used more often than dark comic styles (e.g., sarcasm, cynicism). 
However, dark styles appeared to be rather useful in order to achieve justice. But the specific 
mechanisms have to be studied in more detail.  
It would be fruitful to examine the contents of the items and situations more closely 
for each virtue. It would thus be possible to figure out similarities of groups of items or 
situations assigned to one virtue, and thus to work out the different aspects of humor to 
achieve humanity, or courage, or wisdom. This could result in a questionnaire that makes it 
possible to measure humor as a virtue directly. Whether it is feasible to construct items that 
are distinct for one virtue, remains open. But a questionnaire or test measuring humor as a 
virtue might also make it possible to study the essential nature of humor as a virtue. It is not 
clear if it is a personality or a temperamental trait, an ability, or a question of humor 
appreciation. Such a test would also permit to study the effects of the use of virtuous humor 
on well-being variables like life satisfaction (cf. Diener, 2000) or the absence of 
psychological or physical troubles. It might be that humor in the service of certain virtues is 
more related to well-being than others. Different, dark humor that is used to achieve justice 
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might involve negative emotions and might thus, for example, be less beneficial than comic 
styles that were used in order to achieve humanity. To know which of the humorously 
achieved virtues contribute particularly to well-being, and which humorous ways work best, 
might even make it possible to train these aspects. For all of these further approaches to 
humor as a virtue, the present thesis is hoped to have provided the first basis. 
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Appendix 
The Appendix contains samples of the materials used in this thesis. Note that for copyright 
reasons the materials will not be given in their entirety. The Humor Rating List I (Part I, Study I) 
and the Humor Rating List II (Part I, Study II) will only be exemplified using the items of the 
State Trait Cheerfulness Inventory (STCI, Ruch, Köhler, & van Thriel, 1996). For Part III, the 
distorted portraits will be exemplified using representative examples for the Distorted portraits of 
Oneself that don’t show a participant. For the questionnaires used in the studies, please refer to 
the publications or authors of the respective questionnaires. 
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Part I, Study I 
Example of the Humor Rating List  
(provided to the participants online via SurveyMonkey) 
APPENDIX – PART I 
150 
Wie tugendhaft ist Humor?  
 
Meine Doktorarbeit an der Fachrichtung Persönlichkeitspsychologie und Diagnostik des psychologischen 
Instituts der Universität Zürich beschäftigt sich mit dem Thema „Humor und Tugenden“. Humor ist ein 
häufig verwendeter Begriff. Manche sagen, er sei eine Tugend, und viele wünschen sich Humor bei ihren 
Partnern und Freunden. Manche anderen sagen oder sagten aber auch, Humor entsteht aus einem 
Überlegenheitsgefühl: man lache andere Menschen aus. Diese Art von Humor wird von einigen als 
lasterhaft abgelehnt. Manchmal hat Humor aber auch gar nichts mit Tugenden oder Lastern zu tun. Diese 
Befragung stellt eine Voruntersuchung im Rahmen meiner Doktorarbeit zur Frage dar: Wie sehr wird der 
Aspekt „Tugend“ oder „Laster“ in bestehenden Humorfragebögen behandelt? Helfen Sie mir, diese Frage 
zu beantworten. Vielen Dank! 
 
Ursula Beermann 
 
 
Diese Untersuchung läuft bis zum Donnerstag, dem 15. Juni 2006. 
 
Bei Fragen können Sie mich über u.beermann@psychologie.unizh.ch erreichen. 
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Hintergrund 
 
Humor gilt allgemein als eine sehr positive Eigenschaft oder Charakterstärke. Er wird von vielen als eine 
Haltung angesehen, den Widrigkeiten der Welt mit einem milden Lächeln zu begegnen.  
 
In der Geschichte vor allem Englands galt diese Art von Humor einige Zeit lang als eine Kardinaltugend. 
Dabei versteht man unter „Tugend“ die Art und Weise, menschlich zu sein und zu handeln, unsere 
Fähigkeit, gut zu handeln (Comte-Sponville, 2004). Zu Tugenden zählen z.B. auch Mut, Weisheit, 
Mässigung, Gerechtigkeit, Humanität und Transzendenz (Peterson & Seligman, 2001). Ein Laster bzw. 
eine Untugend hingegen ist das Gegenteil davon: tadelnswertes, schädliches Handeln, eine schlechte 
Angewohnheit, von der jemand beherrscht wird; Verhaltensweisen, die zum Schaden des Einzelnen bzw. 
von Gruppen oder Gesellschaften führen bzw. führen sollen. Es geht dabei nicht um pathologische 
Verhaltensweisen, sondern die moralische bzw. ethische Wertung steht im Vordergrund. 
 
Humor könnte nun einerseits im Dienste einer Tugend stehen, indem jemand auf humorvolle Weise z.B. 
Mut oder Humanität oder Gerechtigkeit verwirklicht. Beispielsweise könnte man eine traurige Person auf 
humorvolle Art und Weise auf hellere Gedanken bringen und somit human handeln. Wenn andererseits 
Humor selbst eine Tugend darstellt, ist auch die Fähigkeit wichtig, sich selbst nicht so ernst zu nehmen 
und über eigene Fehler lachen zu können oder sich (humorvoller) Kritik anderer auszusetzen. Allerdings 
kann weiters Humor auch gegen andere eingesetzt werden, z.B. indem man über Schwächen anderer 
Menschen lacht oder spottet. Das wäre dann ein Beispiel für lasterhaften Humor. Humor kann aber auch 
gar nichts mit Tugenden oder Lastern zu tun haben, z.B. wenn man über einen lustigen, harmlosen Witz 
lacht. Der Kontext und die Art und Weise, wie Humor zum Ausdruck kommt, sind oft entscheidend 
dafür, ob Humor Tugend, Laster oder keins von beidem ist. Darüber, wie häufig diese einzelnen Arten 
von Humor vorkommen, weiss man bislang noch nichts. 
 
Sinn für Humor kann nun ganz generell auf verschiedene Arten gemessen werden. Es kann z.B. gefragt 
werden, was jemand lustig findet oder ob jemand lustige Pointen produzieren kann, oder auf welche Art 
und Weise er in bestimmten Situationen mit Humor reagiert. Ich habe viele „Sinn für Humor“-
Fragebögen zusammengesammelt und stelle mir die folgende Frage: Inwieweit ist der Tugend- bzw. 
Lasteraspekt in diesen Fragebögen enthalten? 
 
Viele der Fragebögen wurden von amerikanischen Forschern erstellt. Daher muss ich noch darauf 
hinweisen, dass der Begriff „Humor“ hier gemäss der amerikanischer Tradition in seinem weitesten Sinne 
gebraucht werden muss: Humor bezeichnet in dieser Untersuchung alles, was komisch ist.  
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Ihre Aufgabe 
Im Folgenden finden Sie einige Aussagen, die humorvolles Verhalten oder Einstellungen 
beschreiben. Die Aussagen wurden verschiedenen Fragebögen zu Sinn für Humor entnommen. Das 
beschriebene Verhalten oder die Einstellung können tugendhaft, lasterhaft oder keins von beidem sein.  
 
Ich bitte Sie jeweils, einzuschätzen, ob und wie sehr tugend- oder lasterhaft Sie das beschriebene 
Verhalten finden. Dafür steht Ihnen eine 9-stufige Skala von -4 = „sehr lasterhaft“ über 0 = „weder noch“ 
bis 4 = „sehr tugendhaft“ zur Verfügung. Diese Befragung ist aus verschiedenen Fragebögen 
zusammengesetzt, die in ihrer ursprünglichen Form unterschiedliche Antwortformate enthalten. Diese 
werde ich jeweils zu Beginn einer Gruppe von Fragen anführen. Die Antwortalternative, die jeweils die 
grösste Zustimmung zur Frage/Aussage darstellt, ist die, die für Ihre Beurteilung ausschlaggebend sein 
soll; Sie finden sie jeweils in Anschluss der Frage/Aussage in (Klammern).  
 
 
Sehen wir uns das folgende Beispiel an: 
 
„Wann immer ich einen guten Witz höre, muss ich lachen.“ 
 
Stellen Sie sich vor, eine Person beantwortet diese Aussage mit „ja“. 
 
Wie schätzen Sie das humorvolle Verhalten dieser Person ein? Sie haben folgende Skala zur 
Einschätzung zur Verfügung: 
 
-4 = sehr lasterhaft 
-3 = ziemlich lasterhaft 
-2 = lasterhaft 
-1 = eher lasterhaft 
 0 = weder Tugend noch Laster 
 1 = eher tugendhaft 
 2 = tugendhaft 
 3 = ziemlich tugendhaft 
 4 = sehr tugendhaft 
 
Wenn Sie z.B. der Meinung sind, dass dieses Verhalten eher tugendhaft ist, dann kreuzen Sie in der Skala 
1 für „eher tugendhaft“ an: 
 
Die folgenden Fragen bzw. Aussagen haben in ihrem 
ursprünglichen Fragebogen die 2 Antwortmöglichkeiten  
ja/nein. 
Jeweils in Klammern finden Sie die für Aussage bzw. Frage 
zutreffende Antwort. 
Bitte beurteilen Sie die derart beschriebenen Verhaltensweisen oder 
Einstellungen jeweils anhand der Skala von „-4 = lasterhaft“ über 
„0 = weder Tugend noch Laster“ bis „4 = tugendhaft“. -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
Wann immer ich einen guten Witz höre, muss ich lachen. (ja) O O O O O O O O O 
 
Wenn Sie der Meinung sind, es ist weder eine Tugend noch ein Laster, dann kreuzen Sie 0 für „weder 
Tugend noch Laster“ an: 
 
Die folgenden Fragen/Aussagen haben in ihrem ursprünglichen 
Fragebogen die 2 Antwortmöglichkeiten  
ja/nein.  -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
Wann immer ich einen guten Witz höre, muss ich lachen. (ja) O O O O O O O O O 
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Wenn Sie finden, das Verhalten ist sehr lasterhaft, dann kreuzen Sie -4 für „sehr lasterhaft“ an: 
Die folgenden Fragen/Aussagen haben in ihrem ursprünglichen 
Fragebogen die 2 Antwortmöglichkeiten  
ja/nein -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
Wann immer ich einen guten Witz höre, muss ich lachen. (ja) O O O O O O O O O 
 
Achtung 
Es geht nicht darum, die Aussage für sich zu beantworten, als wenn Sie sich selbst bezüglich der Aussage 
beschrieben. 
Es geht darum, ob Sie das Verhalten einer Person, die so handelt, wie es in der Aussage beschrieben wird, 
als lasterhaft (in den Stufen „ein bisschen“ bis „sehr“) oder tugendhaft (in den Stufen „ein bisschen“ bis 
„sehr“) oder keins von beiden einschätzen.  
Es gibt hierbei keine falschen und richtigen Aussagen.  
 
 
 
 
Versuchspersonenstunden 
 
Studierende der Psychologie an der Universität Zürich können sich für die Teilnahme an dieser 
Untersuchung Versuchspersonenstunden anrechnen lassen. Als Nachweis der Teilnahme gilt der 
Versuchspersonencode; Bitte notieren Sie ihn sich und bringen Sie ihn mit, um eine Bestätigung für die 
Versuchspersonenstunden zu erhalten. Sie bekommen eine halbe Stunde für die Teilnahme angerechnet. 
Kommen Sie dazu bitte ab Montag, den 19.6.2006, zur Fachrichtung Persönlichkeitspsychologie und 
Diagnostik, Treichlerstr. 10, 1. Stock.  
 
Die Daten werden in keiner Weise mit Ihrer Person in Verbindung gebracht, sondern anonym behandelt.  
 
 
Vielen Dank für Ihre Mitarbeit! 
 
 
 
APPENDIX – PART I 
154 
Bitte machen Sie hier noch ein paar Angaben 
 
Versuchspersonencode: 
(Wenn Sie Psychologie an der Universität Zürich studieren und diese Untersuchung für Ihre 
Versuchspersonenstundenkarte angerechnet bekommen möchten, notieren Sie sich dazu bitte Ihren 
Code.) 
 
Bitte bilden Sie den Code nach folgendem System und geben Sie ihn dann in das freie Feld ein: 
 
 
 
 
 
Code 6-stellig: 
 
(Z.B. Vorname Vater: Hans, Vorname Mutter: Gerda, eigener Geburtstag: 15.04., 
Code: HG1504) 
 
 
 
Geschlecht O männlich O weiblich 
Alter_________ 
Höchster erreichter Bildungsgrad: 
O Kein Schulabschluss 
O Pflichtschulabschluss 
O Lehrabschluss/Berufslehre 
O Matura/Abitur 
O Fachhochschul-/Hochschulabschluss 
 
Nationalität: 
O Schweiz 
O Österreich 
O Deutschland 
O sonstiges, und zwar___________ 
 
Muttersprache_________ 
 
Land des Wohnsitzes:  
O Schweiz 
O Österreich 
O Deutschland 
O sonstiges, und zwar___________ 
1. Buchstabe 
Vorname d. 
Vaters (1-st.) 
1. Buchstabe 
Vorname der 
Mutter (1-st.) 
eigener 
Geburtstag 
(2-st.) 
Eigener 
Geburtsmonat 
(2-st.) 
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Die folgenden Aussagen bzw. Fragen haben in ihrem 
ursprünglichen Fragebogen die 4 Antwortmöglichkeiten 
trifft gar nicht zu/ trifft eher nicht zu/ trifft etwas zu/ trifft 
sehr zu. 
Jeweils in Klammern finden Sie die für Aussage bzw. 
Frage zutreffende Antwort. 
Bitte beurteilen Sie die derart beschriebenen 
Verhaltensweisen oder Einstellungen jeweils anhand der 
Skala von „-4 = lasterhaft“ über „0 = weder Tugend 
noch Laster“ bis „4 = tugendhaft“. -4
 = 
seh
r l
ast
erh
aft
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264 
Auch schwierige Situationen gehe ich leichten Herzens an. 
(trifft sehr zu)   
O O O O O O O O O 
265 Mein Alltag bietet mir oft Anlass zum Lachen. (trifft sehr zu) O O O O O O O O O 
266 Ich lächle häufig. (trifft sehr zu) O O O O O O O O O 
267 
Die gute Laune anderer wirkt ansteckend auf mich. (trifft sehr 
zu) 
O O O O O O O O O 
268 
Die kleinen Dinge des Alltags finde ich oft komisch und 
erheiternd. (trifft sehr zu) 
O O O O O O O O O 
269 Ich gehe unbeschwert durchs Leben. (trifft sehr zu) O O O O O O O O O 
270 Ich bin oft in heiterer Stimmung. (trifft sehr zu) O O O O O O O O O 
271 Ich bin ein fröhlicher Typ. (trifft sehr zu) O O O O O O O O O 
272 Es fällt mir leicht, gute Laune zu verbreiten. (trifft sehr zu) O O O O O O O O O 
273 Ich lache gerne und viel. (trifft sehr zu) O O O O O O O O O 
274 
Ich unterhalte meine Freunde gerne mit lustigen Geschichten. 
(trifft sehr zu) 
O O O O O O O O O 
275 Lachen wirkt auf mich sehr ansteckend. (trifft sehr zu) O O O O O O O O O 
276 Ich bin ein lustiger Mensch. (trifft sehr zu) O O O O O O O O O 
277 
Ich habe die Erfahrung gemacht, dass an dem Sprichwort 
"Lachen ist die beste Medizin" wirklich etwas dran ist. (trifft 
sehr zu) 
O O O O O O O O O 
278 Ich bin ein heiterer Mensch. (trifft sehr zu) O O O O O O O O O 
279 Ich bin leicht zum Lachen zu bringen. (trifft sehr zu) O O O O O O O O O 
280 Ich nehme die Dinge, wie sie kommen. (trifft sehr zu) O O O O O O O O O 
281 Ich bin häufig in einer vergnügten Stimmung. (trifft sehr zu) O O O O O O O O O 
282 Ich habe ein sonniges Gemüt. (trifft sehr zu) O O O O O O O O O 
283 
Die kleinen Missgeschicke des Alltags finde ich oft amüsant, 
selbst wenn sie mich betreffen. (trifft sehr zu) 
O O O O O O O O O 
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Part I, Study II 
Example of the Humor Rating List II 
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Liebe Untersuchungsteilnehmerin, lieber Untersuchungsteilnehmer 
Vielen Dank, dass Sie sich bereit erklärt haben, an meiner Untersuchung teilzunehmen. 
Meine Doktorarbeit an der Fachrichtung Persönlichkeitspsychologie und Diagnostik des Psychologischen 
Instituts der Universität Zürich beschäftigt sich mit dem Thema „Humor und Tugenden.“ 
Es ist eines der Ziele meiner Doktorarbeit, herauszufinden, ob und wenn ja, welche Aspekte oder Bereiche 
des Humors als tugendhaft angesehen werden können. Dafür sind mehrere Schritte notwendig. 
In einem ersten Schritt mussten bestehende Fragebögen zu Humor danach durchsucht werden, wie stark 
Tugenden darin überhaupt berücksichtigt wurden. Dieser Schritt wurde von Laien durchgeführt und ist 
bereits abgeschlossen. 
In einem zweiten Schritt geht es nun darum, die im ersten Schritt als tugendhaft bewerteten Aussagen 
genauer zu untersuchen und herauszufinden, welchen Tugenden sie zugeordnet werden können. Dieser 
Schritt soll mit der vorliegenden Studie gemacht werden. Ich bitte Sie als Experten/Expertin, diese 
Zuordnung vorzunehmen. Lassen Sie sich dabei vor allem von Ihrem hohen fachlichen Allgemeinwissen 
leiten und sehen Sie über Ihre spezielle philosophische Ausrichtung eher hinweg. 
Auf den folgenden Seiten finden Sie genauere Erläuterungen zum theoretischen Hintergrund und zu Ihrer 
Aufgabe in dieser Studie. Das Ausfüllen des Fragebogens nimmt in etwa eine Stunde in Anspruch.  
Bei Fragen können Sie mich unter oben stehenden Kontaktdaten erreichen.  
Bitte senden Sie mir den ausgefüllten Fragebogen bis spätestens 23.11.2007 im beigelegten Antwortkuvert 
zu.  
Als Dank für Ihre Teilnahme möchte ich Ihnen gerne einen Getränkegutschein von Starbucks zukommen 
lassen. Zu diesem Zweck schreiben Sie bitte Ihre Adresse auf dieses Blatt und senden Sie es mir gemeinsam 
mit dem ausgefüllten Fragebogen zu. Sie bekommen den Gutschein dann an diese Adresse gesandt. Name 
und Adresse werden nicht mit dem Fragebogen in Verbindung gebracht, sondern nach Versand des 
Gutscheins umgehend vernichtet. 
 
Name:______________________________ 
Strasse:_____________________________ 
PLZ/Ort:_____________________________ 
Vielen herzlichen Dank für die Teilnahme! 
 
Ursula Beermann 
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Tugendhafter Humor 
Was wird unter Humor verstanden? 
„Humor“ und „Sinn für Humor“ sind häufig verwendete Begriffe. Darunter wird einerseits die Haltung 
verstanden, den Widrigkeiten des Lebens mit einem Lächeln zu begegnen. Manche sagen, Humor sei eine 
Tugend, und viele wünschen sich Humor bei ihren Partnern und Freunden. Im Humanismus des 19. 
Jahrhunderts in England galt Humor sogar als eine Haupttugend (z.B. bei Shaftesbury, siehe Schmid-
Hidding, 1963). Andererseits bezeichnet Humor auch häufig einfach alles, was lustig ist. Für Aristoteles war 
ein Gefühl der Überlegenheit ein essentieller Faktor im Humor, während es manche zeitgenössischen 
Forscher sogar für den einzig relevanten Faktor halten (Gruner, 1997). Darunter fällt zum Beispiel auch das 
Auslachen anderer. Diese Art von Humor wird von vielen als lasterhaft abgelehnt. Andere würden sich sogar 
scheuen, in diesem Zusammenhang von „Humor“ zu sprechen, sondern dies eher als „Spott“ oder 
„Sarkasmus“ bezeichnen. Manchmal hat Humor aber auch gar nichts mit Tugenden oder Lastern zu tun. Die 
unterschiedlichen Ansichten zu Humor existieren nebeneinander. Vor diesen unterschiedlichen 
Hintergründen wurden von Psychologen und Psychologinnen verschiedene Fragebögen bzw. 
Messinstrumente erstellt, wobei den meisten Messinstrumenten für Humor lediglich die Definition „Humor 
ist alles, was lustig ist“ zugrunde liegt. 
Was geschah bisher? – Schritt 1 
Es gibt eine grosse Menge an Testverfahren, die unterschiedlichste Aspekte von Sinn für Humor messen. 
Jedoch ist keines der Testverfahren direkt dafür konstruiert worden, Humor als Tugend zu messen. Trotzdem 
interessierte mich, inwieweit der Tugendaspekt dennoch gelegentlich in den Aussagen der wichtigsten 
Fragebögen enthalten ist. 
Zu diesem Zweck wurden für eine Studie, die im Sommer und Herbst 2006 stattfand, die Aussagen aus 12 
gängigen Fragebögen zu Sinn für Humor herangezogen. Das darin beschriebene Verhalten oder die 
Einstellung wurde auf einer Skala von „sehr lasterhaft“ bis „sehr tugendhaft“ eingeschätzt. 76 Laien nahmen 
an dieser Untersuchung teil. 73 der insgesamt 298 Aussagen zu Humorverhalten und Einstellungen wurden 
im Schnitt zumindest mit „eher tugendhaft“ bis „tugendhaft“ bewertet. 
Was soll nun geschehen? – Schritt 2 
Das Ziel dieses Schrittes soll sein, jene 73 Aussagen mit (eher) tugendhaftem Inhalt nun konkreten Tugenden 
zuzuordnen zu lassen. Das wird Ihre Aufgabe sein. Ich habe dafür ein Raster bereitgestellt, das ich im 
Folgenden genauer erklären werde.  
Das Tugendraster 
Aus Sicht der Positiven Psychologie sind Tugenden Gruppen von Eigenschaften oder Handlungsweisen, die 
von den meisten Menschen als positiv und moralisch wertvoll wahrgenommen werden. Es existieren 
verschiedenste Tugendenkataloge, wie zum Beispiel die platonischen Tugenden, jene von Thomas von 
Aquin oder taoistische Tugenden. Nach den Forschern Dahlsgaard, Peterson und Seligman (2005), die eine 
historische und kulturübergreifende Analyse verschiedenster philosophischer und religiöser Schriften 
durchführten, kristallisieren sich insbesondere sechs universell auftretende Haupttugenden heraus: Weisheit, 
Mut, Humanität, Gerechtigkeit, Mässigung und Transzendenz. Diese Tugenden bilden auch das Raster der 
vorliegenden Untersuchung. Bitte beachten Sie, dass es sich bei den Tugenden mehr um „Tugendfamilien“ 
handelt; jede „Tugendfamilie“ hat den Namen der Tugend als Überbegriff und zeichnet sich durch bestimmte 
Charakterstärken aus. Auf den folgenden Seiten finden Sie genauere Beschreibungen dieser Tugendfamilien. 
Auf dem Extrablatt mit dem Namen „Übersicht der Tugenden“ finden Sie noch zusammengefasst die 
Tugenden mit den dazugehörigen Charakterstärken. Nehmen Sie dieses Blatt gerne als Hilfe für die 
Zuordnung der 73 Aussagen zu den Tugenden zur Hand. 
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Tugendenbeschreibungen 
Mut 
Unter „Mut“ wird die Bereitschaft verstanden, eigene Angst zu überwinden und Ziele zu verfolgen, auch 
wenn sich dabei äussere oder innere Widerstände in den Weg stellen. Dabei gibt es vor allem drei Typen von 
Mut: 
• Physischen Mut (Mut, der zum Tragen kommt, wenn man die Angst vor körperlichen Verletzungen 
oder vor dem Tod überwindet, um sich selbst oder andere zu retten)  
• Moralischen Mut (Mut, Authentizität zu bewahren, auch mit der Gefahr, Freunde, eine Anstellung, 
die Intimsphäre oder Prestige zu verlieren – Stichwort „Zivilcourage“)  
• Psychischen Mut (Mut, den man braucht, um sich einer Krankheit oder einer hinderlichen 
Gewohnheit oder Situation entgegenzustellen; die Tapferkeit, die man hat, wenn man sich den 
inneren "Dämonen" stellt) 
Peterson und Seligman meinen, dass die Tugend „Mut“ gezeigt wird, indem man folgende Stärken einsetzt: 
• Authentizität: die Wahrheit sagen und sich natürlich geben 
• Tapferkeit: sich nicht einer Bedrohung oder einem Schmerz beugen, Herausforderungen annehmen 
• Ausdauer: beendigen, was begonnen wurde 
• Enthusiasmus: der Welt mit Begeisterung und Energie begegnen 
Gerechtigkeit 
Unter „Gerechtigkeit“ versteht man das, was das Leben fair macht: den Versuch, jedermann moralisch 
angemessen zu behandeln. Gerechtigkeit ist für die Beziehung zwischen der Einzelperson und der Gruppe 
oder Gemeinschaft und dabei sowohl für Mitglieder als auch für Führungspersonen einer Gruppe bedeutsam.  
Peterson und Seligman meinen, dass die Tugend „Gerechtigkeit“ gezeigt wird, indem man folgende Stärken 
einsetzt: 
• Fairness: alle Menschen nach dem Prinzip der Gleichheit und Gerechtigkeit behandeln 
• Führungsvermögen: Gruppenaktivitäten organisieren und ermöglichen 
• Teamwork: gut als Mitglied eines Teams arbeiten 
Humanität 
Sowohl Gerechtigkeit als auch Humanität betreffen das Verbessern des Wohlergehens der anderen; trotzdem 
handelt es sich hier um unterschiedliche Tugenden. „Humanität“ bezeichnet eine humane Gesinnung und 
Haltung, die in Beziehungen zu anderen Menschen zum Tragen kommt. Sie kann bedeuten, mehr als nur das 
tun, was fair ist, und grosszügig, liebevoll und nachsichtig gegenüber anderen zu sein. Humanität beruht auf 
Empathie und Mitgefühl und kann sogar manchmal dazu führen, gegen die Regeln der Fairness zu handeln.  
Peterson und Seligman meinen, dass die Tugend „Humanität“ gezeigt wird, indem man folgende Stärken 
einsetzt: 
• Freundlichkeit: jemandem einen Gefallen tun und gute Taten vollbringen 
• Bindungsfähigkeit: menschliche Nähe herstellen können 
• Soziale Intelligenz: sich der Motive und Gefühle seiner selbst und anderer bewusst sein 
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Mässigung 
Normalerweise wird der Begriff „Mässigung“ für Abstinenz betreffend Essen, Trinken, Rauchen oder 
Sexualität verwendet. In der vorliegenden Untersuchung hat er eher die Bedeutung von „allgemeiner 
Selbstbeherrschung“. Dazu zählt auch die Fähigkeit, die eigenen Emotionen und Motivationen ohne äussere 
Hilfe erkennen und damit umgehen zu können und sein Verhalten zu regulieren.  
Peterson und Seligman meinen, dass die Tugend Mässigung gezeigt wird, indem man folgende Stärken 
einsetzt: 
• Vergebungsbereitschaft: denen vergeben, die einem Unrecht getan haben 
• Bescheidenheit: das Erreichte für sich sprechen lassen 
• Vorsicht: nichts tun oder sagen, was später bereut werden könnte 
• Selbstregulation: regulieren, was man tut und fühlt 
Transzendenz 
Das Transzendente ist nach Kant das, was über menschliches Wissen hinausgeht, die Verbindung zu etwas 
Höherem. Diese Beziehung zu einer höheren Instanz erlaubt es Menschen, Sinn fürs Leben zu gewinnen. 
Transzendenz ist nicht das Gleiche wie Spiritualität oder Religiosität, schliesst sie aber mit ein. Sie kann 
auch etwas Irdisches sein und ist nicht an die Ausübung von Religion gebunden. 
Peterson und Seligman meinen, dass die Tugend „Transzendenz“ gezeigt wird, indem man folgende Stärken 
einsetzt: 
• Sinn für das Schöne: Schönheit in allen Lebensbereichen schätzen 
• Dankbarkeit: sich der guten Dinge bewusst sein und sie zu schätzen wissen 
• Hoffnung: das Beste erwarten und daran arbeiten, es zu erreichen 
• Spiritualität: stimmige Überzeugungen über einen höheren Sinn des Lebens haben 
Weisheit 
„Weisheit“ bedeutet eine durch Lebenserfahrung und Abgeklärtheit gewonnene innere Reife. Weisheit ist 
nicht identisch mit Intelligenz. Weise Menschen wenden Intelligenz an, und zwar nicht nur, um die eigenen 
Interessen oder die der anderen zu maximieren; sie stellen auch eine Balance zwischen verschiedenen 
Eigeninteressen und den Interessen anderer her. Dazu zählt auch der Kontext, in dem man lebt: die eigene 
Stadt, das eigene Land, die Umwelt oder sogar Gott. Weisheit ist Wissen, das für Gutes eingesetzt wurde 
oder wird. 
Peterson und Seligman meinen, dass die Tugend „Weisheit“ gezeigt wird, indem man folgende Stärken 
einsetzt: 
• Kreativität: neue und effektive Wege finden, Dinge zu tun 
• Neugier: Interesse an der Umwelt haben 
• Urteilsvermögen: Dinge durchdenken und von allen Seiten betrachten 
• Liebe zum Lernen: neue Techniken erlernen und Wissen aneignen 
• Weitsicht/Durchblick: in der Lage sein, guten Rat zu geben 
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Was ist nun Ihre Aufgabe? 
Jeder Fragebogen enthält eine bestimmte Anzahl an Fragen, die in einem bestimmten Antwortformat 
beantwortet werden sollen. Z.B. könnte die Frage lauten: "Lachen Sie gerne?" und die Antwort könnte sein: 
"Stimme zu". Bei verschiedenen Fragebogen werden unterschiedliche Antwortformate verwendet (z.B. „ja“, 
„nein“, oder „trifft völlig zu“, „trifft zu“, „trifft eher zu“ etc.). Ich habe das jeweilige Antwortformat 
erhalten. Jede Frage bzw. Aussage wird mit der am stärksten zustimmenden Antwort gemeinsam präsentiert. 
Auf diese Art und Weise finden Sie im Folgenden jene 73 Aussagen aufgeführt, die zumindest mit „(eher) 
tugendhaft“ beurteilt wurden. 
Beachten Sie bitte: Es geht hier nicht um die Frage, ob etwas humorvoll ist oder nicht. Es geht darum, ob und 
wenn ja wie tugendhaft ein bestimmtes in den Aussagen beschriebenes Verhalten oder eine beschriebene 
Einstellung ist.  
Bitte beantworten Sie nun für jede der 73 Aussagen die folgende Frage: 
Wie sehr ist jede einzelne Tugend, nämlich Mut, Gerechtigkeit, Humanität, Mässigung, Transzendenz oder 
Weisheit, in dieser Aussage vorhanden bzw. repräsentiert?  
Sie haben dazu eine Skala von 0 bis 9 zur Verfügung. Die Werte bedeuten folgendes. 
 
0 überhaupt nicht vorhanden 
1 sehr schwach vorhanden 
2  
3 schwach vorhanden 
4  
5 mittelstark vorhanden 
6  
7 stark vorhanden 
8  
9  sehr stark vorhanden 
 
Das sieht dann für jede Tugend so aus: 
Tugend 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Mut .......................................................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
 
Verwenden Sie „0,“ wenn Sie finden, dass die Tugend in der betreffenden Aussage nicht gezeigt wird. 
Verwenden Sie – je nach Grad – die Werte 1 bis 9, wenn Sie der Meinung sind, dass die Tugend 
repräsentiert ist. Verwenden Sie „1“ oder einen grösseren Wert nur, wenn eine Tugend wirklich zumindest 
sehr schwach repräsentiert ist. Es kann durchaus vorkommen, dass einige Aussagen gar keine Tugend 
repräsentieren. 
Sie finden diese Skala in der Kopfzeile aller folgenden Seiten. 
Bitte beachten Sie, dass hier nun nur die Tugenden und nicht die gesamten Tugendfamilien inklusive 
Charakterstärken aufgeführt sind. Sie können aber zur Hilfe bei der Zuordnung zu den Tugenden nun das 
Extrablatt „Übersicht der Tugenden“ zur Hand nehmen. 
Auf der folgenden Seite finden Sie ein Beispiel. 
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Beispiel 
Stellen Sie sich vor, eine fiktive Person beantwortet die Aussage „Ich mag Witze, in denen Menschen 
einander helfen“ in einem Fragebogen mit starker Zustimmung. 
Ich mag Witze, in denen Menschen einander helfen. (Starke Zustimmung) 
Bitte beurteilen Sie nun dieses Verhalten: Schätzen Sie für jede Tugend ein, inwieweit sie in diesem 
beschriebenen Verhalten vorhanden ist. Sie finden die Ankerpunkte der Skala in der Kopfzeile der Seite. 
Zur Erinnerung: Wenn Sie der Meinung sind, eine Tugend ist bei einer bestimmten Aussage nicht 
repräsentiert, kennzeichnen Sie das bitte mit „0,“ Sobald eine Tugend zumindest sehr schwach 
repräsentiert ist, verwenden Sie je nach Grad einen Wert zwischen 1 und 9. Wenn Sie der Meinung sind, 
es handle sich bei dem beschriebenen Verhalten um gar keine Tugend, markieren Sie für jede Tugend die 
„0,“ Es kann durchaus vorkommen, dass einige Aussagen gar keine Tugend repräsentieren. 
Wenn Sie z.B. der Meinung sind, das Verhalten in der obigen Aussage repräsentiere Gerechtigkeit 
mittelstark und Humanität stark bis sehr stark, dann markieren Sie für Gerechtigkeit die 5 und für 
Humanität die 8, so wie im Beispiel demonstriert. Markieren Sie für alle anderen Tugenden die 0, wenn 
Sie der Meinung sind, sie werden in dem in der Aussage beschriebenen Verhalten nicht gezeigt. 
Die sechs Tugenden stellen nach Dahlsgaard, Peterson und Seligman einen erschöpfenden 
Tugendenkatalog dar. Sollten Sie aber bei bestimmten Aussagen der Meinung sein, es handle sich um 
eine andere Tugend (die sich nicht nur rein sprachlich von den aufgeführten Tugenden bzw. der 
dazugehörigen Tugendfamilie unterscheidet), so haben Sie die Möglichkeit, diese Tugend unter „andere 
Tugend“ aufzuführen. Bitte schreiben Sie sie auf die Linie und bewerten Sie dann anhand der Skala das 
Ausmass. Im anderen Fall lassen Sie die Linie frei und streichen Sie sie durch, wie im Beispiel gezeigt. 
 
Tugend 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Mut .......................................................................   O O O O O O O O O 
Gerechtigkeit ........................................................  O O O O O  O O O O 
Humanität .............................................................  O O O O O O O O  O 
Mässigung ............................................................   O O O O O O O O O 
Transzendenz .......................................................   O O O O O O O O O 
Weisheit ................................................................   O O O O O O O O O 
Andere Tugend: _________________________ 
 
 O O O O O O O O O 
 
Bitte beurteilen Sie auf diese Art und Weise jede Aussage. Geben Sie jeweils für jede der Tugenden 
eine Einschätzung ab.  
Es gibt hierbei keine richtigen und falschen Antworten. Bitte verlassen Sie sich auf Ihr eigenes Urteil. 
Arbeiten Sie bitte möglichst zügig. Sie können gerne Pausen machen, wenn Sie müde sind. Setzen Sie 
dann aber die Bearbeitung möglichst bald fort. 
Bevor Sie mit den Einschätzungen beginnen, bitte ich Sie noch um die Beantwortung einiger Fragen zu 
Ihrer Person. 
Auf der folgenden Seite geht’s los. Viel Spass!
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Die Ankerpunkte der Skala für das Ausmass der Tugend 
0 = überhaupt nicht vorhanden 3 = schwach vorhanden 7 = stark vorhanden 
1 = sehr schwach vorhanden 5 = mittelstark vorhanden 9 = sehr stark vorhanden 
 
Wichtig: Da der Fragebogen via Scanner eingelesen wird, sind wir darauf angewiesen, dass 
die entsprechenden Markierungen nur innerhalb der Kreise und mit schwarzer Farbe 
eingetragen werden. Ansonsten wird das Einlesen der Daten via Scanner mit Problemen 
verbunden sein. Herzlichen Dank für Ihr Verständnis! 
 
so markieren:        nicht so markieren:      
 
Bitte machen Sie zunächst noch folgende Angaben zu Ihrer Person. Die Angaben werden 
selbstverständlich vertraulich behandelt. 
Geschlecht  Alter 
O männlich   
O weiblich   
Höchster erreichter 
Bildungsgrad 
 
Beruf /Studienrichtung 
O AHS/BHS-Matura/Abitur   
O Fachhochschul-
/Universitätsabschluss 
  
 
Sie finden hier nun die einzelnen Aussagen nacheinander aufgeführt. Bitte beurteilen Sie diese in dem 
darunterstehenden Raster auf das Ausmass der Tugend hin. In der Kopfzeile finden Sie die Ankerpunkte 
der Skala. Auf dem Extrablatt „Übersicht der Tugenden“ finden Sie nochmals die Tugenden samt der 
dazugehörenden Charakterstärken (Tugendfamilien) aufgeführt. 
55)  Mein Alltag bietet mir oft Anlass zum Lachen. (Trifft sehr zu)  
Tugend 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Mut ......................................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Gerechtigkeit .......................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Humanität ............................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Mässigung ...........................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Transzendenz .......................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Weisheit ..............................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Andere Tugend: ...................................   O O O O O O O O O 
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Die Ankerpunkte der Skala für das Ausmass der Tugend 
0 = überhaupt nicht vorhanden 3 = schwach vorhanden 7 = stark vorhanden 
1 = sehr schwach vorhanden 5 = mittelstark vorhanden 9 = sehr stark vorhanden 
56)  Ich lächle häufig. (Trifft sehr zu)  
Tugend 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Mut ......................................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Gerechtigkeit .......................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Humanität ............................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Mässigung ...........................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Transzendenz .......................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Weisheit ..............................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Andere Tugend: __________________   O O O O O O O O O 
57)  Die gute Laune anderer wirkt ansteckend auf mich. (Trifft sehr zu)  
Tugend 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Mut ......................................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Gerechtigkeit .......................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Humanität ............................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Mässigung ...........................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Transzendenz .......................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Weisheit ..............................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Andere Tugend: __________________   O O O O O O O O O 
58)  Die kleinen Dinge des Alltags finde ich oft komisch und erheiternd. (Trifft sehr zu)  
Tugend 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Mut ......................................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Gerechtigkeit .......................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Humanität ............................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Mässigung ...........................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Transzendenz .......................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Weisheit ..............................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Andere Tugend: __________________   O O O O O O O O O 
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Die Ankerpunkte der Skala für das Ausmass der Tugend 
0 = überhaupt nicht vorhanden 3 = schwach vorhanden 7 = stark vorhanden 
1 = sehr schwach vorhanden 5 = mittelstark vorhanden 9 = sehr stark vorhanden 
59)  Ich bin oft in heiterer Stimmung. (Trifft sehr zu)  
Tugend 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Mut ......................................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Gerechtigkeit .......................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Humanität ............................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Mässigung ...........................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Transzendenz .......................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Weisheit ..............................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Andere Tugend: __________________   O O O O O O O O O 
60)  Ich bin ein fröhlicher Typ. (Trifft sehr zu)  
Tugend 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Mut ......................................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Gerechtigkeit .......................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Humanität ............................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Mässigung ...........................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Transzendenz .......................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Weisheit ..............................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Andere Tugend: __________________   O O O O O O O O O 
61)  Es fällt mir leicht, gute Laune zu verbreiten. (Trifft sehr zu)  
Tugend 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Mut ......................................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Gerechtigkeit .......................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Humanität ............................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Mässigung ...........................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Transzendenz .......................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Weisheit ..............................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Andere Tugend: __________________   O O O O O O O O O 
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Die Ankerpunkte der Skala für das Ausmass der Tugend 
0 = überhaupt nicht vorhanden 3 = schwach vorhanden 7 = stark vorhanden 
1 = sehr schwach vorhanden 5 = mittelstark vorhanden 9 = sehr stark vorhanden 
62)  Ich lache gerne und viel. (Trifft sehr zu)  
Tugend 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Mut ......................................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Gerechtigkeit .......................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Humanität ............................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Mässigung ...........................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Transzendenz .......................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Weisheit ..............................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Andere Tugend: __________________   O O O O O O O O O 
63)  Ich unterhalte meine Freunde gerne mit lustigen Geschichten. (Trifft sehr zu)  
Tugend 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Mut ......................................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Gerechtigkeit .......................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Humanität ............................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Mässigung ...........................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Transzendenz .......................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Weisheit ..............................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Andere Tugend: __________________   O O O O O O O O O 
64)  Lachen wirkt auf mich sehr ansteckend. (Trifft sehr zu)  
Tugend 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Mut ......................................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Gerechtigkeit .......................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Humanität ............................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Mässigung ...........................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Transzendenz .......................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Weisheit ..............................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Andere Tugend: __________________  
 
 O O O O O O O O O 
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Die Ankerpunkte der Skala für das Ausmass der Tugend 
0 = überhaupt nicht vorhanden 3 = schwach vorhanden 7 = stark vorhanden 
1 = sehr schwach vorhanden 5 = mittelstark vorhanden 9 = sehr stark vorhanden 
65)  Ich bin ein lustiger Mensch. (Trifft sehr zu)  
Tugend 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Mut ......................................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Gerechtigkeit .......................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Humanität ............................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Mässigung ...........................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Transzendenz .......................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Weisheit ..............................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Andere Tugend: __________________   O O O O O O O O O 
66)  Ich habe die Erfahrung gemacht, dass an dem Sprichwort "Lachen ist die beste 
Medizin" wirklich etwas dran ist. (Trifft sehr zu)  
Tugend 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Mut ......................................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Gerechtigkeit .......................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Humanität ............................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Mässigung ...........................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Transzendenz .......................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Weisheit ..............................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Andere Tugend: __________________   O O O O O O O O O 
67)  Ich bin ein heiterer Mensch. (Trifft sehr zu)  
Tugend 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Mut.......................................................   O O O O O O O O O O 
Gerechtigkeit .......................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Humanität ............................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Mässigung ...........................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Transzendenz .......................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Weisheit ..............................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Andere Tugend: __________________   O O O O O O O O O 
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Die Ankerpunkte der Skala für das Ausmass der Tugend 
0 = überhaupt nicht vorhanden 3 = schwach vorhanden 7 = stark vorhanden 
1 = sehr schwach vorhanden 5 = mittelstark vorhanden 9 = sehr stark vorhanden 
68)  Ich nehme die Dinge, wie sie kommen. (Trifft sehr zu)  
Tugend 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Mut ......................................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Gerechtigkeit .......................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Humanität ............................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Mässigung ...........................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Transzendenz .......................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Weisheit ..............................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Andere Tugend: __________________   O O O O O O O O O 
69)  Ich bin häufig in einer vergnügten Stimmung. (Trifft sehr zu)  
Tugend 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Mut ......................................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Gerechtigkeit .......................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Humanität ............................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Mässigung ...........................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Transzendenz .......................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Weisheit ..............................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Andere Tugend: __________________   O O O O O O O O O 
70)  Ich habe ein sonniges Gemüt. (Trifft sehr zu)  
Tugend 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Mut ......................................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Gerechtigkeit .......................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Humanität ............................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Mässigung ...........................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Transzendenz .......................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Weisheit ..............................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Andere Tugend: __________________   O O O O O O O O O 
 
APPENDIX – PART I 
169 
Die Ankerpunkte der Skala für das Ausmass der Tugend 
0 = überhaupt nicht vorhanden 3 = schwach vorhanden 7 = stark vorhanden 
1 = sehr schwach vorhanden 5 = mittelstark vorhanden 9 = sehr stark vorhanden 
71)  Die kleinen Missgeschicke des Alltags finde ich oft amüsant, selbst wenn sie mich 
betreffen. (Trifft sehr zu)  
Tugend 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Mut ......................................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Gerechtigkeit .......................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Humanität ............................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Mässigung ...........................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Transzendenz .......................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Weisheit ..............................................  O O O O O O O O O O 
Andere Tugend: __________________   O O O O O O O O O 
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Übersicht der Tugenden 
 
Tugend Dazugehörige Charakterstärken (Tugendfamilien) 
Mut Authentizität: die Wahrheit sagen und sich natürlich geben 
Tapferkeit: sich nicht einer Bedrohung oder einem Schmerz beugen, 
Herausforderungen annehmen 
Ausdauer: beendigen, was begonnen wurde 
Enthusiasmus: der Welt mit Begeisterung und Energie begegnen 
Gerechtigkeit Fairness: alle Menschen nach dem Prinzip der Gleichheit und Gerechtigkeit 
behandeln 
Führungsvermögen: Gruppenaktivitäten organisieren und ermöglichen 
Teamwork: gut als Mitglied eines Teams arbeiten 
Humanität Freundlichkeit: jemandem einen Gefallen tun und gute Taten vollbringen 
Bindungsfähigkeit: menschliche Nähe herstellen können 
Soziale Intelligenz: sich der Motive und Gefühle seiner selbst und anderer 
bewusst sein 
Mässigung Vergebungsbereitschaft: denen vergeben, die einem Unrecht getan haben 
Bescheidenheit: das Erreichte für sich sprechen lassen 
Vorsicht: nichts tun oder sagen, was später bereut werden könnte 
Selbstregulation: regulieren, was man tut und fühlt 
Transzendenz Sinn für das Schöne: Schönheit in allen Lebensbereichen schätzen 
Dankbarkeit: sich der guten Dinge bewusst sein und sie zu schätzen wissen 
Hoffnung: das Beste erwarten und daran arbeiten, es zu erreichen 
Spiritualität: stimmige Überzeugungen über einen höheren Sinn des Lebens 
haben 
Weisheit Kreativität: neue und effektive Wege finden, Dinge zu tun 
Neugier: Interesse an der Umwelt haben 
Urteilsvermögen: Dinge durchdenken und von allen Seiten betrachten 
Liebe zum Lernen: neue Techniken erlernen und Wissen aneignen 
Weitsicht/Durchblick: in der Lage sein, guten Rat zu geben 
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Part II 
Humor in Virtues: Humor in Tugenden (HiT) 
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Humor in Tugenden (HiT) 
 
Sehr geehrte Untersuchungsteilnehmerin, sehr geehrter Untersuchungsteilnehmer, 
 
in meinem Dissertationsprojekt geht es um Humor in Verbindung mit Tugenden. „Humor“ wird dabei in 
seinem weitesten Sinn gebraucht und steht für alles, was komisch oder zum Lachen ist. Das Wort 
„Tugend“ stammt von „Tauglichkeit“ ab; Tugenden sind Gruppen von Eigenschaften oder 
Handlungsweisen, die von den meisten Menschen als positiv und moralisch wertvoll wahrgenommen 
werden. Insbesondere sechs Haupttugenden kristallisieren sich dabei nach den Forschern Peterson und 
Seligman (2004) aus Schriften verschiedener Zeitepochen und Kulturen übereinstimmend heraus: 
Weisheit, Mut, Humanität, Gerechtigkeit, Mäßigung und Transzendenz. 
Dieser Fragebogen stellt eine Voruntersuchung zu der Frage dar, inwieweit Humor bei der 
Verwirklichung spezieller Tugenden im täglichen Leben eine Rolle spielen kann. Aus diesem Grunde 
sammle ich Erinnerungen an tatsächliche Erlebnisse und Situationen aus dem Alltag, in denen das der 
Fall war, und ausgedachte Situationen, wie sie geschehen könnten.  
Sie werden auf den folgenden Seiten dafür eine Anleitung finden. 
Bei Fragen erreichen Sie mich  
unter der E-mail-Adresse u.beermann@psychologie.unizh.ch  
oder der Telefonnummer +41/44/635 75 23. 
 
Vielen herzlichen Dank fürs Mitmachen! 
 
 
Ursula Beermann 
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Anleitung 
 
Der Fragebogen besteht aus zwei Teilen. 
1. Im Teil A, der auf der folgenden Seite beginnt, finden Sie eine kurze Beschreibung jeder 
einzelnen Tugend nebst den Stärken, die man (nach Peterson und Seligman) zur Verwirklichung 
dieser Tugend braucht. Sie werden dort gebeten, Ihre Einschätzung zu einigen wenigen Fragen 
abzugeben.  
2. Im Teil B werde ich Sie nach Situationen aus dem Alltag fragen, in denen Humor bei der 
Verwirklichung der jeweiligen Tugenden zum Einsatz kam. Dabei können Sie selbst der oder die 
Agierende gewesen sein, oder Sie waren bei einer solchen Situation dabei und jemand anders war 
die tugendhaft handelnde Person. Wenn Sie eine solche Situation noch nie erlebt haben, haben 
Sie sie vielleicht in einem Film gesehen, einem Buch gelesen oder davon gehört oder können sie 
sich vorstellen. Ich werde Sie um möglichst konkrete Beschreibungen solcher Situationen bitten. 
Es geht dabei nicht darum, herauszufinden, wie humorvoll oder tugendhaft Sie sind; vielmehr 
interessiert mich, ob und wie Humor zum Einsatz kommen kann, um die einzelnen Tugenden zu 
verwirklichen.  
 
Bitte lassen Sie sich für die Beantwortung dieses Fragebogens Zeit. Erinnerungen aus Ihrem 
Erfahrungsschatz sind für dieses Projekt sehr wertvoll. Scheuen Sie sich nicht, auch Beispiele zu 
bringen, die Sie für „schlecht“ halten. Auch diese können sehr wertvoll sein. Sie werden für den 
Fragebogen vermutlich mindestens eine Stunde brauchen. Sie können die Bearbeitung auch 
unterbrechen und den Fragebogen zu einem späteren Zeitpunkt weiter bearbeiten.  
 
Ihre Antworten werden selbstverständlich anonym behandelt. 
 
 
Bitte machen Sie hier noch ein paar Angaben. 
 
Geschlecht 
 
männlich   weiblich  
 
Alter __________ 
 
Höchster erreichter Bildungsgrad 
 
 Pflichtschulabschluss 
 Lehrabschluss 
 AHS/BHS-Matura/Abitur 
 Fachhochschul-/Universitätsabschluss 
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Teil A 
Mut 
Unter „Mut“ wird die Bereitschaft verstanden, eigene Angst zu überwinden und Ziele zu verfolgen, 
auch wenn sich dabei äußere oder innere Widerstände in den Weg stellen. Dabei gibt es vor allem drei 
Typen von Mut: 
• Physischen Mut (Mut, der zum Tragen kommt, wenn man die Angst vor körperlichen 
Verletzungen oder vor dem Tod überwindet, um sich selbst oder andere zu retten)  
• Moralischen Mut (Mut, Authentizität zu bewahren, auch mit der Gefahr, Freunde, eine 
Anstellung, die Intimsphäre oder Prestige zu verlieren – Stichwort „Zivilcourage“)  
• Psychischen Mut (Mut, den man braucht, um sich einer Krankheit oder einer hinderlichen 
Gewohnheit oder Situation entgegenzustellen; die Tapferkeit, die man hat, wenn man sich den 
inneren "Dämonen" stellt) 
Peterson und Seligman meinen, dass die Tugend „Mut“ gezeigt wird, indem man folgende Stärken 
einsetzt: 
• Authentizität (authenticity): die Wahrheit sagen und sich natürlich geben 
• Tapferkeit (bravery): sich nicht einer Bedrohung oder einem Schmerz beugen, 
Herausforderungen annehmen 
• Ausdauer (persistence): beendigen, was begonnen wurde 
• Enthusiasmus (zest): der Welt mit Begeisterung und Energie begegnen 
* * * 
Sie finden nun ein paar Fragen zur Tugend „Mut“. Bitte kreuzen Sie jeweils die für Sie 
zutreffendste Antwort an. 
 
1. Wie bewerten Sie die Tugend Mut in Bezug auf das menschliche Zusammenleben?  
absolut 
hinderlich 
sehr 
hinderlich hinderlich weder/noch förderlich 
sehr 
förderlich unabdingbar 
                     
 
2. Inwieweit fühlen Sie sich persönlich im Handeln der Tugend Mut verpflichtet? 
gar nicht ein bisschen mäßig ziemlich sehr  
               
 
3. Im Alltag ist man manchmal ernst und manchmal lustig. Dies betrifft auch Situationen, in denen 
Tugenden gezeigt werden.  
Wenn Sie alle Situationen betrachten, in denen Mut gezeigt wird: In wievielen davon geschieht dies 
auf humorvolle Weise? Tragen Sie bitte eine Zahl zwischen 0 und 100 auf der Linie ein, wobei „0“ für 
„nie“ und „100“ für „immer“ steht. 
Ich schätze, dass in ______ von 100 Situationen, in denen Mut gezeigt wird, dies auf humorvolle 
Weise geschieht. 
 
4. Wie oft konnten Sie selbst schon auf humorvolle Weise Mut zeigen? 
noch nie 1x mehrmals häufig so gut wie immer 
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Gerechtigkeit 
Unter „Gerechtigkeit“ versteht man das, was das Leben fair macht: den Versuch, jedermann moralisch 
angemessen zu behandeln. Gerechtigkeit ist für die Beziehung zwischen der Einzelperson und der 
Gruppe oder Gemeinschaft und dabei sowohl für Mitglieder als auch für Führungspersonen einer 
Gruppe bedeutsam.  
Peterson und Seligman meinen, dass die Tugend „Gerechtigkeit“ gezeigt wird, indem man folgende 
Stärken einsetzt: 
• Fairness (fairness): alle Menschen nach dem Prinzip der Gleichheit und Gerechtigkeit 
behandeln 
• Führungsvermögen (leadership): Gruppenaktivitäten organisieren und ermöglichen 
• Teamwork (teamwork): gut als Mitglied eines Teams arbeiten 
 
* * * 
 
Sie finden nun ein paar Fragen zur Tugend „Gerechtigkeit“. Bitte kreuzen Sie jeweils die für Sie 
zutreffendste Antwort an. 
 
1. Wie bewerten Sie die Tugend Gerechtigkeit in Bezug auf das menschliche Zusammenleben?  
absolut 
hinderlich 
sehr 
hinderlich hinderlich weder/noch förderlich 
sehr 
förderlich unabdingbar 
                     
 
2. Inwieweit fühlen Sie sich persönlich im Handeln der Tugend Gerechtigkeit verpflichtet? 
gar nicht ein bisschen mäßig ziemlich sehr  
               
 
3. Im Alltag ist man manchmal ernst und manchmal lustig. Dies kann auch Situationen betreffen, in 
denen Tugenden gezeigt werden.  
Wenn Sie alle Situationen betrachten, in denen Gerechtigkeit gezeigt wird: In wievielen davon 
geschieht dies auf humorvolle Weise? Tragen Sie bitte eine Zahl zwischen 0 und 100 auf der Linie ein, 
wobei „0“ für „nie“ und „100“ für „immer“ steht. 
Ich schätze, dass in ______ von 100 Situationen, in denen Gerechtigkeit gezeigt wird, dies auf 
humorvolle Weise geschieht. 
 
4. Wie oft konnten Sie selbst schon auf humorvolle Weise Gerechtigkeit zeigen? 
noch nie 1x mehrmals häufig so gut wie immer 
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Humanität 
Sowohl Gerechtigkeit als auch Humanität betreffen das Verbessern des Wohlergehens der anderen; 
trotzdem handelt es sich hier um unterschiedliche Tugenden. „Humanität“ bezeichnet eine humane 
Gesinnung und Haltung, die in Beziehungen zu anderen Menschen zum Tragen kommt. Sie kann 
bedeuten, mehr als nur das tun, was fair ist, und großzügig, liebevoll und nachsichtig gegenüber 
anderen zu sein. Humanität beruht auf Empathie und Mitgefühl und kann sogar manchmal dazu 
führen, gegen die Regeln der Fairness zu handeln.  
Peterson und Seligman meinen, dass die Tugend „Humanität“ gezeigt wird, indem man folgende 
Stärken einsetzt: 
• Freundlichkeit (kindness):  jemandem einen Gefallen tun und gute Taten vollbringen 
• Bindungsfähigkeit (love): menschliche Nähe herstellen können 
• Soziale Intelligenz (social intelligence): sich der Motive und Gefühle seiner selbst und 
anderer bewusst sein 
 
* * * 
 
Sie finden nun ein paar Fragen zur Tugend „Humanität“. Bitte kreuzen Sie jeweils die für Sie 
zutreffendste Antwort an. 
 
1. Wie bewerten Sie die Tugend Humanität in Bezug auf das menschliche Zusammenleben?  
absolut 
hinderlich 
sehr 
hinderlich hinderlich weder/noch förderlich 
sehr 
förderlich unabdingbar 
                     
 
2. Inwieweit fühlen Sie sich persönlich im Handeln der Tugend Humanität verpflichtet? 
Gar nicht ein bisschen mäßig ziemlich sehr  
               
 
3. Im Alltag ist man manchmal ernst und manchmal lustig. Dies kann auch Situationen betreffen, in 
denen Tugenden gezeigt werden.  
Wenn Sie alle Situationen betrachten, in denen Humanität gezeigt wird: In wievielen davon geschieht 
dies auf humorvolle Weise? Tragen Sie bitte eine Zahl zwischen 0 und 100 auf der Linie ein, wobei 
„0“ für „nie“ und „100“ für „immer“ steht. 
Ich schätze, dass in ______ von 100 Situationen, in denen Humanität gezeigt wird, dies auf 
humorvolle Weise geschieht. 
 
4. Wie oft konnten Sie selbst schon auf humorvolle Weise Humanität zeigen? 
noch nie 1x mehrmals häufig so gut wie immer 
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Mäßigung 
Normalerweise wird der Begriff „Mäßigung“ für Abstinenz betreffend Essen, Trinken, Rauchen oder 
Sexualität verwendet. In der vorliegenden Untersuchung hat er eher die Bedeutung von „allgemeiner 
Selbstbeherrschung“. Dazu zählt auch die Fähigkeit, die eigenen Emotionen und Motivationen ohne 
äußere Hilfe erkennen und damit umgehen zu können und sein Verhalten zu regulieren.  
Peterson und Seligman meinen, dass die Tugend Mäßigung gezeigt wird, indem man folgende Stärken 
einsetzt: 
• Vergebungsbereitschaft (forgiveness): denen vergeben, die einem Unrecht getan haben 
• Bescheidenheit (modesty): das Erreichte für sich sprechen lassen 
• Vorsicht (prudence): nichts tun oder sagen, was später bereut werden könnte 
• Selbstregulation (self-regulation): regulieren, was man tut und fühlt 
 
* * * 
 
Sie finden nun ein paar Fragen zur Tugend „Mäßigung“. Bitte kreuzen Sie jeweils die für Sie 
zutreffendste Antwort an. 
 
1. Wie bewerten Sie die Tugend Mäßigung in Bezug auf das menschliche Zusammenleben?  
absolut 
hinderlich 
sehr 
hinderlich hinderlich weder/noch förderlich 
sehr 
förderlich unabdingbar 
                     
 
2. Inwieweit fühlen Sie persönlich sich im Handeln der Tugend Mäßigung verpflichtet? 
gar nicht ein bisschen mäßig ziemlich sehr  
               
 
3. Im Alltag ist man manchmal ernst und manchmal lustig. Dies kann auch Situationen betreffen, in 
denen Tugenden gezeigt werden.  
Wenn Sie alle Situationen betrachten, in denen Mäßigung gezeigt wird: In wievielen davon geschieht 
dies auf humorvolle Weise? Tragen Sie bitte eine Zahl zwischen 0 und 100 auf der Linie ein, wobei 
„0“ für „nie“ und „100“ für „immer“ steht. 
Ich schätze, dass in ______ von 100 Situationen, in denen Mäßigung gezeigt wird, dies auf 
humorvolle Weise geschieht. 
 
4. Wie oft konnten Sie selbst schon auf humorvolle Weise Mäßigung zeigen? 
noch nie 1x mehrmals häufig so gut wie immer 
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Transzendenz 
Das Transzendente ist nach Kant das, was über menschliches Wissen hinausgeht, die Verbindung zu 
etwas Höherem. Diese Beziehung zu einer höheren Instanz erlaubt es Menschen, Sinn fürs Leben zu 
gewinnen. Transzendenz ist nicht das Gleiche wie Spiritualität oder Religiosität, schließt sie aber mit 
ein. Sie kann auch etwas Irdisches sein und ist nicht an die Ausübung von Religion gebunden. 
Peterson und Seligman meinen, dass die Tugend „Transzendenz“ gezeigt wird, indem man folgende 
Stärken einsetzt: 
• Sinn für das Schöne (appreciation of beauty and excellence): Schönheit in allen 
Lebensbereichen schätzen 
• Dankbarkeit (gratitude): sich der guten Dinge bewusst sein und sie zu schätzen wissen 
• Hoffnung (hope): das Beste erwarten und daran arbeiten, es zu erreichen 
• Spiritualität (spirituality): stimmige Überzeugungen über einen höheren Sinn des Lebens 
haben 
 
* * * 
 
Sie finden nun ein paar Fragen zur Tugend „Transzendenz“. Bitte kreuzen Sie jeweils die für 
Sie zutreffendste Antwort an. 
 
1. Wie bewerten Sie die Tugend Transzendenz in Bezug auf das menschliche Zusammenleben?  
absolut 
hinderlich 
sehr 
hinderlich hinderlich weder/noch förderlich 
sehr 
förderlich unabdingbar 
                     
 
2. Inwieweit fühlen Sie sich persönlich im Handeln der Tugend Transzendenz verpflichtet? 
gar nicht ein bisschen mäßig ziemlich sehr  
               
 
3. Im Alltag ist man manchmal ernst und manchmal lustig. Dies kann auch Situationen betreffen, in 
denen Tugenden gezeigt werden.  
Wenn Sie alle Situationen betrachten, in denen Transzendenz gezeigt wird: In wievielen davon 
geschieht dies auf humorvolle Weise? Tragen Sie bitte eine Zahl zwischen 0 und 100 auf der Linie ein, 
wobei „0“ für „nie“ und „100“ für „immer“ steht. 
Ich schätze, dass in ______ von 100 Situationen, in denen Transzendenz gezeigt wird, dies auf 
humorvolle Weise geschieht. 
 
4. Wie oft konnten Sie selbst schon auf humorvolle Weise Transzendenz zeigen? 
noch nie 1x mehrmals häufig so gut wie immer 
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Weisheit 
„Weisheit“ bedeutet eine durch Lebenserfahrung und Abgeklärtheit gewonnene innere Reife. Weisheit 
ist nicht identisch mit Intelligenz. Weise Menschen wenden Intelligenz an, und zwar nicht nur, um die 
eigenen Interessen oder die der anderen zu maximieren; sie stellen auch eine Balance zwischen 
verschiedenen Eigeninteressen und den Interessen anderer her. Dazu zählt auch der Kontext, in dem 
man lebt: die eigene Stadt, das eigene Land, die Umwelt oder sogar Gott. Weisheit ist Wissen, das für 
Gutes eingesetzt wurde oder wird. 
Peterson und Seligman meinen, dass die Tugend „Weisheit“ gezeigt wird, indem man folgende 
Stärken einsetzt: 
• Kreativität (creativity):  neue und effektive Wege finden, Dinge zu tun 
• Neugier (curiosity): Interesse an der Umwelt haben 
• Urteilsvermögen (open-mindedness): Dinge durchdenken und von allen Seiten betrachten 
• Liebe zum Lernen (love of learning): neue Techniken erlernen und Wissen aneignen 
• Weitsicht/Durchblick (perspective): in der Lage sein, guten Rat zu geben 
 
* * * 
 
Sie finden nun ein paar Fragen zur Tugend „Weisheit“. Bitte kreuzen Sie jeweils die für Sie 
zutreffendste Antwort an. 
 
1. Wie bewerten Sie die Tugend Weisheit in Bezug auf das menschliche Zusammenleben?  
absolut 
hinderlich 
sehr 
hinderlich hinderlich weder/noch förderlich 
sehr 
förderlich unabdingbar 
                     
 
2. Inwieweit fühlen Sie sich persönlich im Handeln der Tugend Weisheit verpflichtet? 
gar nicht ein bisschen mäßig ziemlich sehr  
               
 
3. Im Alltag ist man manchmal ernst und manchmal lustig. Dies kann auch Situationen betreffen, in 
denen Tugenden gezeigt werden.  
Wenn Sie alle Situationen betrachten, in denen Weisheit gezeigt wird: In wievielen davon geschieht 
dies auf humorvolle Weise? Tragen Sie bitte eine Zahl zwischen 0 und 100 auf der Linie ein, wobei 
„0“ für „nie“ und „100“ für „immer“ steht. 
Ich schätze, dass in ______ von 100 Situationen, in denen Weisheit gezeigt wird, dies auf 
humorvolle Weise geschieht. 
 
4. Wie oft konnten Sie selbst schon auf humorvolle Weise Weisheit zeigen? 
noch nie 1x mehrmals häufig so gut wie immer 
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Kennen Sie eine andere Tugend, die hier nicht aufgeführt ist und von der Sie der 
Meinung sind, dass sie mit Hilfe von Humor verwirklicht werden kann?  
 
Wenn ja, führen Sie sie bitte hier auf. (Keine Angst, Sie brauchen sich kein Beispiel dafür 
auszudenken ) 
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Teil B 
 
Im zweiten Teil bitte ich Sie nun um die Beschreibung konkreter Situationen für jede der sechs 
Tugenden. Es geht dabei um Situationen, in denen die jeweilige Tugend auf humorvolle Weise 
verwirklicht wurde oder werden könnte. 
Für jede Tugend sind noch einmal kurz die dazugehörigen Stärken angeführt. Weiters 
werden Sie für jede Tugend folgende Fragen finden, die Ihnen helfen sollen, sich an die 
Situation zu erinnern oder sich die Situation vorzustellen: 
 
• Wo spielte sich die Situation ab? 
• Welche Person(en) waren anwesend? 
• Wie kam es zu dieser Situation?  
• Wie lief sie ab? 
• Wie endete die Situation? 
 
Bitte gehen Sie besonders auf die folgenden Fragen ein:  
 
• Worin bestand das tugendhafte Handeln?  
• Welches humorvolle Verhalten wurde genau gezeigt, das für die Verwirklichung der Tugend 
hilfreich war? (Sagten Sie etwas Humorvolles? Wenn ja, was? Wurde gelacht oder gelächelt? 
Etc.) 
 
Wichtig 
Bitte versuchen Sie, sich zuerst an Situationen zu erinnern, in denen Sie selbst die aktive Person 
waren („Fall 1“). Es kann manchmal schwer sein, sich in allen Einzelheiten an die Situationen zu 
erinnern. Ich bitte Sie trotzdem, alles aufzuschreiben, was Ihnen zu dieser Situation einfällt. 
Sollten Sie noch nie selbst die aktive Person gewesen sein, überlegen Sie, ob Sie schon einmal dabei 
waren, wie jemand anderer auf humorvolle Weise die jeweilige Tugend zu verwirklicht hat („Fall 
2“). 
Sollten Sie eine solche Situation noch nicht miterlebt haben, überlegen Sie, ob Sie schon einmal in 
einem Film gesehen (bzw. in einem Buch gelesen, gehört usw.) haben, wie jemand Humor 
einsetzt/eingesetzt hat, um eine bestimmte Tugend zu verwirklichen, oder ob Sie sich eine solche 
Situation vorstellen können („Fall 3“). 
 
Bitte kennzeichnen Sie für Ihre Situation jeweils, um welchen Fall es sich handelt. 
 
Wenn Sie für alle drei Fälle Situationen wissen, wäre uns eine Situation für Fall 1 am liebsten. Sollte 
Ihnen zu einer bestimmten Tugend nicht gleich etwas einfallen, gehen Sie vorläufig zur nächsten 
Tugend weiter und kommen Sie zu einem späteren Zeitpunkt noch einmal auf die betreffende Tugend 
zurück. Falls Sie zu einer bestimmten Tugend gar nichts schreiben konnten, ist das natürlich in 
Ordnung. Bitte kontrollieren Sie am Ende aber noch einmal, ob Sie nichts unabsichtlich ausgelassen 
haben. Selbstverständlich ist es auch möglich, mehr als eine Situation anzuführen. Verwenden Sie 
dazu bitte die Rückseite oder ein Extrablatt.  
 
Auf der folgenden Seite geht’s los. 
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Mut 
Konnten Sie selbst oder jemand anders schon Mut z.B. durch Einsatz der Stärken Authentizität, 
Tapferkeit, Ausdauer oder Enthusiasmus im Alltag zeigen und dabei das Mittel des Humors 
verwenden? 
 
Bitte versuchen Sie sich an eine Situation zu erinnern, in der auf humorvolle Weise Mut verwirklicht 
wurde. Folgende Fragen sollen Ihnen helfen, sich an die Situation zu erinnern/sie sich vorzustellen: 
 
• Wo spielte sich die Situation ab? 
• Welche Person(en) waren anwesend? 
• Wie kam es zu dieser Situation?  
• Wie lief sie ab? 
• Wie endete die Situation? 
 
Bitte gehen Sie besonders auf die folgenden Fragen ein:  
 
• Worin bestand das tugendhafte Handeln?  
• Welches humorvolle Verhalten wurde genau gezeigt, das für die Verwirklichung der Tugend 
hilfreich war? (Sagte die aktive Person etwas Humorvolles? Wenn ja, was? Wurde gelacht 
oder gelächelt? Etc.) 
 
Bitte beschreiben Sie diese Situation auf dem freien Platz dieser bzw. der nächsten Seite so genau wie 
möglich. Vermeiden Sie bitte Formulierungen, die „man“ oder „sollte“ enthalten, und versuchen Sie, 
die Situation möglichst konkret zu beschreiben. 
 
* * * 
Fall 1: Waren Sie selbst schon einmal der/die Agierende in einer Situation, in der auf humorvolle 
Weise Mut gezeigt wurde? Bitte beschreiben Sie diese Situation hier so genau wie möglich.  
 
Fall 2: Sollten Sie kein Beispiel wissen, indem Sie selbst die handelnde Person waren: Waren Sie 
schon einmal dabei, wenn jemand anders auf humorvolle Weise Mut gezeigt hat?  
 
Fall 3: Sollten Sie eine solche Situation noch nie selbst erlebt haben: Haben Sie sie schon einmal in 
einem Film gesehen (bzw. in einem Buch gelesen, gehört usw.) oder können Sie sich eine solche 
Situation vorstellen, in der auf humorvolle Weise Mut gezeigt wurde? Wie könnte diese Situation 
Ihrer Vorstellung nach ablaufen? 
 
Bitte kennzeichnen Sie, welchen Fall von Situation Sie ausgewählt haben: 
 Fall 1  Fall 2  Fall 3 
Bitte beantworten Sie für diese Situation noch die Frage am Ende der folgenden Seite. 
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Bislang wurde „Humor“ im weiteren Sinne verwendet: Alles, was komisch und zum Lachen ist. 
Nicht immer muss aber Humor etwas mit Lachen zu tun haben.  
Wie würden Sie den Humor charakterisieren, der in der oben beschriebenen Situation vorkam? 
Kreuzen Sie bitte das Zutreffende an. (Mehrfachnennungen möglich.) 
 Humor (im engeren Sinn: Verständnis für die Un-gereimtheiten der Welt aufbringen, Mitgefühl wecken)  
Witz/Geist (Im Sinne von: 
Witz haben) 
 Ironie  Satire 
 Scherz/Spaß  Nonsense/Unsinn 
 Sarkasmus  Zynismus 
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Gerechtigkeit 
Konnten Sie selbst oder jemand anders Gerechtigkeit z.B. durch Einsatz der Stärken Fairness, 
Führungsvermögen oder Teamwork im Alltag zeigen und dabei das Mittel des Humors 
verwenden? 
 
Bitte versuchen Sie sich an eine Situation zu erinnern, in der auf humorvolle Weise Gerechtigkeit 
verwirklicht wurde. Folgende Fragen sollen Ihnen helfen, sich an die Situation zu erinnern/sie sich 
vorzustellen: 
 
• Wo spielte sich die Situation ab? 
• Welche Person(en) waren anwesend? 
• Wie kam es zu dieser Situation?  
• Wie lief sie ab? 
• Wie endete die Situation? 
 
Bitte gehen Sie besonders auf die folgenden Fragen ein:  
 
• Worin bestand das tugendhafte Handeln?  
• Welches humorvolle Verhalten wurde genau gezeigt, das für die Verwirklichung der Tugend 
hilfreich war? (Sagte die aktive Person etwas Humorvolles? Wenn ja, was? Wurde gelacht 
oder gelächelt? Etc.) 
 
Bitte beschreiben Sie diese Situation auf dem freien Platz dieser bzw. der nächsten Seite so genau wie 
möglich. Vermeiden Sie bitte Formulierungen, die „man“ oder „sollte“ enthalten, und versuchen Sie, 
die Situation möglichst konkret zu beschreiben. 
* * * 
Fall 1: Waren Sie selbst schon einmal der/die Agierende in einer Situation, in der auf humorvolle 
Weise Gerechtigkeit gezeigt wurde? Bitte beschreiben Sie diese Situation hier so genau wie 
möglich. 
 
Fall 2: Sollten Sie kein Beispiel wissen, indem Sie selbst die handelnde Person waren: Waren Sie 
schon einmal dabei, wenn jemand anders auf humorvolle Weise Gerechtigkeit gezeigt hat?  
 
Fall 3: Sollten Sie eine solche Situation noch nie selbst erlebt haben: Haben Sie sie schon einmal in 
einem Film gesehen (bzw. in einem Buch gelesen, gehört usw.) oder können Sie sich eine 
solche Situation vorstellen, in der auf humorvolle Weise Gerechtigkeit gezeigt wurde? Wie 
könnte diese Situation Ihrer Vorstellung nach ablaufen? 
 
Bitte kennzeichnen Sie, welchen Fall von Situation Sie ausgewählt haben: 
 Fall 1  Fall 2  Fall 3 
Bitte beantworten Sie für diese Situation noch die Frage am Ende der folgenden Seite. 
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Wie würden Sie den Humor charakterisieren, der in der oben beschriebenen Situation vorkam? 
Kreuzen Sie bitte das Zutreffende an. (Mehrfachnennungen möglich.) 
 Humor (im engeren Sinn: Verständnis für die Un-gereimtheiten der Welt aufbringen, Mitgefühl wecken)  
Witz/Geist (Im Sinne von: 
Witz haben) 
 Ironie  Satire 
 Scherz/Spaß  Nonsense/Unsinn 
 Sarkasmus  Zynismus 
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Humanität 
Konnten Sie selbst oder jemand anders Humanität z.B. durch Einsatz der Stärken 
Freundlichkeit, Bindungsfähigkeit oder Soziale Intelligenz im Alltag zeigen und dabei das Mittel 
des Humors verwenden? 
 
Bitte versuchen Sie sich an eine Situation zu erinnern, in der auf humorvolle Weise Humanität 
verwirklicht wurde. Folgende Fragen sollen Ihnen helfen, sich an die Situation zu erinnern/sie sich 
vorzustellen: 
 
• Wo spielte sich die Situation ab? 
• Welche Person(en) waren anwesend? 
• Wie kam es zu dieser Situation?  
• Wie lief sie ab? 
• Wie endete die Situation? 
 
Bitte gehen Sie besonders auf die folgenden Fragen ein:  
 
• Worin bestand das tugendhafte Handeln?  
• Welches humorvolle Verhalten wurde genau gezeigt, das für die Verwirklichung der Tugend 
hilfreich war? (Sagte die aktive Person etwas Humorvolles? Wenn ja, was? Wurde gelacht 
oder gelächelt? Etc.) 
 
Bitte beschreiben Sie diese Situation auf dem freien Platz dieser bzw. der nächsten Seite so genau wie 
möglich. Vermeiden Sie bitte Formulierungen, die „man“ oder „sollte“ enthalten, und versuchen Sie, 
die Situation möglichst konkret zu beschreiben. 
* * * 
Fall 1: Waren Sie selbst schon einmal der/die Agierende in einer Situation, in der auf humorvolle 
Weise Humanität gezeigt wurde? Bitte beschreiben Sie diese Situation hier so genau wie möglich. 
 
Fall 2: Sollten Sie kein Beispiel wissen, indem Sie selbst die handelnde Person waren: Waren Sie 
schon einmal dabei, wenn jemand anders auf humorvolle Weise Humanität gezeigt hat?  
 
Fall 3: Sollten Sie eine solche Situation noch nie selbst erlebt haben: Haben Sie sie schon einmal in 
einem Film gesehen (bzw. in einem Buch gelesen, gehört usw.) oder können Sie sich eine solche 
Situation vorstellen, in der auf humorvolle Weise Humanität gezeigt wurde? Wie könnte diese 
Situation Ihrer Vorstellung nach ablaufen? 
 
Bitte kennzeichnen Sie, welchen Fall von Situation Sie ausgewählt haben: 
 Fall 1  Fall 2  Fall 3 
Bitte beantworten Sie für diese Situation noch die Frage am Ende der folgenden Seite. 
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Wie würden Sie den Humor charakterisieren, der in der oben beschriebenen Situation vorkam? 
Kreuzen Sie bitte das Zutreffende an. (Mehrfachnennungen möglich.) 
 Humor (im engeren Sinn: Verständnis für die Un-gereimtheiten der Welt aufbringen, Mitgefühl wecken)  
Witz/Geist (Im Sinne von: 
Witz haben) 
 Ironie  Satire 
 Scherz/Spaß  Nonsense/Unsinn 
 Sarkasmus  Zynismus 
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Mäßigung 
Konnten Sie selbst oder jemand anders Mäßigung z.B. durch Einsatz der Stärken 
Vergebungsbereitschaft, Bescheidenheit, Vorsicht oder Selbstregulation im Alltag zeigen und 
dabei das Mittel des Humors verwenden? 
 
Bitte versuchen Sie sich an eine Situation zu erinnern, in der auf humorvolle Weise Mäßigung 
verwirklicht wurde. Folgende Fragen sollen Ihnen helfen, sich an die Situation zu erinnern/sie sich 
vorzustellen: 
 
• Wo spielte sich die Situation ab? 
• Welche Person(en) waren anwesend? 
• Wie kam es zu dieser Situation?  
• Wie lief sie ab? 
• Wie endete die Situation? 
 
Bitte gehen Sie besonders auf die folgenden Fragen ein:  
 
• Worin bestand das tugendhafte Handeln?  
• Welches humorvolle Verhalten wurde genau gezeigt, das für die Verwirklichung der Tugend 
hilfreich war? (Sagte die aktive Person etwas Humorvolles? Wenn ja, was? Wurde gelacht 
oder gelächelt? Etc.) 
 
Bitte beschreiben Sie diese Situation auf dem freien Platz dieser bzw. der nächsten Seite so genau wie 
möglich. Vermeiden Sie bitte Formulierungen, die „man“ oder „sollte“ enthalten, und versuchen Sie, 
die Situation möglichst konkret zu beschreiben. 
* * * 
Fall 1: Waren Sie selbst schon einmal der/die Agierende in einer Situation, in der auf humorvolle 
Weise Mäßigung gezeigt wurde? Bitte beschreiben Sie diese Situation hier so genau wie möglich. 
 
Fall 2: Sollten Sie kein Beispiel wissen, indem Sie selbst die handelnde Person waren: Waren Sie 
schon einmal dabei, wenn jemand anders auf humorvolle Weise Mäßigung gezeigt hat?  
 
Fall 3: Sollten Sie eine solche Situation noch nie selbst erlebt haben: Haben Sie sie schon einmal in 
einem Film gesehen (bzw. in einem Buch gelesen, gehört usw.) oder können Sie sich eine solche 
Situation vorstellen, in der auf humorvolle Weise Mäßigung gezeigt wurde? Wie könnte diese 
Situation Ihrer Vorstellung nach ablaufen? 
 
Bitte kennzeichnen Sie, welchen Fall von Situation Sie ausgewählt haben: 
 Fall 1  Fall 2  Fall 3 
Bitte beantworten Sie für diese Situation noch die Frage am Ende der folgenden Seite. 
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Wie würden Sie den Humor charakterisieren, der in der oben beschriebenen Situation vorkam? 
Kreuzen Sie bitte das Zutreffende an. (Mehrfachnennungen möglich.) 
 Humor (im engeren Sinn: Verständnis für die Un-gereimtheiten der Welt aufbringen, Mitgefühl wecken)  
Witz/Geist (Im Sinne von: 
Witz haben) 
 Ironie  Satire 
 Scherz/Spaß  Nonsense/Unsinn 
 Sarkasmus  Zynismus 
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Transzendenz 
Konnten Sie selbst oder jemand anders Transzendenz z.B. durch Einsatz der Stärken Sinn für 
das Schöne, Dankbarkeit, Hoffnung oder Spiritualität im Alltag zeigen und dabei das Mittel des 
Humors verwenden? 
 
Bitte versuchen Sie sich an eine Situation zu erinnern, in der auf humorvolle Weise Transzendenz 
verwirklicht wurde. Folgende Fragen sollen Ihnen helfen, sich an die Situation zu erinnern/sie sich 
vorzustellen: 
 
• Wo spielte sich die Situation ab? 
• Welche Person(en) waren anwesend? 
• Wie kam es zu dieser Situation?  
• Wie lief sie ab? 
• Wie endete die Situation? 
 
Bitte gehen Sie besonders auf die folgenden Fragen ein:  
 
• Worin bestand das tugendhafte Handeln?  
• Welches humorvolle Verhalten wurde genau gezeigt, das für die Verwirklichung der Tugend 
hilfreich war? (Sagte die aktive Person etwas Humorvolles? Wenn ja, was? Wurde gelacht 
oder gelächelt? Etc.) 
 
Bitte beschreiben Sie diese Situation auf dem freien Platz dieser bzw. der nächsten Seite so genau wie 
möglich. Vermeiden Sie bitte Formulierungen, die „man“ oder „sollte“ enthalten, und versuchen Sie, 
die Situation möglichst konkret zu beschreiben. 
* * * 
Fall 1: Waren Sie selbst schon einmal der/die Agierende in einer Situation, in der auf humorvolle 
Weise Transzendenz gezeigt wurde? Bitte beschreiben Sie diese Situation hier so genau wie 
möglich. 
 
Fall 2: Sollten Sie kein Beispiel wissen, indem Sie selbst die handelnde Person waren: Waren Sie 
schon einmal dabei, wenn jemand anders auf humorvolle Weise Transzendenz gezeigt hat?  
 
Fall 3: Sollten Sie eine solche Situation noch nie selbst erlebt haben: Haben Sie sie schon einmal in 
einem Film gesehen (bzw. in einem Buch gelesen, gehört usw.) oder können Sie sich eine solche 
Situation vorstellen, in der auf humorvolle Weise Transzendenz gezeigt wurde? Wie könnte diese 
Situation Ihrer Vorstellung nach ablaufen? 
 
Bitte kennzeichnen Sie, welchen Fall von Situation Sie ausgewählt haben: 
 Fall 1  Fall 2  Fall 3 
Bitte beantworten Sie für diese Situation noch die Frage am Ende der folgenden Seite. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX – PART II 
191 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wie würden Sie den Humor charakterisieren, der in der oben beschriebenen Situation vorkam? 
Kreuzen Sie bitte das Zutreffende an. (Mehrfachnennungen möglich.) 
 Humor (im engeren Sinn: Verständnis für die Un-gereimtheiten der Welt aufbringen, Mitgefühl wecken)  
Witz/Geist (Im Sinne von: 
Witz haben) 
 Ironie  Satire 
 Scherz/Spaß  Nonsense/Unsinn 
 Sarkasmus  Zynismus 
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Weisheit 
Konnten Sie selbst oder jemand anders Weisheit z.B. durch Einsatz der Stärken Kreativität, 
Neugier, Urteilsvermögen, Liebe zum Lernen oder Weitsicht/Durchblick im Alltag zeigen und 
dabei das Mittel des Humors verwenden? 
 
Bitte versuchen Sie sich an eine Situation zu erinnern, in der auf humorvolle Weise Weisheit 
verwirklicht wurde. Folgende Fragen sollen Ihnen helfen, sich an die Situation zu erinnern/sie sich 
vorzustellen: 
 
• Wo spielte sich die Situation ab? 
• Welche Person(en) waren anwesend? 
• Wie kam es zu dieser Situation?  
• Wie lief sie ab? 
• Wie endete die Situation? 
 
Bitte gehen Sie besonders auf die folgenden Fragen ein:  
 
• Worin bestand das tugendhafte Handeln?  
• Welches humorvolle Verhalten wurde genau gezeigt, das für die Verwirklichung der Tugend 
hilfreich war? (Sagte die aktive Person etwas Humorvolles? Wenn ja, was? Wurde gelacht 
oder gelächelt? Etc.) 
 
Bitte beschreiben Sie diese Situation auf dem freien Platz dieser bzw. der nächsten Seite so genau wie 
möglich. Vermeiden Sie bitte Formulierungen, die „man“ oder „sollte“ enthalten, und versuchen Sie, 
die Situation möglichst konkret zu beschreiben. 
 
* * * 
Fall 1: Waren Sie selbst schon einmal der/die Agierende in einer Situation, in der auf humorvolle 
Weise Weisheit gezeigt wurde? Bitte beschreiben Sie diese Situation hier so genau wie möglich. 
 
Fall 2: Sollten Sie kein Beispiel wissen, indem Sie selbst die handelnde Person waren: Waren Sie 
schon einmal dabei, wenn jemand anders auf humorvolle Weise Weisheit gezeigt hat?  
 
Fall 3: Sollten Sie eine solche Situation noch nie selbst erlebt haben: Haben Sie sie schon einmal in 
einem Film gesehen (bzw. in einem Buch gelesen, gehört usw.) oder können Sie sich eine solche 
Situation vorstellen, in der auf humorvolle Weise Weisheit gezeigt wurde? Wie könnte diese 
Situation Ihrer Vorstellung nach ablaufen? 
 
Bitte kennzeichnen Sie, welchen Fall von Situation Sie ausgewählt haben: 
 Fall 1  Fall 2  Fall 3 
Bitte beantworten Sie für diese Situation noch die Frage am Ende der folgenden Seite. 
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Wie würden Sie den Humor charakterisieren, der in der oben beschriebenen Situation vorkam? 
Kreuzen Sie bitte das Zutreffende an. (Mehrfachnennungen möglich.) 
 Humor (im engeren Sinn: Verständnis für die Un-gereimtheiten der Welt aufbringen, Mitgefühl wecken)  
Witz/Geist (Im Sinne von: 
Witz haben) 
 Ironie  Satire 
 Scherz/Spaß  Nonsense/Unsinn 
 Sarkasmus  Zynismus 
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*  *  *  Ende des Fragebogens  *  *  * 
 
Bitte kontrollieren Sie noch einmal, ob Sie nichts unabsichtlich ausgelassen haben. 
 
 
 
 
Ich werde eventuell Nachfragen zu den einzelnen Sitationen haben. Darf ich Sie in diesem Fall 
kontaktieren? Falls ja, würde ich Sie bitten, hier die Kontaktmöglichkeit, die Sie bevorzugen, 
hinzuschreiben (E-mail-Adresse oder Telefonnummer...). Die Kontaktangaben werden nach 
Beseitigung aller ggf. aufgetretenen Unklarheiten von den Daten getrennt. Vielen herzlichen Dank. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sollten Sie jemanden kennen, den eine Teilnahme an meiner Untersuchung interessiert, wäre ich Ihnen 
dankbar, wenn Sie ebenfalls hier Kontaktangaben der betreffenden Person angeben könnten. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nochmals vielen herzlichen Dank für die Teilnahme! 
 
 
 
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Part III 
Distorted Portraits 
The distorted portraits in the Distorted Portrait Judgment Task exist in two parallel versions. 
Version B is a mirrored version of Version A with exception of the first three images. The 
first three images were alternated in Version B; however, the first image was always one of 
Distorted Portraits of Oneself. Only Version A is displayed here. Note that in the illustration 
displayed here, the Distorted Portraits of Oneself don’t show an actual participant but 
distorted portraits of the author of this thesis as representative examples. Table A1 presents an 
overview of the Distorted Portraits.  
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Table A1. 
Overview over the distorted portraits. 
Image number Distorted Portraits Set 
1 Distorted Portraits of Oneself 
2 Distorted Portraits of Woman 
3 Distorted Portraits of Man 
4 Distorted Portraits of Woman 
5 Distorted Portraits of Oneself 
6 Distorted Portraits of Man 
7 Distorted Portraits of Woman 
8 Distorted Portraits of Man 
9 Distorted Portraits of Oneself 
10 Distorted Portraits of Man 
11 Distorted Portraits of Oneself 
12 Distorted Portraits of Woman 
13 Distorted Portraits of Oneself 
14 Distorted Portraits of Man 
15 Distorted Portraits of Woman 
16 Distorted Portraits of Woman 
17 Distorted Portraits of Oneself 
18 Distorted Portraits of Man 
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Instructions and Stimuli. 
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Answer sheet.  
Note that for all stimuli, the answer format looked the same. Only the first page of the answer 
sheet is displayed here as an example. 
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Bitte verwenden Sie diese Blätter, um die am Computer dargestellten Fotos zu 
bewerten. Notieren Sie, wie witzig Sie die Fotos finden und wie sehr Sie die 
Fotos ablehnen. Bitte beachten Sie, dass es bei „Ablehnung“ und „Witzigkeit“ 
um die Art des Fotos und nicht um die abgebildete Person handelt. 
 
 
 
Wichtig: Da der Fragebogen via Scanner eingelesen wird, sind wir darauf angewiesen, dass 
die entsprechenden Markierungen nur innerhalb der Kreise und mit schwarzer Farbe 
eingetragen werden. Ansonsten wird das Einlesen der Daten via Scanner mit Problemen 
verbunden sein. Herzlichen Dank für Ihr Verständnis! 
 
so markieren: ●       nicht so markieren:       
 
 
1 
nicht witzig          sehr witzig 
           
keine Ablehnung          starke Ablehnung 
 
2 
nicht witzig          sehr witzig 
           
keine Ablehnung          starke Ablehnung 
 
3 
nicht witzig          sehr witzig 
           
keine Ablehnung          starke Ablehnung 
 
4 
nicht witzig          sehr witzig 
           
keine Ablehnung          starke Ablehnung 
 
5 
nicht witzig          sehr witzig 
           
keine Ablehnung          starke Ablehnung 
 
6 
nicht witzig          sehr witzig 
           
keine Ablehnung          starke Ablehnung 
 
 
